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CONTROLLING THE POLICE: LOCAL AUTONOMY DST POLICY AND PRACTICE 
This thesis assesses the influence of The Home Office, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Constabulaiy, the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Audit Commission, the Local 
Police Authority, and the Chief Constable on local policy makers and impleinenters within 
the Devon & Cornwall Constabiilary. It is based on five policy areas: the structmre of the 
organisation. The Citizens' Charter, Annual Policing (now Performance) Plans, Domestic 
Violence Policy, and Equal Opportunities Policy. 
Unlike previous research, it brings together the issues of policy and practice at all levels of 
the organisation through interviews with senior managers in the Devon & Cornwall 
Constabulary and members of the Local Police Authority, and questionnaires to front line 
police officers; as well as analysis of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary reports 
and Police Authority Policing Plans, and recomniendations made in Home Office Circulars 
and Audit Commission reports. 
The research was carried out prior to the infroduction of Crime and Disorder Partnerships 
and Crime Audits, required by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
Both policy makers and policy implementers believed that there was a sfrong influence 
from all the key players in the policy areas examined, with the exception of the 

Association.of Chief Police Officers arid the Local Police Authority: There is-no'^yidence; 
to suggest that there has been any change in the power relationship between the Chief 
Constable and the Police Authority. 
For police officers directly iiivolved in the implementation process. The Citizens' Charter 
and Annual Policing (now Performance) Plans had made little differerice to the way they 
carried out their day-to-day work. In these more generic policy areas they saw less 
influence from the key players but perceived greater influence coming from consumers, 
public opinion, colleagues and immediate supervisors. In the tighter policy area of 
domestic violence, where there is greater top down confrol, the mfluence of the key 
players was the sfrongest, and local autonomy, both in policy and practice was hard to find. 
The police organisatiori retains many of the attiibutes of a classical bureaucracy and an 
ideal form of organisational stincture has yet to be found. 
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
The extent to which local police policy and practice can be influenced by those who are 
recipients of that service, directly or indirectly, and by governmental or quasi-
governmental organisations, has increased dramatically over the last ten years. 
Historically, police accoimtability and control has been the subject of much debate, both 
in terms of the tripartite relationship between Chief Constables, their Police Authorities 
and the Home Office (Baldwin & Kinsey 1982, Lustgarten 1986, Morgan & Smith 1989) 
and with the commimities they police (Scarman 1981, Shapland & Vagg 1988). 
More recently the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 (now mcorporated into the 
Police Act 1996) has resulted in greater involvement of Police Authorities and the public 
in the production of Annual Policing Plans (Morgan & Newbum 1997) leading to 
suggestions that this would bring about changes in the relationships between Chief 
Constables, the re-formatted leaner Police Authorities and the Home Office (Loveday 
1994 [a]. Savage 1998). 
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (which came into effect after the implementation of 
much of this research) places a responsibility on local authorities, and other agencies, 
together with the police, to publish joint local crime reduction strategies (Woods 1998), 
even though similar joint initiatives, for example the Safer Cities Programme and the 
Single Regeneration Budget, were problematic (Pawson & Tilley 1997). 
Control over the police remains an important issiie in a liberal deinocracy raising 
questions of authority, legitimacy and their relationship to other agencies of the State 
(Jones 1995). Particularly today, where there is a perceived decline of the sovereign state 
through subsidiarily, decentralism and localism (Hirst 1994: 28) and the effects of 
globalisation on life, family and society (Giddens 1999). At the same time the police, 
like other agencies in the criminal justice system, are no longer given the mandate, the 
money or the freedom to carry out their tasks, but are 'subject to detailed national 
standards set by Cenfral Government and are closely monitored and inspected to ensure 
that practice and resource-use compHes with those instructions.' (Garland 1996:459). 
For the police this pressure has been from a number of sources: 
• Home Office consfraints to ensure effectiveness and efficiency (for example Home 
Office Circular 114/83). 
• The implementation of perfonnance indicators under the Citizen's Charter (1991: 
Cmd 1599). 
• Annual Policing Plans, their associated Ministerial Priorities and performance 
indicators overseen by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabdaiy. 
Since the infroduction of these Cenfral Government initiatives there has been increasing 
concern about the consequences of over reliance upon perfonnance indicators to measure 
the quaUty of policmg (Police Review 24/12/99, Oliver 2000, Police Review 10/03/00). 
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Although the issue of local control, democracy, citizenship and policy making have been 
touched upon (Gill & Thrasher 1985, Jones et al 1994, Waddington 1999 [a] ) the policy 
making processes and the constitutional influences placed upon poHce managers and 
practitioners have received little attention, particularly at the 'sharp end' (Jones 1995: 2). 
The object of the research is to obtain the views of local police managers from all levels 
of the Devon & Cornwall Constabulary, to assess the influence of key players iii the 
policy process, supported by the examination of policy related documents published by 
bodies such as The Home Office and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, and to 
discover how these influences affect the day to day work of front Ime pohce officers. 
This will involve linking the two fraditions of research into police policy: 
• One in terms of a governing relationship between the poUce and legal and political 
institutions through constitutional and sociological stand-points. 
• One in terms of the day by day work that the police actually do. 
A link between these fraditions which have been of little concern to previous researchers 
(Jones etal 1996: 3-4). 
As a retired police officer, now an academic researcher, I have become an 'outside 
insider' (Sheptycki 1994), but also as an 'ex-policeman' I am still considered to be a part 
of their extended police family. Consequently I am not presented with any of the 
problems of conflict between the role of police officer and researcher (Yoimg 1991). 
However the ever present labelling processes within police culture; the sense of 'them 
and us'(Reiner 1978) 
X V 
may well have labelled me, firstly as a researcher and secondly as a 'challengei-' 
(Holdaway 1983: 71- 77), because research is a form of accountability (Morgan 1989). 
The first part of the thesis will outline the background to the issues of police autonomy, 
accoimtability and control, and discuss the relationships between the key players in the 
policy process. It will then discuss the research methods employed and issues 
surrounding their use. 
The second part of the thesis will consider five poUcy areas in order to examine the 
various influences over local policy and practice. Each chapter will start with the 
background of a policy area, from previously published research and other academic 
sources, because the importance of good literature reviews must not be overlooked, in 
that it allows the researcher to argue with the available theory, and it is also ' a kind of 
qualitative analysis, not merely a collection of ideas' (McCracken 1988: 31). 
The first chapter in part two will take up the concerns of the organisational structure of 
the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary. This is an important issue. Firstly because 
organisations represent a means of bringing people from disparate backgroimds and 
opinions together to achieve specified goals and in doing so produces a distinctive culture 
v^th its own set of rules and common values. Secondly because there have been demands 
for organisational 'delayering'; 'downsizing'; and 'networking' (Franklin 1998: 20), 
the latter more easily accommodated by the infroduction of global information 
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technology (Morgan 2000: 64). The second chapter in part two describes the policy and 
implementation processes within this organisational structure. 
The Citizen's Charter is included because it was one of the first policy mitiatives from 
central government which brought performance indicators into the pohce service in any 
meaningfiil or major way and it remains a current pohcy docimient.. 
Annual Policing Plans are included because they sought to consolidate the issue of 
performance indictors within the pohce service, as well as providing the opportunity for 
public opinion, the views of the local Police Authority, and Central Goverrmient to affect 
local poUce policy making. 
Domestic Violence and Equal Opportunities policies, represent policy areas which are 
never far from both public and academic enquiry; and it is here that the range of influence 
upon police policy and practice is most dramatically illusfrated. 
A resume of the research is given at the end each chapter, and the overall conclusions and 
implications are brought together in a concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
POLICE A3S1D CITIZENS - AUTONOMY. ACCOUNTABILITY. AND CONTROL 
What the poKce do and how they do it is particularly unportant; their role being 'morally 
ambiguous' (Waddington 1997:114), and their profile as being a central public service in a 
modem state (Jones et al 1994): affecting the lives everyone, they are influential in 
modem social life, standing up for the traditions of community and the nation state 
(Ericson & Haggerty 1998:3). However their affect is most noticeable in communities 
where there is a perceived need for trast, for shared values of morality (Fukuyama 1996), 
particularly where this trast has been broken by risky behaviour that damages a 
community's belief in truth or trast (Misztal 1996). 
Policing has been considered in three historical periods. The first prior to the development 
of the modem state where members of a community were required to police anti-social 
behaviour individually. The second followed the emergence of the modem state where the 
police took over responsibility for order and crime control, but this was done within the 
scope of commumty values when deciding the type of behaviour which was considered 
appropriate for formal action. Thirdly, the modem period marked by the loosening of 
cormnimity ties, the expansion of citizenship, extended civil and political rights, and 
increased affluence obtained through the welfare state, making policing a more difficult 
task (Clarke 1987: 388). 
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More recently we can add a fourth period to include private policing (Johnston 1992, Sarre 
& Prenzler 1999, HilHard 2000), a move towards the policing of specific places and 
functions (Johnston 1992, Giddens 1994:38, Jones & Newbum 1998), and the provision of 
security through surveillance technologies designed to identify, predict and manage risks 
with the dissemination of this information to other agencies and organisations concemed 
in the management of risk (Ericson & Haggerty 1998), resulting a perceived dichotomy 
between police and policing. The former being the institutions which primarily carry out a 
policing function and the latter the social processes uivolved in that function (Reiner 
2000), such as active citizenship (involvement in re-active policing, by reporting crime) 
and pro-active policing (taking an active part in various community policing initiatives) 
(Bennett 1998); despite the criticism that such an approach is only effective in areas 
where there is solid public support for the police (Amot 2000). 
The degree of interest shown in policing policy varies widely. From those who are direct 
recipients of police services, either as victims or offenders, to those whose quality of life is 
affected by what the police do, without the need to make direct contact with them, 
emphasised by world-wide research which suggests that peace keeping is the primary 
policing function (Morgan & Newbum 1997: 82). 
Defining police work 
The role of Peel's 'New Police' was initially seen by its advocates as being that of 
preventing crime. However this was gradually extended to include that which Parliament 
wished to be regulated, controlled or licensed (Waddington 1993: 3), although its early 
structure and training methods suggest, that its primary purpose was to provide a force to 
police public disorder (Loveday 1994[a]: 1). 
Seminal research into the work of the police in the United Kingdom by Banton (1964) 
which set the agenda for future debate (Jones & Newbum 1998: 10), suggested a crime 
detection rather than prevention role and the concept of a dual crime detection and social 
welfare role. By examining the balance of welfare and crime roles of the police in Britain 
he concluded that it was an amalgam of both roles: a peace officer rather than a law 
officer. 
At a similar time in the United States of America, Wilson (1966), proposed three 
orgamsational styles of policing: 
1. Watchman Style - general order maintenance. 
2. Legalistic Style - detection of crime and law enforcement. 
3. Service Style - providing a service to the public as customers and 
maintaining order in a welfare context. 
More recently. Fielding (1996) defined three ideal models of policing: 
1. The enforcement model - crime control. 
2. The service model - consultation and maintaining public order. 
3. The community model - consultation and active citizenship. 
During the mid 1970's it was iDecoming more acceptable that policing should assume an 
aspect of social service provision, even if, initially, this may have been as a consequence of 
it being the only organisation available to deal with such problems twenty four hours a day 
(Reiner 1992: 97). Pressure from the pohce themselves, notably in Devon and Cornwall 
(Alderson 1979: Moore and Brown 1981) extended this social service angle by bringing 
the police more actively into the fr)rmulation of social policy, local planning; and other 
areas which they considered to be part of the crime prevention process. This happened, in 
spite of the fact that there remained vwthin the culture of ground level police officers, a 
feeling that a social service role was not what they considered to be 'real police work'; 
which they perceived to be 'fighting criine' and 'enforcing the law' (Manning 1977. 
Ericson 1982. Reiner 1992 ). Indeed Reiner (1978) found that only one in twenty officers 
saw then work as being predominantly a social service rather than that of fighting crime, 
despite the later claim that the police undertook the role of 'social workers' and were seen 
as 'the secret social service' (Punch 1979) with their function being that of care and 
confrol (Stephens & Becker 1994). 
Apart from grouping policing into activities such as pafroUing or criminal investigation, 
where 'public franquillity' and consent are necessary before they can be carried out, as 
suggested by Bayley (1994: 13 -35), describing the police role in a sound bite (Marshall 
1965) is much more difficult. With attempts ranging from it being: 
• To fight and prevent crime; uphold the law; bring to justice those who break the law; 
protect, help and reassure the community (Home Office 1993, para 1.7). 
• If the nature of a crisis is unclear the police are summoned as a default option (Audit 
Commission 1990). 
• hke trying to hit a moving target (Shapland & Vagg 1988: 8). 
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Public influence on police work ' . . • • 
Commenting on the issue of local interest in policing. Sir Robert Mark then Commissioner 
of the Metropolitan Police, wrote that he thought it unlikely that: 
...one in a thousand Englishmen could give even a vague outline of our [the police] 
organisation, accountability or method of control (1977:20). 
A situation which may well prevail today, because, unless there is a. major crisis in 
policing, those who are not direct recipients show little interest in having any affect over 
policing provision, except in cases where the abuse of power and authority have come to 
notice, and only then in an ad hoc fashion (McKenzie & Gallagher 1989:60). 
The fact remains however that local policing responsive to local conditions is vital 
(Morgan and Newbum 1997: 149), despite the argument that the policing policy agenda 
should be confined to the minimum requirements of public opinion (Kinsey et al 1986). 
The changing face of policing in England and Wales illustrates the importance of 
considering the issues of local autonomy and control over policing policy, particularly 
the avenues available to affect policy issues, the groups and individuals who can use theni 
and how effective their influences may be in deciding what the pohce do and how they do 
it-
We need only to look back to the 1960's and the work of Maureen Cain (1973)= whose 
research was considered to be definitive in the field of day to day policing at this time, 
where she found that the commimity being policed defined the role of the police (p239). 
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Later research by Shapland & Vagg (1988: 150) suggested that it was still possible for 
communities to direct what they see as the "right kind" of police attention to local issues 
by various methods, including the manipulation of information given to the police in order 
to direct police action towards a particular problem, one that might not otherwise have 
been policed. 
It is not possible to infer public priorities from the demands which are made upon the 
police ( Hough 1989: 48), for example studies in respect of these demands have suggested 
that crime related issues have been in the minority (Punch & Naylor 1973, Comrie & 
King 1975, Hough 1980, Ekblom & Heale 1982, Morgan 1990, Waddington 1993, Audit 
Commission 1993), although Shapland & Hobbs (1989) suggested that calls in respect of 
crime related demands had increased. 
Research into police work published m the Operational Policing Review (1990), a joint 
venture by the Police Federation, The Police Superintendents Association and the 
Association of Police Officers showed that public opinion of policing tasks ranged from 
crime prevention and attending emergencies, to school liaison and knowing local people. 
It also illusfrated a vwde divergence of policing priorities between the public and the 
police. The public preferrmg a service style approach with the police preferring a 
legahstic approach. Research also suggests that fighting crune is not the only service the 
public require (Redshaw & Sanders 1995) and that to be able to carry out a crime confrol 
fimction the police also need to be involved in many other activities (Redshaw, Mawby & 
Bunt 1997). 
Although Cam (op cit) saw local community power to be important, she was one of the 
first to suggest that community power was decreasing and that central power and the 
power of the professional police officer, to decide the police role, was increasing (p246). 
She suggested that this was due in part to a single national policing model, increased 
conununity mobility, a decline in commimity power, and the police having no experience 
of any other policing methods. 
It was now becoming more acceptable for senior police officers to make it clear that, as 
professionals in the field of policing, they should be responsible for deciding what the 
police do. This had the knock on affect of raising the political profile of the police during 
the late 1970's and 1980's particularly in respect of public statements made by Chief 
Constables, such as those by John Anderton (for example in The Times 18 March 1982) 
and a greater political involvement by the Police Federation during this period, leading to 
the suggestion that the police themselves at all levels were determined to set down the 
terms upon which both law and order and social policy would be debated (Thompson 
1980). 
The three perspectives of conservative; liberal; and radical (Benyon & Solomon 1987) 
provided a whole raft of causes for the inner city riots of the 1980's, the resultant Scarman 
Report (1981) argued for consent and balance in policing and indicated that the role of the 
police was one of the maintenance of public tranquillity over law enforcement (ibid: para 
4.57). Going against the poHcy of the police know best pohcy stance, his report went on 
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to note that the police were becoming a corps elite set apart from the rest of society (ibid: 
para 5.3) and concluded that a police force which does not consult locally will fail to be 
efficient (ibid: para 5.62). 
Consequently the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984, together with a model 
structure set out in Home Office Circular 54/82, implemented the infroduction of public 
consultative groups to provide a vehicle for community involvement in respect of policing 
policy; having as its prerequisite equal partnership and the congruence of community and 
police priorities, with the exchange of information between both groups (Morgan & 
Maggs 1985: 8). They were fairly successfiil in obtaming the view of, and educating 
groups within, communities who were favourable to the police but did little to heal rifts 
between the police and commimities who were hostile towards them (Morgan 1989). 
Indeed research at the time identified more problems than successes vwith statutory 
consultative processes (Haffield 1997: 272). To the extent that Lea & Young (1984) 
suggested that the emphasis should be on the community consulting the police so they may 
formulate then needs, rather than the police consulting the conununity to formulate their 
policies and sfrategies. Consultative groups were perceived to be in a no-win situation by 
all groups having an interest ui them. 
As far as neighbourhoods are concemed they operate in the sfratosphere. As far as 
professionals are concemed they are amateur. As far as politicians are concemed they 
are not representative or accountable. (Morgan 1987: 42) 
As Kleinig argues, many of these problems are caused by the social distance between the 
police and the communities in which they work and adds: 
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In an ideal world the police would know and render the service expected of them. But 
then, in an ideal world police would probably not be necessary. Kleinig (1996:17) 
Police work and the concept of citizenship, democracy, and the state. 
Although citizenship has its roots in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and the 
sociology of Weber, Durkheim and Tonnies, it was not until the work of T. H. Marshall 
that it became a theme of modem social theory (Roche 1992, Bottomore 1992). 
Marshall considered citizenship in three areas: the civil; the political; and the social. 
• The civil comprised of the rights required for a person's individual freedom, freedom 
of speech and thought, to own property and the right to justice through the due process 
of law. 
• The political being the exercise of political power as a member of a political body such 
as parliament or local authorities and the election of its members. 
• The social is the right to economic welfare and the right to take part m society 
accordmg to the standards prevalent in that society (Marshall 1964:71-72). 
In his discussion of the development of citizenship in the area of civil rights and the right 
to justice and in his survey of social services, he underlines the fact that the state 
guarantees a miiumimi supply of certain essential goods and services (quoted in Marshall 
& Bottimore 1992: 32). However the fact remains that social welfare mvariably mvolves 
regulation either of the conditions of access to the relevant goods and services, or of the 
recipients of those goods and services (Hindess 1993). As Lenaghan argues in respect of 
social rights through the National Health Service: 
Some claim that the gap between demand and supply will grow ever wider, (ibid, 1998: 
280) 
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The rationing of civil and political rights, through the access to policing services, is a 
problematical one: 
There must be a right to the protection of civil and political rights but there cannot be a 
right to the services of a policeman, as these are subject to the same problems of 
scarcity as doctors and teachers. If there is a right to 'enforceable civil and political 
rights' then this is a positive right to resources. (Plant 1998: 64) 
However the work of Marshall has been crucial in the development of citizenship in terms 
of social and economic rights (Plant 1992) reconciling political democracy and capitalism 
through the welfare state (Turner 1993: 6), and provoking considerable sociological 
discussion about the effects of capitahsm in the liberal democratic state (Oldfield 1990), 
with citizenship seen as being concemed with social relationships between people, and 
between people and organisations or institutions ui complex industrialised societies: 
Thus exploring citizenship requires an examination of both people and the institutions 
they have created. (Twine 1994: 9). 
The state can be defined in two ways: 
• Organisationally: as a set of institutions with identifiable public and private spheres, 
the sovereign state or supreme power has the ultimate authority for all law, a 
sovereignty applicable to everyone including members of state institutions, with its 
staff recruite4 and its power to tax. 
• Functionally: as a set of institutions which carry out particular objectives, including 
organisations whose functions overlap state functions; and through the consequences of 
its actions such as keeping social order. (Dunleary & O'Leary 1987: 4). 
The state as described by Weber (1964:156) comprises the institutions which claim the 
monopoly of legitimate force and it is this sovereignty which makes the state the stiucture 
10 
that exercises absolute power and .authority in society and the acceptiance of.suph 
sovereignty defines the character of citizensMp (Camilleri & Falk 1992: 4). This is 
particularly relevant to the police, who are seen as the custodians of state authority, a 
power which could, depending upon its use, be capable of damagmg civil liberties 
(Waddington 1999 [a]). The police role, to maintain a stable society by exercising the law, 
and keeping order and peace, were one of the first responsibilities of the state' (Ham.& 
Hill 1987:24), but at the same time policuig: 
...lies at the hub of the conundrum that has occupied political philosophers for 
centuries - the role of the state as both guarantor of and most powerfiil threat to 
democracy. (Waddington 1999 [a]: 21). 
The concept of the state is a controversial one: 
True, an anarchist would like the state abolished. A Marxist wants the state to 
disappear. A liberal would have its powers restricted, while a conservative extols 
its sovereign acts of force. (HofiBnan 1988:14). 
The relationship between citizenship and the state is often seen in terms of democracy, 
defined in the British context by Birch (1993: 56) who suggests it can be seen as a 
parliamentary government holding free competitive elections with a wide franchise or, first 
and foremost a political system (Bottomore 1985: 16) where powerful positions in society 
are open for anyone to contest, v^th power-holders accoimtable to the electorate, together 
with the associated problems of political elites (Bottomore ibid) and class (Miliband 
1983), a system of political power through social or other groups (Nordlinger 1981), or 
something which is unattainable (Michels 1958). 
. However, Ranson (1986) suggests that citizens are active members both of the 
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community and of the poUty, even if community is a difficult sociological concept to 
describe (Bell &Newby 1971: 31, Walklate & Evans 1999). 
Democracy is an essential ingredient of active citizenship, and it is at the macro level of 
the national polity where there is wider inclusion of individual views iipon debates 
regarding social service provision. However this national polity only permits, the electorate 
to express their views occasionally and then m only the most general terms (Ranson & 
Stewart 1989:12). But citizens do try to contribute towards and influence public choices, 
by publicly giving then views of collective needs and general public purpose (ibid: 11), 
through the civil rights of citizenship. They publicly express their concerns, even if it is 
only a political elite that can operationalise those concerns (Twme 1994: 174) whilst 
accepting, at the same time, that perceptions of risky and deviant behaviour mil vary 
widely between different communities (Foster 1995) according to their character 
(Donnison 1998). 
Democracy is also an issue of values, ideals as well as ideas, and the emphasis given to 
them (Jones et al 1994: 43): the character of which will depend upon whether it is 
implemented from above, by the state, or below, for. example by the labour movement 
(Tumer,1990). 
After 1979, Thatcherist doctrine attempted to redefine the relationship between the state 
and society, leading to critiques of the role of the police and then enforcement of 
government policies (Brewer et al 1988). In the market approach of New Right doctrme 
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(Hayek 1960. Freidman 1962) emphasis was placed on individual responsibility 
(Faulkner1994); where the welfare state was seen to inhibit individual freedom (Williiams 
1992) and budgets and outputs of public bureaucratic monopoly providers were seen to be 
twice that of private sector suppliers (Niskanen 1971, Tullock 1979). The police were 
porfrayed as a classic example of all that was wrong in service provision through a 
bureaucratic monopoly (Evans 1991:12). 
With the demise of Thatcherism, and under the auspices of Majorism, Conservative 
policies looked more towards the participation of citizens in the policy making forum. The 
problem here is the difference between consultation and negotiation. The former can be 
used in micro or macro decision making which at its worst can be a manipulative process 
or at its best promoting more open and shared decision making (Coote 1998: 192). The 
concept of active participation in the policy making process continued imder a Labour 
Government with the infroduction of Citizens' Juries for example, which were supported 
by local authorities and local government (Coote 1998), despite the criticism that there is a 
danger of resource and service allocation being de5ided by twelve members of such a jury 
(The Guardian 2:20/01/99: 9). 
Building on the participation model Johnson (1992: 97) puts forward the issue of 'citizen 
participation or active citizenship' in policing crime and public disorder, either 
responsibly, through the special constabulary, and such- schemes as neighbourhood watch, 
or the exfremes of vigilantism. The dilemma bemg to distinguish between criminal 
activity and community action. 
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This participative approach to policing has been encouraged since the 1980's through 
Neighbourhood Watch (Bennett 1990, Gilling 1997, Crawford 1998) and more recently by 
influencing police poUcy making, suggested by the government White Paper on police 
reform (1993) and extended by the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994, allowing an 
avenue for public mput in deciding local policing priorities, within the parameters of the 
Home Secretary's Ministerial Priorities. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 further 
extended police public consultation, with local crime audits and statutory inter-agency 
consultation. However these policies have been criticised in respect of under-funding and 
similar resource issues (Grundy 1999) and that they remove police governance from the 
political arena to that of administration, or governance without politics (Johnston 2000: 
78). 
Taking the view that policing in the United Kingdom is imdertaken by public consent 
(Alderson 1979), and that the accepted politics directing police policy and practice have 
been 'decided through the ballot box' (Dale 1994), any attempt by the police to take up an 
independent political line would reduce public consent and consequently reduce their 
effectiveness. As Kettle (1980: 9) points out, any thoughts about policing and politics not 
mixing is an illusion, both in terms of overall policy issues, administrative decisions and 
decisions made by individual officers during their daily contact with the public. 
Holdaway's (1979: 3) contention that contirol over the role of the police is the question 
which affects our 'constitutional foundation', remains as strong as ever. 
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Police work and Central Government - . . . • 
During the last twenty years, attempts at engineering the role of the police by central 
government has taken place through three general routes: consumerism, partnership, and 
the identification of core and ancillary policing duties. 
The emphasis upon citizens as consmners (Saunders 1990), where consumerism has been 
the 'keynote' for public service reform, even if the police service has used the concept to 
avoid more political means of accountability (Reiner 1992: 266), has brought about a 
change from a consumer with a need, to an economic actor. Turning a consumers' 
requirement of quality into a constitutional right, altering the relationship between the 
citizen and the state, making it a confractual one, removing the social aspect from the 
concept of citizenship (Barron & Scott 1992). Whilst a confractual approach can keep 
control over sfrategic decisions and 'focus democratic control on key policy issues', direct 
accoimtability is 'considerably weakened' if the public sector provides very little, and 
everything is guided by legahstic confrols or regulation (Cony 1998:75). 
The consequence of this has been a more 'assertive and sceptical public' who require their 
share of services provided through the payment of their tax bills (Squires 1998: 171). 
However the prospect of consumer choice in public policing through competition and the 
infroduction of service providers and purchasers (Loveday 1994 [a]) has yet to materiaKse. 
As with the private/public policing dichotomy the concept of consumers, customers, and 
competition for policing services are dogged with the classical economic problems of 
perfect competition, public good, and the free rider effect (Olsen 1971, Johnson 1992) 
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• even if there is a difference between a pure pubhc good, and a good used communally but 
charged to a private user according to consumption (Savas 1982). However the public 
'have a much more complex relationship with public services' than being merely 
consumers or service users (Coote 1998:216). 
The partnership approach has been co-opted by the police in one form or another over the 
last twenty years (Alderson 1979, 1983. Newman 1984) but it was pressure from Central 
Government which caused the poUce to change its attitude towards crune control by 
involving the community, probation service, and local authorities (Gilling 1997:106) 
particularly in preventing crime (Home Office Circular 8/84). 
The Morgan Report (1991) emphasised that the multi-agency approach to coimnunity 
safety should be the concern of local authorities in conjmction with the police, bringing a 
multi-agency approach to crime control leading to: difficulties of defining roles (Bright 
1987); difHculties over lead agency status (Gilling 1996: 110); the offloading of work 
between agencies (Bright 1991: 73-74); and conflict between Local Community Safety 
Groups, Community Safety Plans, and Local Police Authority Aimual Policing Plans 
(Morgan & Newbum 1997). 
This multi-agency approach has been extended by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, 
requiring police, community. Local Authorities, and other partners, including Health 
Authorities and Probation Services, to produce a strategy to reduce crime and disorder in 
their local areas based upon a 'joint audit of local crime and disorder to act as a bench 
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mark for future action' (Woods 1998). 
The goal should be for every partner to configure its input in such a way as to 
maximise effectiveness without compromising the individual agency's wider strategic 
goals. (Home Office 1998: para 1.36) 
However the Crime and Disorder Act was intended to make: 
...no changes to the Police Authorities statutory responsibilities for consulting the 
community about policing issues and priorities'. One of the main mechanisms which 
Police Authorities use for undertaking such consultation and for engaging the public in 
preventative work is the work of the Police Community Consultative Groups. (Home 
Office 1998: para 1.31). 
Central government has also attempted to reform the police, both in terais of its 
organisation and its role. The inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards, The 
Sheehy Inquiry (Home Office 1993) made over two himdred recommendations (Jones & 
Newbum 1998). Those evoking most reaction were those mainly driven by market forces 
and included performance related pay, fixed term appointments, and the abolition of three 
management ranks, but allowed for a broad policing mandate (Leishman, Cope & Starie 
1996). Resistance from all levels within the police service eventually succeeded in 
watering down many of these recommendations (Loveday 1994). 
The White Paper Police Reform (1993) focused upon govemance of the police rather than 
their management, with a narrower policing mandate (Leishman, Cope & Starie 1996) one 
of fightmg crime, a role to be shared and supported by local communities (Home Office 
1993:1). 
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The Home Office (1994[a]) 'Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks" intended to set-
out the role of the police because this was not self evident (Hills 1997:180), and was seen 
by many as a precursor to the privatisation of many policing services (Morgan & Newbum 
1997, Jones & Newbum 1998), through the establishment of core arid ancillary tasks, 
allowing the police to concentrate on What may be considered to be their prime function, 
that is crime-fighting (Loveday 1995: 141). The report, proved to be ineffectual and made 
very few changes, if any, to the role of the police ( Police Review 7/7/95). 
Historically policing has been an issue which is sensitive to local values (Clark 1987: 388), 
both at the individual level between those involved in an incident, or more locally to those 
who are recipients of policings' value in terms of a public good (Loader & Walker 2001). 
It has also been noted that the police and public are generally in agreement about 
priorities in respect of the more serious offences, but that public demand is to be more 
involved in consultation (Dingwall & Shapland 1993). 
The problem facing the police is that they have to be sensitive to both local and national 
values as well as the effects of increasing globahsation (Robertson 1990, Held & McGrew 
1993) which affects individuals at the macro level and the ever present need to ration their 
services as a consequence of fiscal constraints, ff a partnership approach with the input of 
local views in terms of pohcing policy remains a requirement, seen as it is as facilitating 
more responsive local policy making (Edwards & Benyon 2000:45), then the power of 
those who can influence such policy is an important consideration, ff consumerism is a 
strong influence, then we need to know how much it affects what the police do at a local 
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level. 
A more cynical vievi^ , perhaps, is one which suggests that: 
In the community policed world, the police imderstand the value of giving people a 
stake in the process as a viable means of social control (Deleon-Granados 1997). 
It may well be that society is reaching a point where the distinction between local, 
national, and global values are becoming blurred as a consequence of modem 
communications and information technology, to the extent that, although we continue to 
court local views, in wider policy terms, they are of little consequence in affecting the role 
of the police; i f this is the case then the concept of citizenship may be changing. 
Police work, accountability, control and influence 
For governments, police accountability for what they do remains a 'central feature' 
(Loveday 1999). However accountability and control are used synonymously in respect of 
police services, more often than not within the same context. Baldwin & Kinsey (1982: 
105-106) propose that: 
Accoimtability is liability to account for a decision after it has been taken; control on 
the other hand exists where influence is exerted in making a decision. The two may 
fidse together in practice and debate (My emphasis) (ibid). 
Bayley (1985: 160) also uses the words control and accountability mterchangeably, 
explaining that both relate to the achieving conformity between police activity and 
community objectives. 
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In terms of considering local autonomy in respect of contirpUing local police policy and 
practice it is necessary to consider both accountability and control but more importantly to 
add, or' even replace them, with that of influence which in its application is a mixture of 
both and can be effected by all members of the police policy network. 
Day & Klien (1987) state that imlike the National Health Service where accountabihty 
• was 'simple in theory but complex in practice', accountability in the police was 'not only 
complex in theory but even more complex in practice' (pi05). 
There are a number of issues peculiar to the provision of police services which make the 
issue of accountability, control and mfluence more difficult than might be the case in other 
organisations. These can be summarised as follows: 
• The state gives the police the right to use legitimate force (Bittner 1967, 1970. Spike 
1985, Reiner 2000) and therefore what the police organisation represents is different 
to any other organisation. 
• The relationship between police organisations and political authority is difficult to 
imravel: the relationship between police officers, police forces, local Police 
Authorities, the Home Office and Parliament is tmcertain and open to different 
interpretations, where the relationships between the police, and central and local 
government is difficult (Brogden. 1982:1-2). 
• The services it provides are 'demand-led, context specific and resomrce limited' 
(Waddmgton 1993: 192); however, the restraints of economic public good theory 
makes the service it provides difficult to restrict to dnect recipients and conunercial 
provision of police services by public sector police forces, would further complicate 
the already difficult area of police accoimtability (Johnston 1992:69). 
The existence of a more mixed economy for policing in the new milleimium is becoming 
more and more important (Jones & Newbum 1998), with private security companies 
providing policing services to those willing to pay for them, leaving the police to deal with 
problems in areas where such services cannot be provided privately. 
20 
Leaving the issues of private - public policing aside, WGIQ there to be direct political 
control, local or central, or some form of local community control over policing policy the 
problems remain: 
• How can such control be effectively exercised through policy decisions made at Chief 
Officer level, to those made by officers at ground level, that is, how is it possible to 
overcome the problem of distinguishing between 'operational and wider policy 
matters' (Baldwin & Kinsey 1982 :111). 
• How can the problem of pressure from sectarian or minority interest groups be 
prevented from putting imdue pressure upon policing policy, perhaps to the detriment 
of the community as a whole (Lea & Young 1984 : 234). 
It is therefore necessary to consider the affect of local and cenfral government mvolvement 
m poHcing and the work of the police in a democracy (McKenzie & Gallagher 1989: 53). 
In discussing police powers and accoimtability Reiner (1992: p221) highlights the fact that 
the formal rules and accountability functions of pohce work are mdirect and subtle. He 
goes on to argue that elected confrol of police decision making is not necessary in a 
democracy, a view that is confradicted by Lea & Young (1984: 231) who look for greater 
local democratic confrol over the police, and Uglow (1988: 143) who suggests that Chief 
Constables are no longer constitutionally confroUed, and calls for greater safeguards 
against the power of Chief Constables and the Home Secretary (pl36). This argument is 
pursued by Wall (1998: 13) who sees Chief Constables as a self-selectmg and externally 
unaccountable professional elite with influence over the policy making process. 
The more interest'one takes in issues of police accountability the more obvious it becomes 
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that accountabihty is a complex and often a contradictory compromise (Ewing & Gearty 
1990:44). The British policing system is seen as: 
... a delicate balance of itemised obligations and sometimes unclear lines of authority; at a 
time when police work is increasingly scientific and professional, the police feel more than 
ever "beleaguered by bodies exerting pressure upon them. (Palmer 1990: 541). 
The nature of these local and central influences, then relationships and values vwthin the 
accountability and control process, will be discussed in the next chapter, by examining the 
key players in the policy process. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
K E Y PLAYERS IN THE POLICY PROCESS 
Policing in England and Wales has been based, traditionally, upon the local authority and 
despite increasing influences from cenfral government, there remains a sfrong political 
desire to maintain the illusion of de-cenfralised influence or confrol over policing (Bayley 
1992: 533). Indeed the relationship between cenfral and local government over the last 
twenty years has become more and more froubled because of the conflict between their 
respective service provision responsibilities, the adoption of a cenfralising sfrategy to deal 
with this problem, and a sfrong desfre to roll-back the state (Goldsmith 1986), which, 
although predating the first Thatcher Government, came to a head during that period 
(Cochraine 1993: Chpt 2), and continues to this day. 
This relationship was also affected by the expansion of academic research into the police 
service, which was seen to high-lighting the politics of policing and pohce research in 
Britain (Reiner 1992[a]: 442), increasingly carried out by government organisations, local 
and cenfral, but with the Home Office being the most important department of cenfral 
govenunent in terms of fimding police research' (Reiner ibid: 447, Reiner 2000). 
However recent developments in police policy making processes imderline the premise 
that 'local government is an essential part of the system of government in this coimtry' 
(L.G.A Paper. 1998:3), although how the results of proposals for regional government 
(Joseph Rownfree Foundation 1996) will affect the mfluence of the key players in the 
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police policy process remains to be seen. 
The issue of local and central influences have also, affected the work of what were initially 
seen as internal pohce pressure groups, concemed with the rights and conditions of police 
officers, such as the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Superintendents Association 
and the Pohce Federation, which have now moved toward more public and pro-active 
commentators and advisors on policing policy. 
The Police Authority, Chief Constable and Home Office 
These actors in the policy making process represent an ongoing relationship dating back to 
the Mimicipal Corporations Act of 1835. This Act provided for a balance between the 
responsibilities of local government and justices of the peace and a measure of central 
goverrment supervision as well as allowing the Home Office to have central direction over 
Chief Constables and to constinct a large amount of autonomy from local confrol (Remer 
1992:22). 
Prior to the Royal Commission on the Police of 1962 the many small police forces in 
England and Wales may have had, by their very localised nature, effective local confrol 
and accountability. However the make up of their respective watch committees and 
standing joint committees, which included local land owners and business elite, gave rise 
to the view that this confrol was not democratic (Uglow 1988: 123). Furthermore a 
number of high profile instances involving questions of who confrolled the police (Fisher 
V Oldham Corp.) gave rise to 'misgivings about the state of the police' (Royal 
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Commission. Cmd 1728). 
The Royal Commission was given fom* areas of reference: 
• The role and constitutional arrangements of local police authorities. 
• Accountability of the police. 
• Effective complaints procedures and public relations. 
• Pay, conditions and effective recruitment in to the police. 
The subsequent Police Act of 1964 resulted in the repeal of some sixty Acts of Parliament 
and the introduction of the so called tripartite arrangement, consisting of the local Police 
Authority, the Chief Constable and Home Secretary. 
The Police Authority was to consist of one third magistrates and two thirds elected 
councillors whose responsibility it was: to provide the maintenance of an adequate and 
efficient police force properly housed and equipped, to appoint and remove the Chief 
Constable, and to call for reports from him on specific policing issues. 
Police forces came under the direction and control of their Chief Constable, and with this, 
the responsibility for the maintenance of the Queens Peace, the protection of life and 
property, and the prevention and detection of crime. Consequently policing in Britain is 
acknowledged for the amount of operational freedom given to Chief Constables (McCabe 
et al 1988), the so called constabulary independence (Savage, Charman & Cope 2000). 
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These changes increased the power of Chief Constables, who were now fewer in number 
but were able to have greater influence over the policy making process; whereas on the 
other hand, the newly formed Police Authorities had little experience in policing (Pollard 
1985). However the end result was seen by some, not only to increase the power of Chief 
Constables, but also the Home Office, to the detriment of local committees (Marshall 
1973, Banton 1974). . . . 
The Pohce Act of 1964 gave the Home Secretary considerable influence over local 
policing policy through: 
• The provision of fifty one per cent of the funding of the police. 
• Approval of the appointment of Chief Police Officers. 
• The power to call for specific reports from Chief Constables. 
• Home Office Circulars to Chief Officers intended to set out best practices in policing. 
• The appellant function in cases of discipline in respect of Chief Officers. 
• Central Govermnent power to ensure the efficiency of the police, the effectiveness of 
police authorities. 
• The responsibility for such issues as inter-force co-operation and provision of central 
services. 
As a result. Central Government was given the opportunity to place considerable influence 
upon local policing policy. 
The Home Office is thus seen as a powerful, sometimes authoritative, sometimes 
resented force, directing the shape of police policy and operations. (Reiner 1991:276). 
Effectively the tripartite system initially operated a form of gentieman's agreement, and 
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policing policy was neither politically nor socially contentious. However the issues of 
accountability and control were to become more prominent during the 1980's. 
Jack Straw presented an unsuccessful Private members Bil l to Parhament in 1980, which 
suggested the removal of Magistrates from local Police Authorities, powers for Police 
Authorities to appomt ranks down to Superintendent, decide general policmg pohcies for 
their area, and for the Home Secretary to intervene in cases of dispute between Chief 
Constables and their Police Authorities. 
The Miners Strike of 1984-85 fiirther illusfrated the problems of consensus between Police 
Authorities, Chief Constables and the Home Office, with contentious issues such as the 
National Reporting Cenfre based at New Scotland Yard, that confrolled the disfribution of 
Police Officers over the whole of the England and Wales, and finance, vwith a high profile 
dispute between the South Yorkshne Police Authority and the Chief Constable regarding 
the payment for the billeting of such officers (Wright 1985), vwth payment eventually 
settled by the Home Office. 
Policing industrial disputes was not the only reason for disagreements between Police 
Authorities and Chief Constables during this period. The most confroversial of these were: 
regularly calling for reports from the Chief Constable about police operations imdertaken 
by the Merseyside Police Authority during the Toxteth riots (Judge 1981); disagreement 
over the issue of C.S gas or plastic bullets to Northumbria Police from a cenfral store 
provided by the Home Office after the local Police Authority had not permitted them to be 
27 
purchased ( R v Sec of State exp. 1988 2 W.L. R 590); and litigation against the Chief 
Constable of Merseyside for allegedly acting illegally by failing to police certain areas of 
Liverpool (Daily Telegraph 31/10/86 p36), albeit unsuccessful. 
From the 1980's onwards the relationship between Central Government and the other 
members of the tripartite arrangement had changed, partly a result of more dnectional 
Home Office Circulars which affected police policy. The first of these being Circular 
114/83, Manpower, Efficiency and Effectiveness, which set out that in deciding police 
staffing levels, the Home Office would take into consideration the need for reviews of 
objectives, resources and priorities. The relationship was also affected by the requirement 
for greater local consultation through local police consultative groups, required imder the 
Pohce and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and a movement towards consumerism in the 
provision of police services through the Victims Charter, introduced in 1990, and the 
performance indicators provided by the Citizens Charter (Cm 1559:1991). 
The changing relationships between these key players is aptly illustrated by the following 
coroments; firstly ftom Chritchley (1978: 305) suggesting that the tripartite arrangement 
gives: 
...the present advantage of a system that in practice makes ours arguably the most 
accountable police service in the world. 
and secondly, after the intervening years, from Oliver (1996) who writes: 
Under the 1964 Act much was left to the good sense, or otherwise of the parties 
uivolved; it was recognised that no act of Parliament could cater for every contingency 
in every relationship and for the partnership idea to work good will and common sense 
needed to be demonsfrated on all sides.- Unfortunately experiences since the 1964 Act 
has shown that people are not always reasonable and several pressures developed 
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which put a strain on the notion of accountabihty that, on occasions, seemed to stretch 
the structure to breaking point, (ibid: 16) 
The White Paper, Police Reform. The Government's Proposals for the Police Service in 
England and Wales. (Cm 2281) was pubhshed in June 1993. It stated that the 
arrangements for the relationship between the Chief Constable, Home Secretary and Police 
Authorities under the 1964 Act created confiision and provided uncertain lines of 
accountability, in that the Home Secretary was only able to 'set the strategic framework of 
policing through informal but biureaucratic methods such as Home Office Cfrculars and 
guidance' (2.14). The Police Authorities were lunited inthefr ability to ensure the views of 
local people about policing were 'reflected in the sfrategic direction of the force' (2.15). 
The Chief Constable's ability to devolve management responsibility was consframed by 
'local and cenfral intervention' (2.15). 
The White Paper went on to outline proposals to: 
• Allow the Home Secretary to set national key policing objectives. New Police 
Authorities to consist of half locally elected councillors, with the remainder to be 
three magisfrates and five local people who together vwth the Chairman would be 
appointed by the Home Secretary. 
• A responsibility for producing a 'costed policing plan based on local needs' within the 
national key objectives. 
• The Chief Constable would be a fixed term appointment with responsibilities to direct 
and confrol the force within the local policing plan and national key objectives but 
remaining operationally independent. 
As a result of the White Paper, the Police and Magisfrates Court Bil l received Royal 
assent in July 1994 but not vwthout its fair share of confroversy. In particular, the clause 
suggesting that the Chair of Police Authorities throughout England and Wales should be 
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appointed by the Home Secretary, lead to the suggestions that new layers of Quangos 
would result, and raised the possibility that the Home Office could effectively become the 
Chief Constable of Great Britain (Guardian 18/12/93:6). Others however went as far as 
saying: 
PoMcing is not exactly local now. True local power has gone the way of the Watch 
Committee and Home Office Control over budgets has steadily grown (Young. 1993:" 
22). 
Further pressure from within Parhament later led to the removal of this clause from the 
Bill . 
The relationship between these parties after the Police and Magisfrates Court Act 1994 
(now consolidated in the Police Act 1996) can be smnmarised as follows: 
Police Authorities: 
• To consist of seventeen members; nine elected councillors, five independent members 
and three magisfrates, responsible for the maintenance of an efficient and effective 
police force. 
• Determine local policing objectives for then area, in line with the national key 
objectives and produce an annual policmg plan to be drafted by the Chief Constable, 
setting out these objectives together with respective performance indicators and, at the 
end of each financial year, to produce a report to assess the effectiveness of the plan 
and its execution. 
• Appoint and remove Chief Officers, with the approval of the Home Secretary and to 
remain as their disciplining authority. 
• Responsible for obtaining the views of local people about policing matters both imder 
the S.106 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Police Consultative Groups) and 
prior to the setting of local policing plans. 
• To call for reports from Chief Constables in respect of any local policing matters. 
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The Home Secretary is parliamentary accountable for: . 
• Ensuring the provision of an effective and efficient police service. 
• The setting of national key policing objectives. 
• The power to direct Police Authorities in respect of the setting of performance 
indicators. 
• Authority to set out codes of practice for Police authorities. 
• Enabling Her Majesty's hispectors of Constabulary to inspect and report upon a force 
to ensure it is being 'maintained effectively and efficiently' and insist oil any remedial 
action if appropriate. 
• The power to call for reports from Police Authorities and from Chief Constables. 
• The preparation of a 'short hst' of candidates for independent members of Police 
Authorities. 
The Chief Constable is responsible for: 
• The independent direction and confrol of the force within the Police Authority's 
Annual Policing Plan, an independence underlined by the Audit Commission report 
Cheques and Balances: a framework for improving police accountability (1994) which 
pointed out that pohcing plan objectives told Chief Constables what to do but not how 
to do it. 
The annual policing budget is to be decided through consultation between the Chief 
Constable and the Police Authority according to a 'costed pohcing plan', closer to a 
purchaser provider arrangement. With the Police Authority becoming the purchasers of 
services, it was intended to enhanced their role through greater confrol over police services 
(Loveday 1994). No doubt the lessons learnt from the artificiality of the local market 
experienced in the Health Service, with the imposition of purchaser/provider arrangements 
that proved to be so disruptive have been learnt, and will prevent any fiiture need to 
maintain the impression that a competitive relationship still exists (North 1998). However 
Loveday goes on to argue that the Police & Magisfrates Court Act: 
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...gives the Chief Constable ultimate responsibility for finance and does not estabhsh 
the purchaser/provider split vi^ hich the Major govermnent has found so necessary in all 
other public services (1996: 31). 
The aim of the Act was to clarify the roles and lines of responsibility of these actors in the 
policing process, in particular to re-organise local Police Authorities, apparently in the 
belief that 'Community support for the police would be encouraged.' (Travis 1993:18) and 
to provide lines of communication with local communities, in terms of consumers, to 
allow their input into the policy making process. At the same time it ensured that the 
Home Office remained the dominant partner through fimding, national key objectives, and 
controls over performance indicators, but still providing a responsibility opt out, should 
things go wrong, by setting broad pohcy stances but not prescribing how such policies 
should be implemented. 
Proposals under the Governments' 'Best Value' initiative however may redefine the Chief 
Constable - Police Authority relationship, with Pohce Authorities having the responsibility 
to consult to ascertain policing priorities, and the Chief Constables to show they are giving 
best value based upon those priorities (Jenkins 1998). As well as the requirement for 
consultation between local authorities and other statutory bodies to present joint crime and 
disorder strategies under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and the consequences of the 
affects of research vmdertaken for that purpose (Reiner 2000:211). 
The present arrangement gives an opportunity to ensure better relationships between the 
police and the public (Shattock 1995) but at the same time very much rests upon the 
balance of mfluence between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority in terms of the 
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importance and priority of meeting local as.against national, key objectives and;, 
performance indicators (Newbum 1995[a]:77. Newbum 1995[b]: 54). 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 
Established in the mid nineteenth century as a result of police reform, the Mspectorate was 
mitially intended to ensure that local authorities provided statutory policing service, and to 
determine if the service provided was efficient, before local authorities could continue to 
receive funding from Cenfral Government. They were intended to be independent from 
government and in the main comprised of retired Chief Constables. 
More recently the frispectorate has increasingly been seen to be working vwthin pre­
determined criteria set down by the Home Office (Oliver 1996: 72), with the inspection 
process becoming more probmg; with more binding 'advice' on procedures and standards, 
and the recruitment of younger Inspectors. This cenfral influence over policing through 
H.M.I.C has increased (Reiner 1992: 242), with its role being linked mtxch more closely 
with Home Office policy (Weatheritt 1989: 107 - 112). Home Office Circular 114/83 
{Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service) increased the power of 
H.M.I.C by ensuring that it became the means of enforcement m terms of ensuring 
effectiveness, efficiency and value for money from police forces. 
The Citizens' Charter (1992 Cm 2101: 50) and the Government White Paper, Police 
Reform (1993. Cm 2281: pp 35-37) has since promised to place the inspection process on 
a more independent footing through greater public awareness of the role of H.M.I.C, the 
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introduction of lay. inspectors and openness in terms of publication of inspection reports." 
In 1995 Her Majesty's then Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Trefor Morris in an article in 
Police Review made it clear that the Inspectorate: 
...has been the lever to bring about change but it cannot direct, only persuade, and 
rightly so (Morris 1995:17). 
The Inspectorate's remit has now been placed on a statutory base through the Police Act 
1996. This includes ascertaining the effectiveiiess and efficiency of a police force in the 
manner it thinks best, by using their professional knowledge, based upon: 
• The governments national key objectives (now Ministerial Priorities) and local 
objectives set out in the Annual Policing Plan (now Annual Performance Plan). 
• Home Office policy on policing issues. 
And to report in respect of the following: 
• Perfonnance against performaiice indicators in respect of national key objectives and 
any other performance indicators provided by Home Office Circular. 
• Effectiveness of force strategies to attain both national and local objectives. 
• Adequacy of the partnership between police and community. 
• Any other matters affectmg the service provided by that force. 
H.M.I.C is also expected to provide advice in respect of: 
• Policing plans. 
• Key objectives. 
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• Performance indicators. 
Inspections are carried out on three levels; a Primary Inspection at three year intervals, an 
Annual Performance Review, and any number of 'ad hoc' Thematic Inspections m respect 
of various pohcy issues. Inspectors are based regionally, with a small team of seconded 
police officers, and civihan inspectors. 
In a written answer to a Parliamentary Question on 14 December 1995 (No 306) in respect 
of the duties of the H.M.I.C, the then Home Secretary Michael Howard said: 
I have made it clear that I will also be looking to the Inspectorate to report to me on the 
progress being made by police authorities and forces in establishing local strategies for 
building effective partnerships between police and the local community. (Quoted in 
Circular 67/1994: para 4 (Home Office 1994[b]). 
This fuelled the debate that H.M.I.C duties may also include mspecting the performance of 
local police authorities, leading to the: 
Home Secretary imposing his will on police authorities and forces through Her 
Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (Grenyer 1993:14-15). 
However, Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary, David O'Dowd has made it 
clear that he acts as: 
...the senior professional police advisor to ministers and as such plays an important 
part influencing pohcy making in a positive and constructive way for the service (1998: 
7). 
He sees the future as one of working within the parameters of the Governments' Best 
Value mitiative, with further collaboration between the Inspectorate and the Audit 
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Commission, which will bring H.M.I.C into a role of certification when historically the 
task has been ex facto review (ibid:7). 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary has acquired the dual role of advisor and 
inspector: 
H.M.I.C is charged vdth the duty to inspect police forces with regard to their efficiency 
and effectiveness but it also has a clear and formal fimction to advise, among others, 
the Home Office, Secretary of State police forces and police authorities. (Hughes et al 
1997:236) 
The Audit Commission 
The Audit Comniission was set up in 1938 as an independent body, the members of which 
are appointed by the Secretary of State for the Environment, are responsible to 
Parliament, to ensure the external auditing of local authority services, and to ensure that 
such services provide value for money. The Comniission employs the District Audit 
Service, private firms and independent advisors to carry out its work. Since 1986 the 
Commission has published reports uito pohce pohcies and practices gradually movmg 
from generic areas of practice to the more dehcate policy arena (Love 1991) and has been 
seen to have decided its role as also being one to change the way in which those being 
inspected carry out their work (Day & Klien 1990: 13). Audit Commission Police Papers; 
'Reviewing the Organisation of Provincial Police Forces' (No9 February 1991) and 
'Streetwise - Effective Police Patrol (1996) being good examples of this. 
Jones et al (1996: 199-200) indicate that H.M.I.C consults closely with the Audit 
Commission, in respect of areas under investigation by the Commission, but both 
organisations sfress their individual impartiality and independence. With many Chief 
36 
Police Officers having considerable confidence in the work of the Audit Coimnission and 
the Home Office, though not obliged to take on recommendations firom the Comniission, 
they are in fact doing so. The Audit Comniission exerts a great deal of influence, to the 
point where it has been suggested that there is considerable overlap between its work and 
that of the H.M.I.C to the degree that a clarification of the roles or a decision to opt for just 
one of these inspection agencies needs to be urgently addressed (Roberts 1995). 
Indeed the Audit Commission itself has stated that the police have been 'among the 
commissions most enthusiastic partners', that they are prepared to analyse their role and 
are wilhng to change (Audit Commission 1995). 
The most striking criticism of the Audit Commission is that it does not take social values 
into account (Butler 1992), emphasising as it does, economy, effectiveness and efficiency; 
more recently the excessive criticism of its reports; and the problem of its dual role of 
'policer and advisor' (Brown 1997). 
Recently Government concerns for best value has lead the Audit Comniission to suggest 
that regulation within the public sector should not be affected by organisational and 
professional divides but that the different systems of inspection and audit should be 
merged (Audit Commission 1999). Arguably this would allow the Audit Commission to 
take the leading role over other inspection bodies, including Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (Travis 1999). 
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The Association of Chief Police Officers 
The Association of Chief Pohce Officers was formed in 1948, as a result of the 
amalgamation of a number of different associations, in consequence of the insistence of 
Lord Oaksey, the chanman of the Committee on Police Conditions and Service (Home 
Office 1949), to deal with representatives of Chief Constables from one association only. 
It has gradually moyed from a loose social group of police officers above the rank of Chief 
Superintendent, into an association vwth a full time secretariat, and plays an important 
role on the policy making stage, through its various committees dealuig with issues such as 
Crime, Traffic, Terrorism & Alhed Matters. 
Siuce the 1980's when A.C.P.0 was instrumental in setting up the National Reporting 
Cenfre to organise the policing of the National Miners Strike, the Association has been 
encouraged by the Home Office to maintain a high profile through standardisation and 
reconunendations for good policing practices, being seen along with H.M.I.C as an 
'...important co-ordinatmg bodies between the Home Office and individual Chief 
Constables' (Reiner 1991: 31). 
The role of A.C.P.0 however is seen as bemg more than merely a co-ordinatmg body but 
one which is active in making pohcy, particularly in its influence at force level. The more 
corporate state of the Association, setting agendas rather than attending to them; bringing 
members into a collective policy setting association, make it more difficult for individual 
Chief Constables to ignore A.C.P.0 policy statements (Savage & Charman 1996 ). This is 
illusfrated by the A.C.P.0 Sfrategic Policy Document which set out the Police Services, 
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Statement of Common Purpose and Values (1990); its influence in the agreement over the 
inclusion of qualitative performance indicators under the Citizens' Charter; and more 
recent policy advice on police responses to intruder alarms (Guardian 22/03/97:9). 
A.C.P.0 is therefore a forum, through which Chief Pohce Officers can express a corporate 
view of police policy. An Association which in practice can be expressed as an 'emergent 
network of a national police organisation' although most of its decision making processes 
remain outside the public arena and consequently not accoimtable (Jones et al 1996; 
Uglow 1988) but which none the less has considerable influence over local policing issues. 
Police staff associations 
The Superintendents Association, the Police Federation and U.N.I.S.O.N (representing the 
majority of civihan staff) are included here. Unlike the Association of Chief Pohce 
Officers, these groups are more influential in terms of protecting the rights and well being 
of their members but have now become more active nationally in the policy makmg 
process. However, the Police Federation, having been in existence since the police strike 
of 1919, did not fully involve itself in what may be termed 'overt political activity' until 
the mid 1960's when it published an article called 'The Problem' which argued for better 
police pay to assist the 'fight against crime'. Within the next ten years it was placing 
advertisements m the national press in respect of law and order pohcy, blaming the 
government of the day for failing to stop a rising crime rate and continuing to argue for 
higher pay. The Federation was later to bring pressure upon the subsequent Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Zander 1985) as well as its involvement, together with the 
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SuperiBtendents Association and ACPO, in publishing the Operational Policing Review (-
1990), outlining problems and possibilities in respect of policing policy and later in 
response to the Government's 'Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards (1993). 
The Police Federation has disposed of the tradition of having a political advisor from the 
opposition benches in Parliament, leading to the accusation of then having a closer 
relationship with the party in power (Reiner 1992: 93), and has been criticised for taking 
out unnecessary litigation in respect of press reports that could identify police officers 
who are the subject of outstanding complaints; thereby greatly stifling any opportunity to 
adequately report such cases, which in itself was having an adverse effect upon crime 
prevention (Campbell 1997: 3). 
The number of civilian staff employed by the police has increased over the past ten years 
and they are represented by the Trades Union, UNISON. Then main concern is the 
welfare of their members in terms of pay and conditions, and then input into the policy 
makmg process has been lunited, although the Home Office has been seen to welcome 
then views (Jones et al 1994:199). 
It is clear that there have been considerable changes in the relationships between the key 
players, and greater confroversy over issues of accountability and confrol since the late 
1960's. Before considering the research findings regardmg the influence these key players 
have over local autonomy, both in police policy and practice, the next chapter will set out 
the research methodology. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research process, the deshre to provide knowledge, requires the application of proven 
sociological tools, to ensure its rehability (its ability to be replicated) and to provide 
validity (the ability to measure what it is intended to measure and how the conclusions are 
generalised). This has to be coupled with a sound theoretical base, placing the research 
vidthin a specific academic discipline which gives perspectives methods and a tradition 
(Gilbert 1993: xi). Account must also be taken of the assumption by social scientists that 
research which fails to achieve objectivity and truth should be rejected (Blaikie 1995), 
even i f some philosophers argue that there is no such thing as truth (Trigg 1985). 
No one sociological tool is superior to another and a wide range of techniques can be 
utilised according to the problem under consideration. 
Such a perspective means that researchers cannot rigidly apply their methods but need 
to be flexible in their approach and utilise a range of methods for any problem (Burgess 
1984:143). 
My first step in the research process was one of findmg a problem, rather than producing 
an hypothesis, preferring a 'research-then-theory' approach to that of 'theory-then-
research' (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias 1992:46). 
Good social science research requires a significant problem. Social science is a special 
kind of problem solving by which disciplined and logical social investigation attempts 
to answer questions about the social world and human existence. The social scientist is 
a man with a problem or he is nothing (Bulmer 1982:38). 
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Sociological method has historically sought to assign labels to various systems of research: 
to put the science into the social sciences. From Durkheim's need to 'consider social facts 
as things' (Aron 1976: pp 69-79); the development of positivism, treating research into the 
social in a similar way to that of the natural sciences; the achievement of objectivity and 
the extent to which researchers can be detached from the subject under investigation, in 
order to understand human behaviour both in terms of cause and effect; to that of anti-
positivism or realism where the intention is to discover the construction of social 
relationships in order to understand the reasons why we have the pohcies and practices we 
do. (May 1995:5-7). 
Because social reality affects both the researcher and the researched it cannot be 
examined in isolated terms by value free observers, as it is a phenomenon which is 
constantly changed by the actors involved ui the world being researched (Gidduigs 1976). 
As a retned pohce officer I have to be aware of my own views of reality whilst carrying 
out this research, particularly in terms of the 'outsider/insider' debate in respect of social 
research (Brown & Waters 1993, Shepfycki 1994, Blaikie 1995, Reiner 2000). It is 
essential to ensure that my knowledge and experience of pohcing does not affect rny 
objectivity, or devalue the response from those being researched, on the grounds that they 
may believe that my police backgroimd means that they do not have to fully explain the 
reasoning behind their views. For example, interviews with managers about the processes 
involved ui decidmg the contents of Force Annual Policing Plans illusfrate that they did 
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not accept that I had any prior pohcing knowledge when they discussed these processes, 
and their perceptions of it. 
However it is also important to use this knowledge to better describe the processes 
involved, in terms of participant experiences, rather than a mere commentary on my own 
experiences (Downes & Rock 1989: 66). 
Being a retired police ofiBcer removes the problems of conflict inherent when performing 
the dual roles of police officer and researcher (Young 1991); it has eased the problems of 
access to the police organisation (Hughes 2000); and has increased the trust of those being 
researched, not simply by being a retired police officer, but being one that did not attain 
managerial rank, and therefore did not present a challenge to their knowledge and 
perceptions of the policy, implementation, and decision making processes. A good 
example to support this proposition are the responses from managers regarding the power 
of the Chief Constable in the selection of members of force policy committees, and the 
influence that these committees have in the local pohcy and decision making process. 
The concept of social reality in terms of research into social policy issues is impolrtant and 
particularly so in respect of policing policy, leaning heavily as it does upon peoples' 
concepts of crime, public disorder and the correct methods to address these issues. 
Man constructSihis own reality. And with the help of others, he creates a social world. 
The construction of this world is related to the knowledge man develops, the ideas to 
which he is exposed, and the manner in which he selects and interprets information to 




Through the use of triangulation technique (Denzig 1970) this research will endeavour to 
'bridge' (May 1995) these approaches: to provide qualitative and quantitative data, with a 
view to explaining and describing the influences placed upon local policing policy, even if 
the split between quantitative and qualitative research is not as obvious as it once was 
(Hall & Hall 1996), nor as problematical as it may appear, (Bryman 1992: 63). Even 
though, as in my case, qualitative researchers often find it difficult to ignore the powerful 
argument that figures can bring in social research (Merger 1997:139). 
I have deliberately avoided using the term methodology in respect of this thesis because of 
the problems of confusion between 'research method' and 'research technique', both of 
which are used interchangeably imder the heading of methodology. Research method is an 
overall plan a general approach the logic of which guides the investigation and Research 
Technique is the tools and operations used to achieve the overall plan. 
Method consists of a certaiu sequence of interrelated techniques linked together by the 
study plan. (Mayer & Greenwood 1980:49). 
The research method 
Research plans vidthin the area of public pohcy research suggest that it can be carried out 
to predict behaviour within the field of enquuy; to explain the views of those involved ui 
the policy processes; to describe their actions; to interpret their behaviour (Young & Mills 
1980), and for policy analysis in terms of 'description - how policies are made' and 
'prescription - how they should be made' ( Hogwood & Gunn 1989). It is not my intention 
to provide prediction or prescription in this research but to consider the influence that 
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various groups and individuals may have upon local policing both in policy and in practice. 
This will be done by examining documents produced in respect of policy issues by The 
Home Office, The Audit Commission, and H.M.I, as well as Force Pohcy documents and 
Local Aimual Policing Plans and, because it is important to remember that one of the 
drawbacks of examining public documents is the difficulty of critically analysing the 
politics that lay behind their contents (May 1993: 145-146), the perceptions of those 
involved in the pohcy process wiU be examined: those considered to form a part of an elite 
group within that process, for example; the intellectuals, managers and bureaucrats 
(Bottomore 1964); tibe front line service providers and 'gatekeepers' (HaU 1974, Foster 
1983); and the interests of the more powerfiil considered agauist local, popular 
representation (Selznick 1966). The intention is to analyse their views, describe their 
actions, and interpret their behaviour, in terms of policy and practice. 
My concern is to describe to those who may have little knowledge of the mechanics of 
policing pohcy, the various influences that effect this process in a non - mefropolitan 
English police force and to provide some understanding of the problems involved in 
providing a public service which is free to users at its point of issue. 
Description has a low status in social science. Descriptive studies can be confrasted 
unfavourably vwth more analytical and theoretically orientated research, as though 
description is a 'low level' activity hardly worth attention. This is somewhat nonic, 
since description permeates scientific theory and without it theories could have neither 
meaning nor application (Spradly 1980: 31). 
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The research techniques 
To square the quahtative/quantitative curcle I have employed a variety of techniques 
which I believe are appropriate for the problems being considered and will provide some 
balance between these two extremes. 
Over a two year period structured interviews were imdertaken with chief officers, senior 
managers and staff employed in departments involved in the policy making process at 
Headquarters (the top corridor) using an interview schedule (Appendix A). Members of 
divisional management teams throughout the force were also interviewed, as they are 
involved at a more local level of the policy process, and middle managers of Inspector rank 
in Plymouth, (ground level managers) where a type of Basic Command Unit policing 
system was in operation. In all cases the same interview schedule was used. 
Members of the Police Authority were also interviewed to obtain a comparative response 
from 'outside' the police, using a different interview structure (Appendix B). The reason 
for using a different interview schedule is based upon Moser & Kalton's (1983: 271) 
concepts for successfiil interviewing, namely that: the respondent must have knowledge of 
the subject in order to answer questions on it; the respondent must know what the 
researcher wants from him in terms of how technical or personal the answers need to be; 
and a desne on the part of the respondent to answer the questions truthfully. 
These groups were targeted as they formed an elite within the force, who can give greater 
insight and value to the interview because they live in the world of ideas, politics and the 
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generalisation of policing (Marshall & Rossman 1995: 84), being dnectly involved in the 
business of makmg, deciding or advising upon force policy and, more unportantly, because 
it is rare for researchers to gain access to the elites of the criminal justice system (Hughes 
2000:241). 
The interview method was employed because research into organisational decision making 
relies upon those involved to tell others what happens: 
To discover how anything happens in an organisation we ask people to tell us stories. 
To convince others that we know something about how things happen in organisations 
we construct and tell stories about those stories. As others react to our stories, they tell 
stories about stories we have told - and so on (O'Coimor 1997: 304). 
The schedule of questions made sure that any variations in the answers were genuine and 
not caused by any variations in the questioning ( Ackroyd & Hughes 1992) and were 
undertaken as near as possible in the same manner, asking other questions only to: 
a] Assist the respondent to talk. 
b] Reassure the respondent if there are concerns about personal implications 
that might affect his/her reaction to the questions. 
c] To give praise where necessary. 
d] To shift the conversation to include a topic which has been over looked. 
e] To explain 'implicit assumptions'. 
(Rothlisberger & Dickson 1939:203) 
The interviews were tape recorded with the consent of the respondents and were 
transcribed as soon as possible afterwards, each interview lasting about one hour and its 
transcription taking about three hours. Each transcript was checked against the recording 
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and categorised both by question and also according to group^  that is. The Top Corridor; 
The Police Authority; Divisional Managers; Ground Level Managers. This was done to 
compare individual replies within any one group, to gain an overview of the theme of each 
interview and also to provide an opportunity to compare replies between groups. 
Analysing the results of the interviews was an on-going process, in that categorisation was 
completed immediately, but further work was carried out until a point was reached where 
the required information was ready for the thesis. This was done using 'template analysis' 
(Kmg 1998), an approach which is 'most suited to interview transcripts' where: 
The essence of the approach is that the researcher produces a list of codes (a 'template') 
representing themes identified in then textual data (Ibid: 118). 
In this case recurring themes were coded in hierarchical order, under the general headings 
taken from the interview schedule (Appendix C). The data, in the form of supportiag 
quotes, was finally brought together to provide an account (Dey 1993: 83) of the 
perceptions of police managers, in respect of the policy and implementation processes in 
the Devon & Cornwall Constabulary. 
In doing this I have tried to reach a compromise of MaxweU's (1996: 77) arguments about 
the advantage of dealing with the analysis immediately as against his reference to 
Seidman's (1991) preference of leaving this until all the interviews are completed but I 
have been ever mindful of the need to be selective about the number of themes included, in 
that: 
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The critical task in qualitative research is not to .accumulate all the data, but to can (le. 
get rid of) most of the data you accumulate. This requires constant wimiowing. The 
trick is to discover essences and then to reveal those essences with sufficient contact, 
yet not become mired trying to include everything that possibly might be described 
(Wolcott 1990: 35). 
At the same time, published quotes from interviewees have not been edited, in order to 
avoid the possibility of altering the context of the response, whilst some comments 
representing a minority view have been included to prove that contradictory evidence has 
also been reviewed (Silverman 1993). 
Fifteen respondents, including chief officers, senior mangers and staff from departments at 
force headquarters involved in the policy making process (mainly the Executive Support 
and Special Projects Departments) were interviewed, representing about 60% of such 
headquarters staff. In addition, interviews were conducted with nine members ( 53%) of 
the Police Authority; twenty five senior divisional police managers ( representing some 
49%); and twelve ground level managers (90%) from one division. A total of 61 
interviews, which compares favourably with the level of interviews in other pohce related 
research; for example Hoyle's (1998) interviews of confrol room staff in respect of 
domestic violence issues, Choongh's (1997) interviews of persons brought into pohce 
custody, and Plotnikoff and Wolfsan's (1998: 2) research into Domestic Violence who 
interviewed 40 hne managers, and 41 domestic violence officers. 
Observation was used to gain an insight into the consultation process employed to consider 
the contents of the annual policmg plan: internally within the pohce organisation, 
externally at pubhc annual focus session of the regular police liaison meetings, and at three 
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Police Authority Meetings. Eight out of ten of the police focus group meetings and nine of 
the sixteen public focus group meetings were visited. Unlike the seminal work of White 
(1955) and Becker (1963) this research did not require gaining access into a social group, 
merely, after bemg permitted access by the organisation, participating as a member of the 
public or the organisation, as appropriate. Thus making the observation* process simple; 
accessible; imobtrusive; and with activities which recur regularly at each meeting, 
achieving Spradley's (1980: pp45-57) criteria for selectmg the social structures for 
participant observation, as well as providing the opportunity to study the consultation 
process in its every day setting (Hammersley & Atkins 1983: 24) without influence. 
Care has to be taken however ui respect of what Madge (1969: 119-127) refers to as 'the 
inadequacies of our sense organs' and 'observation and inference'. The former suggests 
that what the observer perceives at any given occasion depends upon his/her state of mind 
and body, m terms of alertness and comfort and that our 'sense organs' are not perfect; 
some things can be missed. The latter suggests that what we see is affected by our 
knowledge and past experiences, placing our ovm inferences on what we observe. The 
observer cannot act as a totally objective recording machine; observation and mference 
cannot be separated. 
Using some concepts of content analysis, to ensure a structured technique and enable me 
to use non-quantitative documents and transform them into qualitative data (Bailey 1987), 
Her Majesty's hispectors' Reports, and Home Office Circulars, were assessed to consider 
their influence upon force policy and practice. Annual Policing Plans were also examined 
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to describe their development and their effect upon local policing policy and practice. 
As content analysis deals with comparison, the type of comparison being decided by the 
investigator's theory.' (Holsti 1969: 5) the use of a 'what is said' category as suggested by 
(Holsti 1969) and summarised in Frankfort -Nachmias and Nachmias (1992: 315) has been 
employed, namely: 
• Subject matter - what is it about. 
• Direction - how is it treated. 
• Standard - how is it classified. 
• Values - the goals and values revealed. 
• Methods - how goals are achieved. 
• Actor - who is undertaking particular acts. 
Although Holsti (1969:95) believes that it is not sufficient for the researcher to trawl 
through documents merely to see what information can be used, but should represent the 
objectives of the research, Krippendorff (1980: 170) sees no methodological difficulty, if, 
after a general search to discover what information is available, the data is reassessed, to 
ensure that it is still meaningful, representative and appropriate for the area being 
researched and the data is justified by what the researcher wishes to discover. 
The major part of this analysis will be of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature, and 
as Holsti (1969) and Bereison (1971) have argued, both methods are effective in terms of 
content analysis. 
51 
The quantitative research consisted of a questionnaire (Appendix D ) sent to a random 
sample taken from fifty per cent of the three hundred and ninety five front line police 
constables and sergeants based ui Plymouth. This was done in order to look at policy 
making from opposing hierarchal ends of the organisation, from 'below' as well as 
'above'. Plymouth was chosen because it has the largest pool of officers of all ranks, 
gender, and length of service withrn the Force, it is one of the busiest pohce areas in the 
force, comparing favourably with similar cities elsewhere in the country (Povey et al 
2001), and it has operated a type of Unit Beat Policing for some years. 
Using a random digit chart (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias 1992: Appendix D) a total 
of one himdred and ninety eight Constables were selected, of whom sixty-seven (33.8%) 
rephed. 
Of these 24% had five years or less service; 29% had over five and under ten years 
Service; 21% had ten years and under fifteen years service; 12% had fifteen and under 
twenty five years service; and 13% had twenty five years or more service; with one missing 
value. 
The same questionnaire was sent to all the Sergeants m Plymouth, a total of forty two 
officers, of whom twenty nine (58%) rephed. Of these 3% had less than five years service, 
21% had over five and under ten years service, 35% had ten years and under fifteen years 
service, 24% had fifteen years and under twenty five years service, and 17% had over 




In total ninety six of the two hundred and forty officers replied (40%) of which 51% had 
over five and under fifteen years service in the force. A response rate almost comparable 
with that of Cheurprakobkit's (2001) 49.6% rate in his research into community policing, 
but far below the 75% achieved by Jones (1986) in her research into women in the police 
service. 
S E R V I C E IN D E V O N & C O R N W A L L C O N S T A B U L A R Y 
Frequency % of Sanple 
15 yrs service or less 
• Over 5 years and 
under 10 
• 10 years and under 
15 
• 15 years and under 
25 
• 25 years service and 
over 
• Mssing Value 
(n = 96) 
Fig: 1 
This can be fiirther analysed in terms of their length of service in Plymouth, as set out in 











L E N G T H O F P O U C E S E R V I C E IN P L Y M O U T H 




Frequency % of Sample 
{n = 96) 
• Uhder 2 years service 
• 2 years and under 5 
• 5 years and under 10 




The age profile of the sample is shown in the following figure; with the largest age group 













Frequency % of Sample 
(n = 96) 
• 20 years of age or under 
• 21 years to 30 years 
• Slyears to 40 years 
• 41 years to 55 years 
Fig: 3 
The work role profile of the sample can be seen in Figure 4, overleaf the highest response 
rates coming from officers within the Criminal Investigation Department and Ward 
Constables. 
WORK ROLE - PROFILE OF SAMPLE 
Frequency % of Sample 
(n = 96) 
• Ward Sergeant 
• Response Sergeant 
• Ward Constable 
• Response Constable 
• C.I.D Officer 





The sample consisted of eighty-three male (87%) and twelve female (13%) officers, with 
one missing value (1%). 
The results cannot be generalised to a wider population to any great extent; btit they do 
give a description of the views of police officers about the influences they face, in terms of 
policy and practice. 
In my case I am faced with the 'compromise of what is desnable in pursuit of vahdily and 
what is practicable in terms of cost, time, politics and ethics..' (Jupp et al 2000: 11). 
In part two I will discuss the research in specific policy areas: each chapter will conunence 
with an overview of the relevant theoretical issues; set out the research findings by 
bringing together data from interviews, questionnaires and published documents; and 






Every organisation needs to ensure that its activities are geared towards particular aims 
that pennit its members to share common experiences and develop a corporate 
understanding of those experiences (Frederickson 2000: 49). Organisational activity is 
regulated, through task allocation, supervision, and co-ordination. It is these factors which 
make up the organisational structure, a structure which must be designed appropriately to 
ensure it is effective (Pugh & Hickson 1996: 4, Pugh 1997). 
Therefore the organisational structure of police forces is an important issue when it comes 
to ensuring effective and efficient service provision (Bayley 1992: 538) but it has been a 
neglected subject for serious intellectual analysis (ibid: 541). 
Using a macro approach (Bryan & Cronin 1986, Robey 1986) to the study of 
organisational structure, this chapter seeks to consider the higher structures rather than 
purely managerial aspects of the police organisation. 
The study of organisations is an evolvmg process where earlier theories of organisations 
should not be forgotten, where classical does not mean outdated (Robey 1986: 26). Indeed 




Studies of the formal structural characteristics of organisations over the past thirty years 
have used the work of Max Weber as the starting point for discussion (Pugh & Hickson 
1996: 9). Considering bureaucracy to be features relating to structure and function (Perrow 
1972), it is Weber's, organisational features and characteristics/ together with his 'ideal 
types' of social, actiotii and authority, which provide the most rational.form of bureaucracy. 
(Albrow 1970). 
These 'ideal types' make it possible to identify the 'empirical phenomenon' that would 
need to be present in an organisation if it 'had bureaucratic tendencies'(Clegg 1994: 60). 
Although Weber never defined bureaucracy (Albrow 1970) he listed the characteristics of 
an ideal type of bureaucracy which can be summarised as follows: 
• A continuous organisation with specified fimction, or functions, its operation bound by 
rules. Continuity and consistency within the organisation are ensured through the use 
of writing to record acts, decisions and rules. 
• The organisation of personnel is on the basis of hierarchy. The scope of authority 
vwithin the hierarchy is clearly defined and the rights and duties of the officials at each 
level are specified. 
• The staff are separated from ownership of the means of administration or production. 
• They are personally free, subject to authority only with respect to then impersonal 
official obligations. 
• Staff are appointed, not elected, on the basis of impersonal qualifications and are 
promoted on the basis of merit. 
• Staff are paid fixed salaries and have fixed terms of employment^  the salary scale 
normally graded according to the rank iu the hierarchy with employment being 
permanent with a certain security of tenure and pensions usually paid on retnement. 
(Handy 1985: 192, Clegg 1994:55). 
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Weber's concept of bureaucracy as a ideal type is based upon his notion of 'legal rational 
authority' where: 
• A legal code claims obedience from organisational members. 
• Rules are applied to particular cases and the adminisfration looks after the organisation 
within those rules/laws. 
• The person exercising authority obeys these impersonal laws. 
• Obedience is due not only to the person but to the impersonal order that grants him/her 
that position. 
(Albrow 1970; Clegg & Dunkerly 1985). 
Organisational structure is most likely to be based upon five aspects of rational 
bureaucracy: 
1. Specialisation-of work roles. 
2. Standardisation- amount of rules and procedine. 
3. Formalisation - amount of recorded instructions and procedures. 
4. Cenfrahsation - amount of decision making coming from the top. 
5. Configuration - long or short chains of command. 
(Pugh 1990:46). 
The label bureaucratic caimot be applied to all organisations (Gouldner 1954) and is less 
usefiil in areas where the work is unpredictable and non-routine. Similarly Bums & 
Stalker (1961) refer to mechanistic organisations where work is routine and the 
organisational stracture is rigid; and organic organisations whose work is affected by the 
environment and have to be flexible m order to respond quickly to change. 
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Aspects of bureaucracy can be identified in police organisations, which are rank and power 
centred and maintain an emphasis on control (Green et al 1994), even though rational 
bineaucracies can be dysfimctional organisations (Merton 1952) m that strict comphance 
to the rules eventually become both a means and end in itself, resulting in goal 
displacement. This is particularly noticeable where government organisations are 
introduced to attend to social goals, but these are often lost in the pressure of work 
(Hogwood & Peters 1985: 52). 
Organisational control 
Gouldner (1954) sought to distinguish between rational rules, punitive rules and mock 
rules, and others have argued that the efficiency of organisations can be improved by rules, 
procedures and contiol (Jaques 1976, Drucker 1989). Conversely it has been argued that 
bureaucracy causes more problems than it solves (Peters & Waterman 1982, Handy 1988, 
Roddick 1991) and that a rational bureaucracy merely supports the 'iron law of ohgarchy' 
where the few control the many (Michels 1949). 
The introduction of information technology is another major influence which can 
'threaten to change the balance of power vwitiiin police organisations' and affect uitemal 
reorganisation between centralised and decentrahsed sti^ctures (Manning 1992: 384-
388). 
However it is through rules that the norms and expectations of the organisation, that its 
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social reality is formed, regardless of its personnel turiiover- (Hall 1972). Rules provide 
the criteria for decision making, rather than stipulating what the decision should be, they 
permit greater freedom of action (Blau et al 1973) and allow members of police 
organisations to participate in the decision making process despite .the perceived emphasis 
on control (Wycoff et al 1994: 89). 
Organisational design 
In order that organisations can be managed effectively Fayol (1949) proposed that their 
structure should consists of 
• Specialisation - by function and labour. 
• Scalar principle - hierarchical chain of command. 
• Unity of command - employees report to one supervisor. 
• Span of control - an effective level of supervision. 
• Vertical commimication - an official means of communication through a chain 
of command. 
• Minimum level of authority - reducing levels of authority. 
• Line and staff divisions - line for product decisions staff for personnel 
decisions. 
(Bryans.& Cromn 1983:10, Pugh & Hickson 1997:100). 
Models of organisational design have been criticised for bringing complex sets of 
relationships into a simple framework (Katz & Kahn 1978: 285). Despite this however 
there remains an academic need to classifying organisations, in a similar way to the 
layman's desne to discover the similarities and differences, both amongst, and between 
them (Salaman 1979: 55). 
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Centralisation or decentralisation: the continuing conundrum 
Organisation^ design can be centralised, with an authority relationship between those in 
control and the remauiing staff, which can be achieved, for example, through the following 
structures: 
a) Traditional structures. Hierarchical: managing director - deputy - staff 
officers - general managers - managers - supervisors - workers. 
b) Functional structures. Director - functional departments. 
c) Divisional structures. Director - product departments. 
d) Dispersed structures. Head office - regional or area departments. 
(Pettinger 1996:440-443). 
The greater the control the greater the centiahsation. 
Or they may be decentrahsed, with control delegated from the cenfre, which monitors, 
evaluates and considers sfrategic issues, rather than confrolling operational matters. 
As Mintzberg (1979:181-213) points out, issues of cenfralisation and decenfralisation have 
been discussed since organisations were first written about, but for him, the former means 
that the power for decision making often hes with one person, at a single point in the 
organization; whilst the latter allows this power to be dispersed among many individuals at 
all levels of the organisation: terms representmg two ends of a continuum, but still 
allowing some organisations to partially decenfrahse, leaving more power than necessary 
at the apex of the structure. 
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Organisational-structures can also described as tall or flat. These are identified by tiie 
'number of levels according to its size', a tall structure being one with many levels of 
hierarchy, and one in which managers have 'a low average span of control' in comparison 
to its size (Child 1986: 58-84). 
The intractable bureaucracy 
Police forces are both complex and formal organisations (Stanyer 1994: 35), the structures 
of which should be designed to ensure that they function effectively (Gianakis & Davis 
1998: 486). However as Crank & Langworthy (1996) argue, a normative approach to the 
design of police organisations assumes that the organisation can be controlled by its 
managers (p214), whereas in fact front Ime police officers are often not controlled by the 
organisation (ibid: 229), even though policing is a punishment centred bureaucracy 
(Waddmgton 1999 [b]: 301). 
Following Meyer and Rowland (1977), Crank & Langworthy (ibid) go on to argue that 
formal organisational goals are separated from the day to day work of front line staff, 
thereby, allowing them to carry out the day to day work of the organisation whilst 
organisational structures and formal goal statements can appease managers and 
institutional authorities (p217). They conclude that 'fragmented cenfralization', brought 
about by the complexities of local. and cenfral government funding, has resulted in 
organizational structures and pohcies being grafted, haphazardly, onto existing 
organisational arrangements (p226). 
62 
Others argue that the design- of police organisations has been based upon a military model. 
(Maiming 1977. Critchley 1978) exhibiting a militaristic attitude to its related tasks and 
providing an envnomnent best suited to a imiformed service (Hobbs 1989: 79). As such it 
is, organisationally, based upon a hierarchy, a military model, which generally has not 
been open to public participation (Gianakis & Davis 1998: 486), a service which is 
organisationally similar to a.militaristic.bureaucracy (Chan 1997: 44), where increasing 
bureaucratisation brings greater task specialisation (Reiss 1992: 71): an organisation based 
upon a military model, and one that is not suitable for pohcing (Waddington [a] 1999:228). 
Gianakis & Davis (ibid: 488) argue that i f we accept Bayley's (1994) elements of 
community pohcing (namely: consdtation, command devolution, mobilisation of agencies, 
remedying problems that cause crime, and focused problem solvmg) then police 
organisations must take up an organic structure. This means adopting a participatory 
management style, a decentralised command structure and more importantly, ensuring that 
the structure of the organisation does in fact change, not merely change its operational 
practices iu order to support the legitimacy of the existmg structures. 
Classic organisational theory has provided what at first glance appears to be a hst of 
simple propositions about the formal structure of organisations that do not do justice to the 
complex issues which are mvolved (Ham & Hill 1987: 14). However it should be 
remember that it is a singular feature of bureaucracy that once it has become established it 
is in Weber's words 'escape proof. (Giddens 1985:182). 
Bureaucracy, therefore, meant control by experts - men with the skill and knowledge to 
be able to apply technical rules and norms that govern the functioning of modem 
organisations (Salaman & Thompson 1980:11). 
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• Pressure for change 
Although police organisations have been described as 'the most intractable of public 
bureaucracies', capable of resisting external pressures to change, even to the extent of 
eventually preventing it (Gyot 1979), there has been pressure from the Audit Commission 
to change the shape of police organisations from tall hierarchical structures, where the 
'lines of command are often longer than necessary' to that of 'territorial units' resulting in 
'trunmer forces with basic command units being held responsible for pohcing their own 
communities, given an adequate share of resources to meet their objectives' {Reviewing 
the Organisational Structure of Provincial Police Forces. Audit Commission Paper No.9. 
1991). 
Further pressure at this time came from the reconunendations of the Morgan Report 
(Home Office 1991) for the greater involvement of local autborities m community safety 
issues. 
The basic command unit (B.C.U), comprising Bayley's (1994) attiibutes of community 
policmg, is another 'buzz word' for the police service, popular in discussions about police 
organisations. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the system remains in its relative infancy, it quickly 
secured the tmqualified support of the Audit Commission, H.M Inspectorate and the 
Home Office - primarily because of the scope it appeared to offer to reduce 
management on-costs. It was also seen to be very much in line with contemporary 
popularise belief that the police service should be more accountable to the local 
communities pohced (Anon. 1995:3). 
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The Ward Pohcing system employed in Plymouth was seen as an exainple of a Basic 
Command Unit, where the division was divided into two main groups, response officers 
and commumty patrol officers; the latter being split into teams each corresponding to the 
thirteen political wards in the division. The Audit Commission (1996: 67) described Ward 
Policing as being likely to '...increase public reassxurance, reduce crime levels, increase 
detections, raise the status of the patrol constable and strengthen, inter-agency links.' 
However, in spite of the pressure for the police to become more responsive to local 
opinion, the pohce service still feared that the issues of economies of scale and cost 
effectiveness may result in regional 'super forces' (Bourne 1998). 
Further changes to the police organisation were suggested by the (Sheehey) Inquiry into 
Police Responsibility and Rewards (Cm 2281: 1993), a report considered to have been 
instigated and driven by the influence of market forces (Cope et al 1996). This report made 
a niunber of contentious recommendations m respect of stracture, suggesting that the 
management stracture was top heavy, and recommending the abolition of three of these 
hierarchical management levels. In terms of remuneration, it suggested the introduction 
of performance related pay, the removal of allowances, and new conditions of service, 
through fixed term contracts. However, as pointed out earlier, these, along with many 
other recommendations made in the report, have not been implemented. 
The Devon and Cornwall Constabulary - the organisational structure 
Prior to April 1994 organisational diagrams for the Devon and Comwall Constabulary 
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displayed the functional responsibilities of headquarters departments by specialisation, and 
dispersed into territorial divisions, each displaying the attributes of Weber's five 
prominent characteristics of bureaucracy and Fayol's aspects of managerially effective 
organisational design. 
Following^ traditional structure it set out the Chief Constable as effectively the managing 
dnector of the organisation, with a Deputy Chief Constable reporting directly to him and 
four Assistant Chief Constables (one of whom was a civihan Assistant Chief Officer) who 
ui turn report directly to the Deputy. In addition the Deputy Chief Constable had four staff 
departments organised by specialisation, for example an Executive Support Department, 
which also reported directly to hun. 
Each Assistant Chief Constable had responsibility by specialisation in respect of 
operational matters, crime matters, personnel, and finance/technical support. These 
general areas were further divided hierarchically by specialisation, for example 
operational matters include traffic branch, operations support, policy and planning. Each 
of these are further divided by specialisation and hierarchy through a rank structure 
generally consisting of a Chief Superintendent, Superintendent (s). Chief Inspector (s). 
Inspector (s). Sergeant (s). Constables, Civilian Staff, and Special Constabulary. 
In reality however the Force was not seen as exhibiting the expected top down 
organisational control, with Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary Report of the 
Force for 1990 (HM.S.O) suggesting it: 
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' operated within a strongly de-centralised organisational philosophy, proyiduig a 
considerable measure of autonomy to territorial commanders.' (para 2.17) and added the 
caveat of a need to strengthen central support to, amongst other things, '...ensure the 
communication, practice and monitoring offeree policy..' (ibid). 
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Fig 5 
The six territorial divisions were similarly organised both by specialisation, hierarchical 
chams of command, and through dispersed structures, resulting in twenty sub-divisions 
throughout the force, each with its own hierarchical system of control The organisation at 
this time gives the impression of decentralisation with monitoring and evaluation from the 
cenfre, a tall structure with many levels of management, low spans of confrol, and 
perpetuating the Sfreet Level and Management Level dichotomy, found in police 
organisations (Punch 1983, Reuss-Ianni & lanni 1983). 
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The Traditional Structure of Divisions and Sub-Divisions - Pre 1994 
Divisional Chief Superintendent 
Superintendent (D eputj^  
Sub-Divisional Superintendent 
Chief Inspector (Deputi^  
Sub-Divisional Superintendent 








Influencing chame: Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and The Audit 
Commission 
hi then- 1991 Report (H.M.S.O) the Inspectorate states that it is '....satisfied that the 
number and structure of territorial divisions are appropriate for the size of the force and the 
concentration of operational activity.' (para 2.39). 
Hov^ever the 1992 Report (H.M.S.O: para 8.5) referred to advice given to the Chief 
Constable by letter firom H.M.I.C that year on 'the structure and organisation...taking mto 
account the Audit Commission proposals'(referring to their Paper 9 of 1991 op cit) and 
making a number of recommendations: 
Leaner and flatter management structure. 
Removal of unnecessary supervisory ranks. 
Greater delegation of responsibility to divisional commanders. 
Setting local performance standards agreed by Chief Constable and Police 
Authority. 
A published system of measuring those standards. 
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• Local community consultetion and customer surveys. 
• Clear policing style based on commimity needs. 
• A performance review Inspectorate above the level 
of basic command units. 
As a result of their 'discussions' with the Chief Constable, JHer Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Constabulary reported that the force intended to 'undertake a wide ranging review uito the 
conunand structure at Chief Officer and Chief Superintendent levels within all areas of the 
force primarily concemed with the points raised in the Audit Commission Paper 
Number 9.' [para 8.6]. 
The Report for 1993 (H.M.S.O) noted that an evaluation of the force operational structure 
had commenced in 1992 and was based upon the previously noted letter from Her 
Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Audit Commission Report, which had 
'identified the potential for change in the existing force structure' (para 2.34). 
Consequently a project team was set up in January 1993 to undertake a 'comprehensive 
revision of the force headquarters structure' and the 'implementation of a new 
departmental structure embracing all aspects of operations, crime management, executive 
support, staff services and adminisfration and technical services.' (para 2.35). The next 
part of the project entails an '...option for change document in relation to divisional 
management stiuctures...' with 'identified savings in a number of senior management 
ranks' which could be implemented by April 1994. (para 2.36). 
The Force Stracture reproduced m the Chief Constables Annual Report 1996/97, shows the 
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Deputy Chief Constable as having three departments (Public Relations, Executive Support 
and hitemal Affans) which report directly to hun, and force headquarters retaining three 
force wide speciahst departments each headed by a Chief Officer: 
• Operations 
Criminal hivestigation Division 
Operations Division 
• Operations Support 





Support Services for Criminal Investigation and Operations Divisions 
• Finance & Admniistration 
Territorially the force was divided into nine geographical divisions in the form of 
dispersed structures. Each was led by a divisional management team headed by a 
divisional commander, and consisting of Chief Inspectors with particular responsibihties 
for criminal investigation, operational support and personnel, and a civihan administration 
officer. The use of sub-divisions and their corresponding rank structures and specialises 
within divisions were removed. Consequently the levels of management were reduced -
those which remained were given wider spans of control and the organisation was seen as 
becoming flatter in design. (Fig. 7). 
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The organisational diagram does not give ah mdication of the. chain of command between 
Divisional Commanders and Headquarters but this appears to remain unchanged. The 
design of territorial divisions does allow theih to become more co-tenninus with local 
authority boundaries than the previous arrangement. 
Divisional Organisational Diagram - 1994 to 1999 
Divisional Commander 1 





hi the 1994 Report (H.M.S.O) Her Majesty's Inspector made it clear that the force was 
undergoing great change and that the intention was to '....remove a tier of territorial 
management and introduce a flatter organisation which is more closely aligned to local 
communities.' (para 9.1). They go on to congratulate the Chief Constable for ' the bold 
and positive steps which he and his officers have taken to seek to implement i t ' (para 9.2). 
The report went on to criticise the force for failing to offer earlier and clearer guidance to 
divisions from the cenfre, leaving them to fmd their own answers to any occurring 
problems. The H.M.I. felt that further reviews would ascertam if management structures 
both in division and at headquarters were still 'too generous'. There was also concern that 
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the centrahsation of certam prune activities may result in 'diffiision of effort' and 'lack of 
co-ordination' at local level (para 9.3). 
The 1995 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary Report, the first after fiill 
implementation of the force organisational change, noted that 'Possibly a casualty of the 
re-organisation has been the loss of confidence in the formal internal consultative 
processes which should be addressed urgently.' (page 1). 
The 1996 Performance Review Inspection (H.M.S.O) report underlined the requirement 
for headquarters divisions to support territorial divisions which was not properly shown 
either in the planmng, decision making or resource allocation processes (pi) and went on 
to note that the re-structuring of the force had reduced supervisory ranks as a percentage of 
all officers '...from 43% m 1994 to 39% in 1996..' (para 4.22). 
By the tune of the 1997 Report (H.M.S.O) the Chief Constable had already unplemented 
another review of the force organisation to '...assess whether the origmal auns of re­
organisation have been met and recommending any additional changes..' and was expected 
to suggest options for rationahsing support services (para 2.2). 
More recently the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 has made it essential that all territorial 
divisions are co-terminous with local authority areas, in order that the necessary 
consultative and planning processes can be more easily complied with. This was noted in 
the 1998/99 Inspection Report (Home Office 1999) in that the Act will '...increasingly 
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affect policing style and impact on core business.. The current management structure needs 
to be clarified to take account of this significant change. This advice appears to have been 
accepted by the force, in that as from April 1999, the force now consists of four areas: 
Comwall, Plymouth, West Devon, and East Devon. Each headed by a Chief 
Superintendent or Area Commander, supported by an Assistant Area Commander, a 
Personnel OflBcer and an Admmisfration/Finance Officer. Each Area will provide its own 
policing plans, operations sfrategy, budget and personnel management, and adminisfration 
teams. Areas will be sub-divided into Districts, force-wide a total of sixteen, each 
following district or unitary political boimdaries, and headed by a Superintendent or Chief 
Inspector. 
Area Stmcture -1999 
Adninistiraiioii Pejsoittiel Assistant Area CxittE 














This latest change in organisational stracture took place after the research interviews with 
Top Corridor and Divisional Managers were completed. 
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Who were the major influencers ? 
Clearly, then, the 1990's saw considerable changes in the organisational structure for the 
Devon and Comwall Constabulary, many instigated by Central Government. However, 
headquarters had some degree of control over how changes were made, and this is 
reiflected in staff views of the process. Here we consider staff views under the headings: 
influencing change, why the change, how it was implemented, and future changes. 
For top corridor managers 
Overwhelming influence from the centre as this quote established: 
' The Audit Commission was the main influence and inevitably the H.M.I..' [12]. 
For divisional managers 
Views of these managers are summed up in the fohowing quote: 
'I think for me the most powerful influences come from the Audit Commission. The Audit 
Coimnission seem to presage any hne of approach. The HM.I.C then takes it on and 
between the two of them they tend to make the Chief Constable dance, and influence the 
changes. The primary changes tend to be those that are financially driven. So we're in 
the business of giving good value, or value for money. Those are the sort of things which 
tend to bring about changes. I'm not altogether sure that those on the table at the moment, 
taUcing about 30% increase in adminisfrative costs across the force, because you now have 
nine divisions. I'm not altogether sure that's the reason why we've got that rise in 
adminisfrative costs. I think we need to look far more closely at what is happening at 
headquarters, because I think we are far leaner [in division] and meaner. What we see is 
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that aU the admmistrative work is being, palmed oufto lis, delegated to us^  :and there's not. 
been a reduction behind us. If anything there's actually been an increase in admin 
admmistrative centralisation. Now therefore I think the actual pressures to change come 
specifically firom those two bodies in particular. Subsequently I don't feel that at the 
moment there's been sufficient examination of how those changes- are being evaluated, 
whether they've actually addressed the so called problems in the first place.' [45]. 
For ground level managers 
For Gxoimd Level Managers - the Chief Constable, the Audit Commission and the Home 
Office were seen to have the greatest influence: 
'The most influence must have come from the Home Office, Audit Conunission and the 
Chief Constable in person throughout the process of deciding how the force was to be 
reorganised. There was some consultation, there were some representatives, and these 
were made known to me, so that I could contact them if I had any ideas. These were put 
out through weekly orders and through regular documents that came out askmg for 
suggestions. So I think they did ask for ground root views, but I thmk that pressure was 
put on, mainly because the Audit Conunission and the Home Office were looking to save 
money and looking to make things more efficient and sfreamlined.' [24]. 
Another manager said: 
'I think the re-organisation along council boundary lines is another thing from the 
govermnent to make local people feel that they have got a little more confrol over then 
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police force, although I think it comes from Cenfral Government from whatever arm of. 
cenfral government. We fail m many areas because of the lack of resources at the front 
end. Money and energy has gone into the driving and technology side of things and 
research, but the balance of staffing is not right and if this were right we would be a lot 
more effective. There, are a lot of support divisions to the detriment of those which are 
operational. This is not the fault of Cenfral Government but of individual forces.'. [27]. 
Why was the structure chansed? 
For top corridor managers 
Most 'top corridor' managers and staff believed that these changes had been made to 
flatten the organisational structure by removing a management tier and carried out as a 
result of influence from the cenfre: 
'The changes came from an Audit Conunission report saying that the police service was 
top heavy in terms of management costs and required a cut of ten per cent which in turn 
would get more bobbies on the beat. Less management and more work on the sfreets with 
more supervision. The force saw that the old system of sub-divisions was obsolete. The 
structure should be headquarters and divisions. To do this it has increased the number of 
divisions but all the little sub-divisions with Chief Inspector ranks went, leaving only 
Inspectors at. the old sub-divisional levels. This proved to be a model for police forces 
through out England and Wales to follow. The H.M.I then took it fiurther during his 
inspection process in respect of management on costs and said to the force, what are you 
doing about i t ' [12]. 
And: 
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We were already aligned with local authority boundaries. The force was trying to get 
ahead of the game and tried to make changes which it believed would have to be made 
through pressure from the cenfre but that eventually didn't materialise. The whole thing 
was handled very badly.' [8]. 
^ For divisional managers ' . 
Divisional Managers followed a similar view with one manager seeing the force reaction 
as 'second guessing': 
'Effectively it started from Sheehey and it started from the push that was there and 
through the H.M.I to look at basic conunand units. It was 'Z ' Department's (as it was then) 
job to review how basic command imits could brought into the force - i f that was the best 
way forward. And within that there were some good decisions that have lasted the test of 
time, that came from that, one of them was making co-terminus boimdaries with local 
authorities, which was the right move. It second guessed "Batton" but it second guessed it, 
well the only one it got wrong was Exeter, because it was second guessed that Exeter may 
well be a imitary authority and it turned out not to be so.' [54]. 
And: 
'I think its all about money. Its all about cause and effect and the budgets that the police 
force spends nationally apart from the freasiuy set up. It probably was time for a change 
anyway. I have no problem with the new structure. I think that we were in a management 
construct, top heavy with managers, and I think that was recognised and that was one 
positive effect of Sheehey and it receives my total support. I think we are better for it, but 
the whole motivation probably wasn't any altruistic concern about improving the service, 
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taking us thfoiigh to the year 2000 and the rest of it. It was all about how much bloody 
money could we save.' [31]. 
For ground level managers 
Generally a deshe to save money: • • ' 
'In terms of pohce management, yes, there was an excessive tier of management which 
was quite rightly identified. However the savings in terms of salary were not actually re­
directed to where they were needed and were absorbed for other reasons, that's not to front 
line policing.' [29]. 
And: 
'For this division unitary status was being talked about at the time but the driving force 
behind it all was the desne to save money. [32]. 
How was change implemented^ 
For the top corridor 
Many Top Corridor managers said that the changes were decided and unplemented by a 
special project team, with the assistance of work groups throughout the force: 
'A special projects team managed the unplementation and the policy. There were also a 
number of working groups to decide how to implement and what the implications would 
be of the change. A number of news letters were also published and distributed to 
members of the force.' [3]. 
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It was generally agreed that this was not a standard approach to pohcy implementatioxL, 
many were' mihappy with the process and the end product, the main complaint being that 
implementation was too rushed with uisufficient consultation with staiff: 
'...done without a lot of thought as a result of demands from outside and elsewhere and 
all done urgently, as a result it was infroduced so rapidly that.it was very inefficient for the 
first few years.'[14]. 
For divisional managers 
Divisional Managers saw the decision making process in respect of organisational changes 
through special project teams or working parties, implemented through a top down 
approach, which they consider to be the standard method: 
'To my knowledge they set up a force review team which reviewed it. Now we've got 
more pilots ui this force than we had in world war one and two put together, and they're 
still going on. But yes, it was promulgated from on high, and review teams came out and 
spoke to divisional commanders to seek then views, which went back up. Some things 
were taken on board others weren't. I see this as standard practice, some of it is good. I 
mean there's a lot of good ideas, and probably more ideas, from the lads on the grotmd 
than there actually is from the top and if the system only works once under the present 
system and you get a positive result then that's good.' [38]. 
Views on its top down implementation ranged from the philosophical: 
'There was a debate at the time as to whether we had set up working groups to set up the 
re-structures over a twelve month period or actually get on with it, and deal with it through 
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what I call rapid prototyping, whichis just rebuilding it and do it as we go along, which is 
what we did, we did for the second one. The reason for not gouig with the more structured 
approach was that we knew that if we studied it for a year by the time we got to the end of 
the year it would be a different world and you couldn't dot every dot, cross every tee, 
because we were going into the imknown in so many areas. So I think rapid prototyping 
actually worked. It gave us a better value but I think it caused more chaos and probably 
higher anxiety levels, and I've just been reading some stuff about other forces who wanted 
a more studied approach actually found themselves going into rapid prototyping because 
they found that the only way to go forward.' [53]. 
To the blunt reply: 
'I would say it was presented as a fait accomph to the employees of the organisation 
without much consultation.' [46]. 
For groimd level managers 
Grotmd level managers were not fully conversant with the decision making and 
implementation processes mvolved in the changes to the organisation, but most of those 
who did, felt that it was generally a top down approach with some consultation: 
'Smack bang wallop! We did have a consultation process, saying we wanted ward officers, 
with the city broken up into political wards with a sergeant nmning his own ward because 
we feel we have to give the constable back to the community - but we've got to have this 
ability to respond, so you have to have response units. So Russ Mitchell put this plan 
together and there was consultation and there was a bit of tweaking but then it was "Right 
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' E ' Division we are going to do it on April 9* 1.994!". It.wasdone.a year before anyone 
else it was up and numing, before any one else had even put a plan in. It was that quick: 
you are going to have nine divisions and get on with it, but here, because of the strength of 
character of the Divisional Commander, he has the support of everybody and this is why it 
has worked. .This doesn't always happen. We were all told on the 9th April you. will be 
here you will be there and we were and within a week it was up and running. This is iiot 
normally how this sort of policy would be unplemented. Wheels usually turn very slowly.' 
[21]. 
Or perhaps more cynically: 
'I think that some of the consultation that went on was done as a man management 
exercise rather than actually takmg on board the feelings of the staff. They can say they 
have consulted but really they are hstening but taking no notice.' [19]. 
Future changes 
Top Corridor managers were confident that there would be further changes to the 
organisational structure as mdicated by this manager: 
'Yes, because the decisions taken were based upon the influencing factors at the time. 
Some of these may haive changed. There may be therefore an opportunity to further 
rationahse the structure of divisions in the future' [1]. 
Divisional Managers strongly believed that there would be changes to the organisation 
over the next few years, some to greater centrahsation: 
'I have a feeling that in fact it will become more centralised. Less independence and again 
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I think that's because of financial considerations more than operational need. It's been my . 
experience that organisations which are under pressure financially claw back and take 
greater and greater control from the centre: whereas in more favourable times they are 
quite happy to devolved and let people do their own thing. So my own view is that I think 
thatdivisions could ill fact get bigger.'[31]. . • . - , 
Whilst there is always someone who has seen it all before: 
'Yes, we're forever changing aren't we and you've got people who are bringing in these 
changes, who all think it's a damned good idea but a lot of it has been tried before 
anyway.' [52]. 
However, divisional managers did not envisage that pohce areas/divisions would ever 
become autonomous units within the host force, most based this upon logistical 
difficulties. This was a typical response: 
'That's an extreme and if it happens it will be a retrograde step because no division on its 
own has the resources to deal vwth every issue that comes up and despite the difficulties 
there are with the 'support divisions' the concept of 'O' , ' L ' and " M ' is right. [41]. 
Orzanisational structure - a question of terminolosyl 
Top Corridor Managers considered that the force stincture at the time of the research was 
one based upon the concept of 'Basic Command Units'. One replied: 
'Yes. However the Chief Constable would be semantic and say that there is nothing basic 
about a police command unit' [10]. 
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Like the.Top Comdor Managers,- most divisional managers saw'the force as taking on 
board the general principle of basic command imits, although many felt there were 
problems of defining the concept: 
'In a different name yes. I think what you have is you've got a number of forces up and 
down the country using different nomenclature for their policing -systems. There's 
commimity pohcing. basic cominand units you've got sub-division? that others hay? and 
other police units having different names.' [43]. 
And: 
'Yes all our divisions are B.C.U's but in another name. It's just that the decision was that 
we wouldn't wish to go with that terminology in this constabulary. Leading on from that 
however there has been a huge argument as to which devolvement is appropriate to a 
B.C.U or a division. If the cenfral confrol and influence is right you'll get a whole range of 
opinions about that.' [22] 
Ground Level Managers also believed that the force structure was based on a form of basic 
conunand units: 
'I'm not really sure how big a basic command unit can be. We've got a basic command 
unit in Plymouth with a commander m charge of it. You could have a B.C.U, well we 
have units out in divisions with inspectors in charge and each is a B.C.U, so I don't know 
how well it works elsewhere but that's the style the force is buih on.' [32]. 
Wardpolicing 
The 'basic command unit' in operation in Plymouth at the time of the research was 
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referred to as 'Ward Policing' to further compound the terminology issue. 
Described by one member of the Top Corridor as giving: 
' total ownership of the problems of an area to a given number of officers and when 
they go home they retam these problems until they next return to duty. This gives them a 
commitment to trying to solve these probleins. The political ward was chosen as it is the 
smallest 'Joe-political' area where each ward has three elected councillors and larger 
councils tend to divide their own resources from the cenfre using the ward system.' [10] 
And that to measure its success it requned a 'before and after' process: 
'One would be by the 'before and after' method, and by looking ahead to compare current 
crime and incident records with those when ward pohcing is at its peak. It must be seen 
agreed that now there are many more absfractions from ward teams to support the response 
teams. Also qualitative public surveys as well as comparing specifics for example crime 
patterns.' [8]. 
However there was a problem of defining success: 
'The problem is how do we measure success. We need a debate to ask what pohcmg is 
before we understand success. Operational policing sfrategy is required to encompass 
ward pohcing, pafrol and maintain public reassurance. We do not know where these 
things fit into each other. I believe the government see it as a crime confrol model only.' 
[4]. 
The majority view was that it was a system that suited a large urban area, to provide both a 
community policing approach, as well as a parallel quick response to immediate problems, 
and where policing could be organised alongside existing political boundaries. They did 
however consider it a scheme that could be used in a number of other areas vwithin the 
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force and there were comments that this had happened already; there had also been 
considerable interest from other forces, from the R M . I and the Audit Commission. 
Divisional Managers beheved that the system was effective for an urban area such as 
Plymouth where it had been given considerable momentum by the divisional conunander 
at that time: 
'It was Mr. Mitchell's [the former Divisional Commander] sfrategy because it was down to 
each commander in each division to make the best use of their resources and each 
commander made that decision.' [23]. 
But not just in Plymouth: 
'We've got a similar system here. I think it was mfroduced into Plymouth because the 
divisional commander had the foresight to do so but my knowledge of policing in 
Plymouth is not good' [44]. 
Most Divisional Managers saw the success of the system in terms of public satisfaction: 
'fri a number of ways. In terms of pubhc opmion, political opinion too, my own 
understandmg is that on both those counts there would be ructions in Plymouth if we tried 
to disband the ward system because it is very popular with the politicians and by 
unplication by a lot of the public. People like to know that they have their own pohce 
officers working in their areas and the ward system is designed to provide them with that. 
So that is one level where you can measure success through public esteem.[22]. 
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Ground level managers interviewed worked within ,the-Ward Pohcing structure: Most, of 
them believed that this system was introduced because it suited Plymouth and was 
supported by the then divisional cormnander: 
'The divisional commander who is very progressive and has done a lot of things here much 
of which has spread to the rest of the force. It has spread to other parts of the force but it 
doesn't necessarily work iri other parts of the force where as you have all the infrastructure, 
here and its working very well.' [25]. 
Once again ground level managers see public satisfaction as the measurement for its 
success: 
'I think firstly there is a public perception and an agency perception as well with the 
people we work with at ward level be it councillors, volimtary groups and agencies, they 
are certainly very positive about it and also the influence that ward teams have and the 
success they have in the projects and mitiatives they run.' [28]. 
And: 
'Public opinion. Which is good. This is done through headquarters. It is good but perhaps 
not as good as in other places where they are less busy, remembering that we have 28% of 
the force crime here. We are pretty busy but you would never have seen a policeman on 
the beat before.' [16]. 
The outcomes of orsanisatioml change 
Communication - internal and external 
Most Top Corridor managers felt that the organisational structure at the time of the 
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research-did not provide for good mtemal communication, between local commanders and 
headquarters, vdth blocks and black holes, for example: 
'Probably very poor. The flow of information up the organisation is slow but it works. It 
doesn't filter down very effectively however. I don't think the system is in place to allow 
this. I sure many people think that headquarters is the black hole of the force which 
.everything disappears into'[9]. • 
However most Divisional Managers felt that changes to the organisational stracture prior 
to 1999 did give better local connnimication: 
'There is plenty of liaison and good communication. Both Divisional Commanders I have 
worked with have put themselves out to ensure they have good conununication with 
members of the local commimity. I think the police service leads the way in all 
organisations now in communicating with the public and being accessible, so I think it's 
good and effective.' [20]. 
Externally they felt that changes to the stracture had resulted in better communication 
between the public. Divisional Commanders and Chief Officers, although views varied as 
to how this had been achieved. This comment is a good summary: 
'You could say that removmg the sub-divisions hasn't helped but removing a tier of middle 
management may have assisted communication. The number of police liaison groups has 
also increased and may make communication better. We have more geographically based 
responsibility. Inspectors and urban ward sergeants now have this responsibility rather 
than divisional commanders, as previously, which improves communication with the 
public. Removal of a layer of middle management makes the organisation rely upon a 
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concerted effort by members of the Divisional Management Teams to cormnunicate 
because there are less of them and more inspectors. It is harder work for them but the 
information they receive is better and more realistic' [3]. 
Many ground level managers suggested that commmiicationhad improved: 
'Intemally within this division we are far more responsive to public needs and issues and 
that's mainly through the setting up of the ward structure, the conmnmity structure.' [28]. 
However problems were highlighted with communication between divisions and 
headquarters: 
'We now have three divisions in Plymouth, all fighting their own comer. You've got ' E ' 
Division policing out on the street, you've got ' M ' Div. dealing with the prisoners and is 
telling ' E ' Div. what to do. Papers then go to an Admin Support Unit in ' M ' division that 
say what they are going to do with those papers and they tell ' E ' division what they do or 
don't want. You've got ' 0 ' Division which takes the telephone calls from members of the 
pubhc and work the radios and they decide how quickly ' E ' Division will respond to those 
calls. You've got ' L ' Division who deal with serious crune in ' E ' Division. You have five 
divisions but they do get together and talk around a table. Well the inspectors have 
meetings but all they do is agree to disagree. I would suggest because they've all got their 
own budgets and they are fighting their own battles. For instance you've got an inspectors 
meetuig where you'll sit aroimd a table but at the end of the day the 'A.S.U' Inspector 
doesn't come down there vdth the attitude that we've got a problem in ' E ' Division that we 
must resolve. He is ' M ' Division and ' E ' Division is causmg hun problems. The 
'Management Team' for ' M ' Division is based at Exeter and I would suggest that they do 
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not conununicate with ' E ' Division 'Management Team' at Plymouth.."When a major 
crime is committed, like the on going murder enquiry here, then ' L ' Division take control 
but in doing so they take staff from ' E ' Division, so do we really need a separate ' L ' 
Division under these cncumstances. Even our crime squads and intelligence officers are 
all ' L ' Division. We have created lots of Divisions which are putting up barriers.' [34]. 
However information technology was seen to canyout a 'big-brother' role in respect of 
how incidents were dealt with at a local level: 
'Since the force took on its 'IT' systems with the computer for example everyone in the 
organisation has great conununication skill right through the organisation. The paper-less 
system we have got is excellent. Sometimes it is too good and you find that someone at 
headquarters is making decisions on the computer message log for you on the job you are 
doing down here. It can be too good.' [16]. 
The views of front line staff 
Front line staff were questioned in respect of the most recent change to the organisational 
structure. Constables saw the Chief Constable, senior managers in the force and the Home 
Office/Cenfral Govermnent as the major influencers. They were almost unanimous in the 
view that they themselves, and public opinion had little or no influence over these changes. 
These views were echoed by those of the Sergeants: except that they were unsure about 
the influence of the Audit Commission and A.C.P.0 (28.6% not knowing in each case) 
and H.M.I.C (with 25% not knovwng). Details of their responses are shown in the figures 
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Accepting the problems of terminology; front line staff were asked if the present force 
structure consisted of 'basic command units'. Of the sergeants, 69% either strongly 
agreed or agreed that this was the case. The views of the constables were less positive 
v^th 44.8% either disagreeing or sfrongly disagreeing that this was the case (Fig. 11). 
Although the percentage of those who neither agreed nor disagreed from both groups is 
remarkably similar, there is a more positive acknowledgement of the introduction of 
B.C.U's from all levels of the organisation, apart from front line staff. 
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Fig: 11 
Front line staff were also asked if they saw the Basic Command Unit system employed in 
Plymouth under the heading of Ward Pohcing, as an effective method of combining a 
desire for inunediate response policing with that of conununity policing (n = 95). The 
results (see Fig. 12) indicate that front line staff are critical of Ward Policing, and by 
inference Basic Command Units, in this context. It would seem therefore that the views of 
The Audit Commission, The Home OfTice, and senior managers in the Devon and 
Comwall Constabulary are at odds in respect of the effectiveness of the use of 
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B.C.U's, with practitioners at ground level, who felt they were not consulted in the first 
instance. 
EFFECTIVENESS OF WARD POLICING -
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Despite the changes made to the force structure over the last ten years, its formal structural 
characteristics are designed according to classical organisational theory and management 
ideology. It remains a hierarchical organisation - a rational bureaucracy, with internal 
communication seen as problematical. 
It is both rank and power centred, with an emphasis on control. This control is achieved 
through information technology (which is easily accessed throughout the force) and 
through centralisation and specialisation: this, despite the fact that policing is a process 
which requires quick responses to change, and with a decentralised organisational diagram 
for the force, one would expect the organisation to be more organic than it actually is. 
Examination of Constabulary Armual Reports, and documents published by The Audit 
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Commission and H.M.I, clearly indicate the strength of mfluence that these two groups had 
upon the changes made to the organisational structure of the force. 
This is supported by those interviewed, who suggested that the changes were made for 
politipal and economic reasons, with the result that there is no evidence to indicate an 
improvement in members' shared meaning of the goals of the organisation, nor anything to 
indicate that the changes have been other than 'bolted on' to the existing organisational 
arrangements, resulting in 'fragmented cenfralisation'. 
Overall the research, from published documents and from the existence of a general 
agreement at all levels of management, indicates that the Chief Constable, Her Majesty's 
Inspectorate of Constabulary, the Audit Commission and the Home Office had the greatest 
mfluence upon the mfroduction of these changes, with employees and staff 
associations/unions having had the least influence. 
Although a large percentage of front line officers felt that they made a difference to 
policing in the city, they are not convinced that an organisational structure based on Basic 
Command Units is an effective system of combining pro-active and re-active policing; ui 
spite of the opposite view expressed in an Audit Commission Report. Even though they 
are important decision makers at the point of service delivery, they feel that they have had 
little impact upon how changes in the orgamsational structure were decided. 
The next chapter will consider the influences placed upon the policy making and 
implementation processes within this organisational structure. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE POLICY PROCESS 
Although often quoted, Cunningham's (1960: 229) remark that, 'Pohcy is rather like an 
elephant - you recognise it when you see it but cannot easily dejSne it.', remains valid to 
this day. Perhaps even more so, with divisions in society now making agreement on policy 
goals much more problematical, where there now tends to be 'marginal changes' in policy 
rather than new policy approaches (Radin 1997:213). 
It also has to be acknowledged that the central/local relationship in policy making and 
implementation has been seriously undermined over the last twenty years. This can be seen 
through the haemorrhaging of power firom local govermnent to appointed Quangos and 
Agencies (Twine 1994:87) where decision making is ofi:en made out of the public view 
(Sperling 1998) and under pressure from cenfral government in many pohcy areas (Laffin 
1989: 30). A situation which can cause tension between cenfral policy makers and local 
implementers. 
Policy and practice - the problems of definition 
Separating policy making and implementation may be achieved in the private sector, 
which is more product orientated, by suggesting, for example, that policy making is a 
theoretical consideration and implementation a practical one: where implementation 
means to rigidly follow the comrses of action set out in that policy without considering its 
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overall aims or problems (Dunn 1981: 56). However, this approach is especially difficult 
in a police organisation: firstly because it is a process rather than a product', where 
science cannot provide clear answers to our social problems (Williams 1980); secondly 
because of the considerable discretion given to staff at its lower levels (Wilson 1968, 
Bottomleyl973: Ch. 2, Scraton 1985:40-57, Waddington 1993, Morgan and Newbum 
1997: 82); and thirdly because there is little direct supervision over ground level staff 
(Mun 1977). 
Policy making continues during the course of unplementation. In fact Hogwood & Gimn 
(1989:198) argue that there is no division between policy formation and implementing that 
policy, whilst Heclo (1972: 85) blurs the distinction even fiorther by stating that policy 
should be not be considered as any specific decisions or actions but rather as a cornse of 
action or inaction. 
Because the implementation process is interactive, any consequent responses to a given 
pohcy whilst it is being implemented may result in it being influenced or changed (Barrett 
& Fudge 1981: 26), especially where implementation can only be achieved through 
negotiation and bargaining. This applies to both inter and intra-organisational interaction, 
and is particularly relevant to the concept of a partnership approach to crime and disorder. 
Policy 
The term 'policy' is problematical: ranging from a decision, to a general view. It is hard to 
pin-point whether policy is made, or whether it evolves during implementation ( Hill 
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1997 [a]). Although policy is an 'amorphous' subject, Hogwood & Guim (1989:13-19) 
have identified ten categories, all of which are applicable to the research: 
• As a label for a field of activity, a policy space or 'stance' (Friend et al 1974). 
• As an expression of general pmpose or desired state of affans. 
• As specific proposals. 
• As decisions of government. 
• As formal authorisation through Act of Parliament to permit/requhe such activity. 
• As a programme. A package of legislation, organisation and resources. 
• As output, what is actually delivered, rather than what has been proposed. 
• As outcome. What is actually achieved. 
• As a theory or model in respect of cause and effect. 
• As a process. 
Policy is also a series or weave of many different decisions and actions (Easton 1953:130 
quoted in Ham & Hill 1987) which are carried out within a policy network involving the 
interrelationship of three elements; public policies, policy stakeholders and policy 
environments (Dunn 1981:47). 
Pubhc policies, Dunn (ibid) suggests, are decisions made by govenunental bodies or 
officials, and the interrelationships between these three elements can be identified by 
policy decisions made by The Home Office: 




• Policy stakeholders: those who can affect public .policy such as the Chief Constable, 
Audit Conunission, and pressure groups. 
• Policy environment: being the immediate context in which policy issues occur and are 
influenced by the various stakeholders. 
Practice 
Hill (1997 [a].pp375 -385) argues that when the implementation of most pohcy fields is 
clbseiy examined it can be ascertained that: 
• New initiatives probably have scope for multi-choices in the policy making process. 
• Policy initiatives require support from people who have made compromises to reach 
the policies they value. 
• Many policy initiatives are intended to solve earlier policy problems. 
• The majority of policy initiatives enter policy arenas which are 'crowded' where their 
affect is likely to be minimal. 
• Many policies, particularly in policing, address issues of resoincing, measuring and 
structure, rather than outputs which directly change the services provided to the public. 
Within the police organisation top down confrol over policy implementation through 
complete and perfect compliance is difficult (even assimiing that implementation is just 
'the stage between decision and operation to make operational what has been decided.' 
[WiUianas 1980:1]), not only for the reasons previously discussed but because of: 
• The multitude of services the organisation provides. 
• The difficulty of setting tight and unambiguous objectives for each service. 
• The links in the chain of command are not tight enough. 
• The expertise of specialists providing services at groimd level is greater than that of 
then managers. 
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Unlike the private sector, services provided by the police are free at pomt of issiie, 
consequently there is often a perceived need by sfreet level staff to slowdown or ration the 
demands upon these services. This is possible because prospective consumers have to 
argue their need with an expert, who can confrol the situation through professional 
knowledge and power (Day & Klien 1987). Such experts can use their power base yvifhin 
the organisation to change public policy, either by not taking, into account organisational 
rules (enabling them to relate more easily to then peers and adapt to the public who use 
the services they provide), or through informal routines, working practices and methods 
(Blau 1955). These so called 'sfreet level bureaucrats' have evolved practices to make 
then working life easier, so that what they decide to do franslates into the policy they carry 
out (Lipsky 1980: xii) turning the customer/client relationship into essentially a 
social/organisational construct rather than a legal one. (Fineman 1998). 
Research into this phenomenon suggests that public policy reforms have not been fiilly 
implemented by sfreet level bureaucrats who were more concemed with rationing claims 
and scarce resources than implementing new policies (Meyers et al 1998). 
The issue of 'gatekeepers' in public services becomes more apparent in policing, because 
many recipients are socially powerless and have gone to the police as a last resort 
(Waddington 1993). Although, as Doem (1993) infers when he writes of 'co-
determination of public services', to be effective the pubhc have to contact the police in 
the first instance, either as consumers or in terms of active citizenship. These 'citizens as 
clients' are at the same time both the targets and the final agents in the policy process, who 
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together can produce pohcy outcomes. And of course, not all recipients of pubhc services 
are merely 'passive consumers' (Hasenfeld 1983, Hasenfeld 1992, Johnston 1992). 
How much consideration is given to the effects of implementation upon policy, at the 
decision making stage, in terms of 'backward mapping'- as suggested by Elmore (1979), 
to discover how implementation affects policy, remains to be seen. It is arguable whether 
police organisations (as opposed to private sector organisations) would easily fit into any 
of the four models he suggests as being essential to the study of implementation namely: 
• The systems management model - value maximising with implementation ordered and 
goal directed. 
• The bureaucratic process model - emphasising the role of discretion and routme 
behaviour with implementation controlling discretion and routine. 
• The organisational development model - the need for individual participation and 
commitment where implementers shape and own the policies. 
• The conflict bargaining model - treating organisations as areas of conflict with 
implementation a bargaining process. 
(Elmore 1978:185). 
Decision making 
Throughout the processes involved m policy formulation and implementation there lies the 
fimdamental ingredient of decision makmg. This has been analysed in terms of three 
elements (Rivett 1994:19): 
1. The range of choice. 
2. The Consequences of each of these choices. 
3. The objective(s) involved. 
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Decisionmaking is central to the study of the process through which policies are both 
decided and implemented (Smith & May 1980: 1). However it is withm the organisational 
context, that this notion becomes complex. This is firstly because of 
• Ambiguity in respect of issues, preferences, and information. 
• Decision makers often formpartofan ongoing policy process.. . 
• hicentives and penalties may have an adverse affect. 
• Middle management decisions can be repeat decisions on similar issues. 
• Conflict and power issues in organisation effect decision makmg. 
(Shapna 1997). 
Secondly, particularly in the policmg policy arena, the decision makers can be citizens 
and recipients of policy as well as being those in an authorised position (Hambrick 1998: 
533). 
It is also important to understand that most organisations do not actively look for problems 
fihat entail decision making, this is only done when it is faced with a potential problem, and 
even then to prevent uncertainty, it will attempt to find answers that provide speedy 
feedback (Hill 1979: 93). This is particularly true in the case of policy and decision 
making in the police. 
A number of models have been developed to describe decision making within the public 
administrative process, and these can be placed into three historical periods (Self 1997): 
• Prior to 1900. The attempt to attain impartial implementation of policy by separating 
public administiation from political intervention. 
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• 1945 to 1970. An 'exceptionally rich period of administratiorl theory' which 
considered the actions of bureaucrats, goals, tactics and the removal of the insulated 
public administrators of the previous period. 
• From 1975 an era of new public management (Pollit 1990) where pubhc servants 
pursued their own personal goals, with lean public administration and the application 
of market principles, even though such principles were seriously flawed because public 
administration is different to. private administration which has no market parallel (Self 
1993). 
Work published between 1945 and 1970, particularly that of March, Lindblom and Perrow 
remain as relevant today as when they were first pubhshed (Armson & Paton 1994: 155-
174, Heimnan et al 1997: 21). Papers first published by Herbert Simon in 1945 and since 
reprinted, provide the seminal work for the development of decision making models and 
became 'the basis of two decades of development of the theory of choice' (March 1978). 
Taking as his starting point that a decision is making a choice between different options, 
Simon goes on to describe rational choice as a decision between a munber of alternatives 
which will achieve a desired goal. His Rational Comprehensive Model takes the following 
form: 
• Set out the desired overall goals. 
• Set out the available means to achieve them. 
• List the means to maximise the decision makers values. 
• Consider any alternatives means. 
• List the cost and value of each. 
• Reconsider the available means which maximise values. 
• Choose the best one. 
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The model is accepted as being an ideal type and is dependent upon the subjective nature-
of the choice environment (Elster 1986). Simon went on to amend this model by 
suggesting that choice remained a rational process but was bounded, substituting 
'economic man' with 'administrative man' who, using past organisational experience, 
limits the alternatives by choosing those which will satisfy the required standard, known as 
satisficing. 
March (1994) beheves that decision makers will always try to find answers that will best 
suit then own organisational mterests (pl7), that the idea of 'maximising' alternative 
policy choices means choosing the best alternative, whilst 'satisfyuig' means choosmg an 
alternative which will exceed a given target. Having said this he goes on to say, 'Decision 
makers often seem to satisfice rather than maximise', (pi 8). 
Further criticisms of models of rational choice, came from Lindblom (1959, 1979) who 
disagreed with the 'means/end' approach and went on to describe a model of 
'incrementalism' or muddling through'. A system of 'making successive limited 
comparisons' by assessing information, values, means and ends at the same time, reachmg 
the desned goals by comparing various policy options, m terms of what they are achieving 
and making changes when required. The aim is to ensure agreement on the policy without 
a need to agree the most appropriate method of achieving the agreed goal. However power 
relationships between the groups involved in this process may mean that partisan mutual 
adjustments to policies (where independent decision makers in an organisation adapt to 
each other decisions) cannot be frilly achieved (Harrison et al 1990). 
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Writing in 1967 Etzioni described a model consisting of a mixture of ftie rational 
comprehensive models and incrementalism which he called 'mixed scanning'. This 
involves two phases: 
• First a broad search of general policy alternatives are considered and listed. 
• From this list decisions are made incrementally in terms of specific details or 
problems. 
The caveat to such decision making processes is of course that the alternatives, 
consequences, and preferences for the political actors who are able to make these choices 
are often constrained by the 'institutional context' in which they operate (March & Olsen 
1996). 
Richardson & Jordan (1979) suggest that rational and mcremental pohcy making systems 
have been seen as two alternatives as extremes along a continuum, but that in practice 
there is remarkable agreement between them. Forced to choose they would describe 
decision making ui Britain as being mcremental. This view is echoed by Hill (1997: 78) 
who sees the incrementalist approach as being 'easy to apply to social policy'. 
Pubhc administration has been subjected to initiatives to reduce bureaucrats, to encourage 
greater co-operation between public agencies, the business community, and voluntary 
groups, to improve local policy initiatives (Osbone & Gaebler 1992) and a reduced role for 
the interventionist state, but at the same time there has been a corresponding increase in 
the regulationary state (Majone 1997). There still remains the virtuous triangle of the 
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individual, the state^  and society/conununity where the case for the autonomous individual 
and his/her liberated relationship with the state is clear, as is the historical presence of 
some form of community, and their relationships with each other. The problem today is 
who is the senior partner and who the junior ( Norman 1996) . In terms of the Police 
Authority Annual Policing Plmi for example^ the search for an effective method of using 
democracy to its fullest,' by giving absentees a voice .in order to improve the influence of 
the ordinary citizen rather than those from elite groups (Lmdblom & Woodhouse 1993) 
continues. 
Therefore it may be too early to assimie the demise of the fraditional bureaucrat: indeed as 
the work of March and Simon suggests such bureaucratic tasks are still unportant 
(Kooiman 1993). 
The issue of power 
It is all very well to consider various models of decision making and implementation 
processes but of course, they caimot be applied to a policy issue if that pohcy does not 
reach the political agenda. Hogwood and Guim (1989) suggest that there are six general 
cncumstances which make a new policy issue most likely to reach an agenda: 
• An issue has reached crisis proportions. 
• The issue underlines a greater problem which needs to be faced. 
• An issue has an emotive impact. 
• The issue will have a wide unpact upon" society as a whole. 
• The issue is one which raises questions of power, authority and legitimacy. 
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• An issue has become popular and is in the public eye for some reason. 
Earlier work by Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1963; 1970) pomted out that issues also fail to 
reach the agenda because power relationships withm the political process ensure that 
contentious, issues do not become subject of public discussion, thereby suppressing conflict 
through 'non-decision making'. Limiting practical decision making to 'safe' issues by 
utilising dommant conununity values, accepting prevailing power relationships, and 
ensuring that 'when non decision making occurs, issues do not even become matters for 
decision': they remain latent and do not enter the decision making process. If conflict can 
be found then non decision making does not occur (Hill 1997). 
The issue of power according to Dahl (1957) is one where one person has the power over 
another so that he can get that person to do what they would not otherwise do. He went on 
to suggest that although no one group was powerless to affect decision making, neither was 
any group dominant (Dahl 1958). Power can only be imderstood by examining the 
relationships of those actors involved in the decision making process. Through the analysis 
of the decisions that have been made, where there have been differences of opinion 
between the actors in question (Ham & Hill 1984). The confiision arises when we have to 
differentiate between power and the concepts of authority, influence, manipulation and 
force (Glegg 1997: 79). 
Essentially then, in a pluralistic political system power is fragmented and diffused, and 
the basic picture presented by the pliuralist is of a political market place where what a 
group achieves depends upon its resources and its decibel rating (HiU 1997 [b]: 33). 
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With recent emphasis upon consultation in respect of police, policy, the issue of powerand 
its affect upon the decision making process, for example in terms of Annual Policing 
Plans, is an interesting concept. Even more so, i f v^ e^ consider the relationships between 
the key players in the policy making process, relationships which some commentators (for 
example Savage et al 1996) saw the Police and Magistrates Courts Act of 1994 aS; being 
likely to change. 
Lukes (1974) third dimension of power is an important issue ui this context; its existence 
having been noted in early research into the relationship between a Chief Constable and 
his Police Authority (Brodgen 1977). Lukes argues that power can be put mto three 
dimensions: 
• Power employed by actors m observed overt conflict over major issues ui the policy 
arena (Plurahsm). 
• Power employed by actors in observed covert or overt conflict over issues or possible 
issues before they reach the policy arena (non-decision making). 
• The third dimension - the power to shape peoples' views so that neither overt or covert 
conflict exists - 'latent conflict'. 
The essence of this third dimension is the ability of an actor to shape another actor's 
perceptions in order to persuade him or her to accept, value and not to question the status 
quo for any reason, without that person being aware that such power is being exercised. 
' A exercises power over B when A affects B in a maimer contrary to B's interests.' (ibid 
p27), and in domg so negates conflict. Therefore the absence of conflict does not mean 
that power has not been used or that a consensus is genuine. 
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Decisions in organizations involve processes of power and conflict between groups, 
v^ dthin the organization. From this poiiit of view a particular decision or a particular 
structure is not an expression of the organisation's goals but of the ability of particular 
groups to impose their definition of the situation and their solution to it on other groups 
within the organisation (Morgan 1991:81). 
Wildavsky (1979) believes that it is more effective to undertake policy analysis than it is to 
describe what policy analysis is, a view for which I have some sympathy, tlowever some 
concepts of policy analysis and decision making have been tiecessary, as a foundation for 
the research. 
It has been suggested that policy analysis can be separated into two areas: analysis of 
policy and analysis for policy. Or descriptive, how policies are made and prescriptive, 
how policies should be made (Hogwood & Gunn 1989: 3). In. respect of social policy 
issues, analysis has concentrated on the rationale behmd policy, its operation, and its goals 
(Gordon Lewis and Young 1977), a route I intend to take in terms of considering control 
of, and local autonomy in, policing policy and practice. Concentrating on the descriptive, 
rather than the prescriptive. 
The policy making process - planned policing to policing plans 
Historically Central Government has attempted to control policing policy, for example, for 
experimental purposes, between 1969 and 1974, some police forces were subjected to a 
method of measuring performance in terms of cost benefit analysis under a Home Office 
'Programming and Budgeting System', which was eventually abandoned, partly because of 
difficulties in defining separate police functions (Horton & Smith 1988). 
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However, the pohce service was one of the last public, sector organisations to feel the 
effects of Thatcherism, and the Conservative Government's pledge to roll back the state. 
After an initial honeymoon period, with law and order a government cause celebre, the 
pohce service was gradually brought to heel through the mtroductipn of new management 
systems, driving private sector ideas into the heart of the public sector (McLaughlin & 
Murji 1997: 82). 
Pro-market Thatcherite pohcies saw the introduction of managers from the private sector 
into government under the Rayner reforms and the establishment of a 'Prime Minister 
Efficiency Unit', intended to deal with public sector inefficiency. This led to the 
implementation of the Financial Management Initiative (H.M.S.0 1982) which infroduced 
accoimtable management systems into govermnent and the public sector, delegating 
responsibility to lower levels of management, who were responsible for achieving 
performance standards within set budgets, and the Next Steps Programme (H.M.S.0 1988 
[a]) bringing into focus the confracting out of government services with laid down 
objectives, budgets and performance indicators. The result was the so called New Public 
Management (Barberis 1998, Walker 1998), with management mformation systems, 
contracting out of services, internal quasi-markets, short term confracts, the concept of 
value for money, and the attainment of effectiveness and efficiency. 
Here effectiveness can be defined as a measure of how successful an organiszation is in 
reaching its goals and operating as a social unit, and efficiency as a measure of how well 
an organization uses its resources to achieve its goals (Bryans & Cronin 1983:121). 
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Al l these measures were.intended to reduce public expenditure and to require large public 
sector bureaucracies to be more effective and responsive (Barron & Scott 1992). However 
the Cabinet Office Paper, 'Service to the Public' (H.M.S.0 1988 [b]) then proposed 'a 
consmner orientated approach' to public services, with a requirement to ensure service 
provision has matched needs, and to show that this match has been.achieved through 
effective evaluation methods. 
These issues were not lost on the police service, which was hit by Home Office Circular 
114 of 1983, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service (Home Office 1983). This 
document required the service to consolidate rather than to continue to expand and to 
make more efficient and effective use of its current resources, making it clear that further 
growth in personnel would not be considered imless it could be shown, through 
assessment, that force objectives and priorities could not be achieved without such 
increase. It introduced the system of new public management into the police service by 
emphasising the need for objectives, good practice, and a more assertive management 
style. 
Managers in the police service looked towards the private sector to adapt methods of 
control over the activities of the work force to assist in complying with this circular and 
the 'even tougher Home Office Circular 106 of 1988' (Remer 1992: 241) regardmg the 
issue of setting organisational objectives: being convinced that the issues raised would be 
the bench mark for future policy making and budgetary control (Sincalir & MiUar 1984, 
Horton & Smith 1988). This took the form of a 'closed system' based on inputs in respect 
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of resources and outputs in terms of specified organisational goals (Warhurst 1998:470). 
The Devon and Comwall Constabulary undertook a system of Plarmed Policing based 
upon policing by objectives (Lubens & Edgar 1979), consisting of 
• The Chief Constable setting out an overview of Force Priorities. 
• Goals of the force based upon Force Priorities. 
• Objectives to enable the achievement of force goals. 
• Action Plans setting out the actions needed to achieve the objectives. 
• Monitoring and Evaluation. 
This system utilised an annual planning cycle during which all members of the 
organisation were expected to take part, usmg a cascade of staff meetmgs starting at the 
top of the organisation with the Chief Coiistable's Policy Committee to set Force Goals, 
Divisional Pohcy Conferences of senior managers to approve their Objectives, Sub-
Divisional Tactics Meetings of junior managers to set their plans. Operational Meetings of 
constables and other support staff to suggest ideas, give feed back and implement plans. 
The introduction of Planned Policing, together with its associated performance indicators, 
brought the issue of organisational goals uito focus much more sharply than at any other 
time ui the history of the police service. Setting out the objectives for the force in 
specified policy areas, it effectively began a process of telling both members of the 
organisation and potential consumers, exactly what they could expect from the police. 
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Further attempts to control organisational goals have been made through Intelligence-led' 
Policing, requiring the collection, analysis and storage of information about active 
criminals who are then targeted through special operations, and Problem Orientated 
Policing, the identification of contuming social or crime related problems and the 
introduction of strategies to counteract them, in consultation with the public and other 
agencies (Goldstein 1990). The introduction and execution of both these developments has 
proved to be difficult (Maguire & John 1995, Amey et al 1996, Leigh et al 1996), because, 
it is argued, it is people who have goals and objectives not organisations, and that, where 
objectives are set, it is difficult to foresee, in their application, how much front line staff 
may adjust them (Hogwood & Gunn 1979), resulting in goal displacement (Perrow 1961). 
The Association of Chief Police Officers, the Superintendents Association and the Police 
Federation, brought their collective weight to bear upon the issue of effectiveness and 
efficiency, management initiatives and public expectations of policing, by pubhshing their 
Operational Policing Review (1990) which paved the way for the pubhcation of their 
'Statement of Common Piupose and Values' - a mission statement for the police service. 
This was followed by their 'Strategic Policy Document - Setting the Standards for 
Policing: Meeting Community Expectations' (1990) that gave notice to the police service 
of performance measurement, quality of service, customer satisfaction and conununity 
consultation. This document would be a 'base point' for the police service to respond to 
short falls in areas of police provision to the public (pl4), leading one Chief Officer to 
suggest that the police were the prime movers in terms of consultation, rather than 
government. (Hnst 1992:40). 
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The introduction of this new approach to pohce management, in terms of balancing the 
needs of the consumer and the quality of service, with effectiveness, efficiency, and 
economy, marked a changing point in the relationship between Central Government, the 
police, and the public, and altered the attitudes of staff vwthin the police service whose 
working practices were affected by it. It paved tiie way for John Major's Citizen's 
Charter (1991) programme, with its emphasis on consumerism and then through the Police 
and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 (consolidated mto the Police Act 1996) to Annual 
Policing Plans, and the concept of public consultation, that was itself extended by the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
More recently there has been increasing demands firom central government for Best Value 
in public services, driven by the need to avoid recurrence of poorly managed local 
authorities which dogged the Labour party in the 1980's (Travers 1999). The duty of Best 
Value is given as one where local authorities (including police and fire authorities) have to 
obtain best value by providing economic, efficient and effective services.' (D.E.T.R.1998: 
para 3.1), consult locally (ibid: para 4.14) and produce Local Performance Plans (ibid: 
para 4.21). Even if consultation is not easily defined and there are no plans for 
implementation. Best Value is seen as strengthening earher local government reforms' 
(Geddes & Martin 2000). 
There needs to be a balance between 'competmg values of efficiency and equity, cost and 
quality' (Erridge 1998), such that costmg police work '..doesn't necessarily mean forces 
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should be providing the cheapest service available:.' (Jenkins 1998). Nevertheless, 
Howarth (1998) argues that in the police service the search for efficiency and cost remain 
dominant, noting that: 
There have been four Audit Commission police reports pubhshed in the last three 
years, and to this can be added the H.M.I.C thematic reports, of which three (Beating 
Crime; Lost Time and What Price Policing) have been received in 1998. In addition to 
these national studies - which incidentally are genuineily welcomed as adding value -
forces are routinely audited by a combination of H.M.I.C and internal and external 
auditors (ibid: 17). 
There does appear to have been the required change of emphasis within the police 
organisation to reflect the private sector, and market forces; to accept the view that 
services should be consimier-led rather than producer driven, as suggested by Connelly et 
al (1994:23). 
The policy process in the Devon & Comwall Constabulary 
To consider the local policy making process. Annual Inspection reports pubhshed by Her 
Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary were examined. However the pohcy making 
process is not the subject of the same amount of comment by the Inspectorate, as is for 
example, domestic violence issues. 
Their report for 1998/99 'compliments the structured approach to policy-making and the 
involvement of divisional and departmental heads', going on to note that 'policy ultimately 
depends upon the acceptance and approval of the policy group' (para 2.4). The report 
emphasises that 'the structures and systems of management are well developed and 
provide a comprehensive flow of information to the policy forum, chaired by the Chief 
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Constable, where most decisions are curifently made.' (Para. 2). • 
• The Report for 1995 (Appendix D) sets out the following diagram of the meetings 
structure, for the force, which effectively can be seen as the 'decision making structure'. 
The Decision Making Structure 
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The senior officers' planning semmar and the Chief Officers strategy weekend noted at the 
head of Figure 13 above are annual events and relate solely to deciding the contents of the 
Aimual Policing Plan. 
Reports firom Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, however, provide only one 
perspective. To probe the policy and decision making processes within the force, managers 
were asked to describe the processes involved in deciding local police policy. The 
following sections probe, respectively, the views of senior management, divisional 
management, ground level managers and ground level staff. 
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The senior managers from the top corridor 
Although many Headquarters top corridor mangers and staff believed that policy could 
originate ftom divisions, almost everyone referred to the use of decision making policy 
committees: 
'Force Policy can come from anywhere. For example a constable who suggests a policy at 
a 'five-weekly' section meeting which is taken from the minutes by a member of the 
divisional management team to the appropriate Sfrategy Review Group. That group 
considers it and may task someone to research, trial or otherwise comment on it. If 
appropriate the matter would move from that group to the Policy Advisory Group and then 
to a the Chief Constable Policy Committee where it would be accepted as policy or 
otherwise. There are five Sttategy Groups (Sub-committees) each chaired by a Chief 
Officer and consisting of senior management: Performance Review; Personnel & 
Training; Operations; Finance; Marketing & Resources. They meet quarterly and would 
report anything of mterest upwards to the Policy Advisor Group which meets monthly and 
then the Chief Constable Policy Committee Meeting.' [7]. 
Altitough policy can come from the ground it is the policy committees which are seen as 
the decision makers: 
'It is possible for divisions to have a direct influence on a policy. It starts by a report to the 
Division Commander or the Force Suggestion Scheme or to a Force Sfrategy Sub-
Committee. There are key players for each part of the policy process. For example the 
relative department (i.e. C.I.D) will be given the report for discussion, where it can be 
placed into draft policy form. It would then go back to the Sfrategy Sub-Conunittee to 
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debate and question the policy initiative. • If agreed, it would then, pass-to .the Policy 
Advisory Group, when it should be in a draft form, suitable for consideration by both 
Chief Officers and Divisional Commanders. For example the policy in respect of Mental 
Health was an idea suggested by 'R' Department which went directly to the Policy 
Advisory Group, where it was discussed and then back to the Chief Constable's Policy 
Conunittee. It-is quite a laborious method which can take a long time.' [6]. 
Most top corridor managers felt that new policy was tested through pilot schemes and 
trials. However many felt that not all policy was tested and that when it was, it was 
ineffective: 
'Testing a policy depends i f it is an operational or resource issue. If there is a direct 
saving then it will be done without testing. If operational then it may require a pilot 
scheme. This is decided at the Policy Advisory Group. In my view the evaluation process 
is not effective and there are not enough staff to evaluate all new ideas.' [6]. 
And: 
'In so far as testing is concemed, this is something I am relatively disappointed with. We 
don't do much policy review, for example our new intelligence lead crime model has been 
a policy driven/made process which has commenced, and I don't know how effective it 
will be. There are no plans for post implementation review to see if the policy was done 
for the right reasons and if it works for the right reasons.' [1]. 
Divisional Managers 
Most divisional managers saw policy as being made by the force policy committees. 
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although many believed that policy cbidd originate from ground level: 
'From strategy sub-committees run by headquarters based at headquarters. Some staff 
throughout the force are party to these but all pohcy, as far as I'm aware, are set by those 
strategy sub committees. These are sent to the policy committee who say 'yes' or 'no' as 
to whether it will be force policy. It's a top down system.' [3.8]. 
Many managers saw the possibility of policy originating from division but even then it 
would be subject to decisions made in force policy conunittees : 
'I think it is possible for a constable in Honiton for example, to influence or bring about 
policy change, and indeed as a constable in *, admittedly some years ago now, I was 
able to bring about a pohcy which was ,* because it was something we didn't 
have and I came with my previous experience m * as a .* It's somethmg I acted as 
catalyst for. .1 think that this is still possible, the force suggestion scheme has been the 
catalyst for policy change and policy infroductions. In terms of how or what, the process 
for influence, for people hke myself, on policy, well I am less satisfied. Because there are 
different types of policies aren't there. I think that, yes, individual constables, with a good 
idea can bring about a change, any officer can do that, but when it comes to amendment of 
existing policy it is the Policy Advisory Group of which I am a member as a Divisional 
Commander, that has the power. However, I don't feel that I am really able or giveJn an 
opportunity to influence policy in a way which is meaningful because that environment is 
one run by an autocratic style and this is where I'm glad that this is not attributable. But 
its not an envnoimient where I feel that I can challenge things in a comfortable way. I'm 
there to be told I'm either performing or non-performing and hand-bagged around the head 
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i f I'm doing it wrong. And if I speak up then my experience to date has already been that 
I've been summoned into the Chiefs ofiBce on three occasions to be told that I was 
speaking out of turn and perhaps, diplomatically, I'm not puttmg that quite right, but it's 
not a comfortable enough environment to challenge or confront policy issues. The Chief 
Constable is very clever by introducing the Steering Group, the policy steering group, in 
between his Chief Officer Team or his Policy Team and the Policy Advisory Group 
because that diffuses confrontation. That small group of senior sycophants, all senior 
Chief Superintendents, are just a barrier between the Chief Constable and people like me, 
and presumably I won't be allowed mto that little nucleus until such time that he thinks I 
am sufficiently well frained and I won't confront him.' [45]. 
* Removed to preserve confidentiality 
The power of the policy committee was always evident: 
'There is a simple way of looking at it in that pohcy is decided in committee by the Chief 
Constable and his team having had advice on policy matters from the policy advisory 
group and also potentially from one or more of the Sfrategy Sub-Committees and from 
Unison and the Police Federation. That is the model and I think that you can show that the 
model actually works to an extent that policy matters are discussed in the Policy Advisory 
Group. They are discussed ui liaison with the staff associations there's no doubt about 
that, it's there for all to see. I'm not aware of any officer within the constabulary having 
created or initiated a policy. I'm not saying it's never happened, I'm just not aware of it. 
The model allows for it and the section meetings which are supposed to be held every four 
to five weeks, where if a police officer says this would be a very good idea and the 
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Sergeant or Inspector agrees, and then it goes to the Divisional Commander who also 
agrees, then in six months tune it could be a pohcy. The reality is that this doesn't happen. 
Now some people would say as a result of that, well, that means we don't have a say in 
policy matters to be brutally frank. It doesn't show that they don't have a say, frankly not 
surprisingly pohcy matters are not debated at section conferences. They debate different 
things there, not to be disparaging about section conferences, far from it, I think they have 
a different pinpose. It's a two way thing and if its working properly, and its not working 
properly, I'm well aware of that, then a constable or a civilian can express a view then as 
policy is disseminated downwards they have a say as to how its is implemented.' [22]. 
This suggestion that front line officers could influence policy through its implementation 
was commented on by other managers: 
'It depends how you define policy really. I would say overall, no, they shouldn't be making 
pohcy. But we live in the real world. We accept that if you say policy is actually what we 
do, what we've done, then yes, on the street, when they take a decision to either arrest or 
not arrest somebody, then they are not necessarily making policy, but they are interpreting 
policy based upon what they think is within their remit.'[54]. 
Divisional Managers saw problems with testing and evaluating policy, for example: 
'The difficulty arises in that we introduce policies but never evalimte them. If I can go off 
on a slight tangent with the crime management model, quite a nice little system, a very 
good piece of work, very usefiil, but nobody has evaluated it. Nobody is now looking at it 
to see if we can automate it more, use the IT more. It's very manpower intensive and in 
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theory fine. It's a Rolls Royce running aroiuid on a Reliant Robin engine at the moment 
because we haven't got anybody out there to do anything with it. So we need to review 
how we are doing and I know for a fact that there are people in this force who do not 
beheve in evaluating.'[44]. 
Ground level managers 
Groimd level managers also believed that policy could emanate from their level: 
'You can start things locally perhaps at an Inspectors meeting with what you could call 
good practice. I suppose that it would go up the system, perhaps as good practice and then 
be adopted by others and then perhaps become force policy. Things like Domestic 
Violence Units. Soon I can see us having a unit looking out for abuse against the elderly 
because it becomes the buzz thing. We have to be seen to be douig something about it. 
You have to be ahead of the game. To be seen to akeady be doing something about it 
before it is recognised as a problem. Some of the people at Middlemoor give us the 
impression that they are chivvying away to know what is coming before it arrives, so the 
force can say, yes we know about that, we are already dealing with that.'[19]. 
Most saw greater mfluence over policy decisions coming from force policy committees 
under the confrol of the Chief Constable: 
'I presume it's discussed at Policy Advisory Group, but at the end of the day I get the 
impression that the Chief Constable is a very authoritative type of leader and I think he 
hstens to the view of the Policy Advisory Group and then makes his own decision. I don't 
know if a constable could start off a policy but I suppose an inspector could come up with 
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a suggestion but this would be in terms of practice rather than policy making.! [34]. 
Front line managers can also distinguish between policy and practice: 
'First of all I think that policy is completely different from the idea of having a business 
plan. Pohcy is created in a number of ways, because of things that impact upon the 
organisation, where we have to make a policy, for example; a change in kgislation or a 
particular problem arises on your patch which means that you've got to do it. I think 
though, mainly because of a change in legislation, because of Home OfSce Circulars, 
pohcy has to be created. Now ' X ' Department does the research and actually provides a 
draft pohcy for senior management. A.C.P.0 tiien agree to it as a particular policy. 
Things happen outside the force which create policy through our reactions to it. Policy can 
also happen where an individual in the force identifies a particularly effective way of 
doing something which seems to just grow rather than being steered effectively. You have 
an idea that might be put into action in an area which is then put up as best practice to a 
Pohcy Advisory Group meeting. There is a difference between policy and practice. An 
idea I put up can be put into place, for example I was tasked to look at the way property is 
handled within the division and found what I thought was a better way to deal with it. So 
I put pen to paper, which resulted in me running a working group and come up with a 
policy for the force which was then fed into the system and I'm now waiting to see if they 
act upon it or not, but this where force policy is agreed.'[24]. 
There was concern at to its effectiveness: 
'It will be tested very poorly. This force has got very little idea, I think, in terms of 
122 
testing. Setting out what the objectives are of a new pohcy, setting out how its going to be 
measured, needing to measure it properly and changing it if it doesn't work. We don't 
seem to set targets and review the results in any cohesive sort of way other than in the 
divisional planning process through targets where our aim is to reduce burglary offences by 
3%. We will look every three months to see how we are doing, after twelve months 
someone will either get a 'bollicking' or a pat on the back. We are all right at that, but 
introducing new policies, we're not very good at, or setting our targets and then testing 
how well we are achieving them.' [26]. 
Outcomes - the views of front line staff 
Having considered how managers withm the organisation envisage the policy making 
process, ground level staff were asked to assess how various people, groups and 
organisations influenced what they actually did during then normal working day. If we 
accept that pohce officers at the fi-ont Ime of the organisation retain then 'gate-keepmg' 
properties in respect of access to police services, then it is important to understand who 
influences them when they implement local police policy. 
The research shows that 78.6% of Sergeants thought the Audit Commission had a great 
deal or some influence over their day to day work, however 58.2% believed that the Home 
Office/Central Government had very little or no mfluence. 57.2% indicated that the Chief 
Constable had either a great deal, or some influence over what they actually did during the 
course of then normal working day. The Police Authority was seen to have little mfluence 
- with 35.7% indicating it had either a great deal or some influence over their work. 
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E X T E R N A L I N F L U B V C E O V E R I M P L E M E N T E R S - S E R G E A N T S 
(n = 28) 
Local influences were stronger: 
• 96.4% indicated that colleagues had a great deal or some influence over what they 
actually do during the course of their normal working day. 
• 89.3% indicated that their inunediate supervisors have either a great deal or some 
influence over what they actually do during the course of their normal working day. 
• 75% indicated that their area police managers had either a great deal or some influence 
over what they actually do during the course of their normal working day. 
• 96.4% indicated that consumers of police services had either a great deal or some 
influence over what they actually do during the course of their normal working day. 
• 60.7% indicated that local public opinion had either a great deal or some influence 
over what they actually do during the course of their normal working day with 64% of 
sergeants believing that police policy should reflect public opinion not direct it (21% 
being unable to agree or disagree). 
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LOCAL f^FLUBJCEOVBim\.Bm^TWS - SERGEAMTS 
• A Great Deal 
• Some 
• Very Little 
• None 
Coleagues Supervisors Area Consurrers Rjbic 
Managers Opinion 
Fig: 15 
With the exception of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Central 
Government, Constables saw central influences as weaker, with over sixty percent of 
respondents believing that A.C.P.0, The Audit Commission, The Police Authority, and the 
Chief Constable as having very little or no influence over their day to day work. 
See Figure 16, overieaf: 
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EXTERNAL INFLIIE3MCES OVER IMPLEVOmERS - CONSTABLES 
(n = 67) 
"46:3 WT 
I A great deal 
I Some 
• Very little 
• None 
AC.P.O Audit Comm Pol.Auth H M I C Cent.Gov Ch.Cons 
Fig. 16 
Their views of local influence on their work reflects those of Sergeants: 
• Their colleagues were influential - 85.1% indicating they had either a great deal or 
some influence over what they actually did during the course of their normal working 
day. 
• Their supervisors - 89.6% indicating they had either a great deal or some influence 
over what they actually did diuing the course of their normal working day. 
• Their area managers - 65.7% stating they had either a very great influence or some 
influence over what they actually did during the course of their normal working day. 
• Consumers of pxjlice services were seen to be influential - 85.1% seeing them as 
having either a great deal or some influence over what they actually did during the 
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course of their normal working day. 
• Local public opinion was seen to be influential - 50.8% seeing them as having either a 
great deal or some influence over what they actually did during the course of their 
normal working day, with 67% of constables believing that police policy should reflect 











L O C A L INFLUENCES OVER IMPLEJVffiNTERS - CONSTABLES 
(n=67) 
64,2 
1 • 6^3 3^.3 
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Concluding comments 
The strong influence of pohcy committees in the policy process, especially the Chief 
Constable's Policy Group, where most policy decisions are made, is highlighted in reports 
from H.M.I. 
Managers within the organisation believed that they were able to distinguish between 
policy and practice. Although control over policy making is top down, even if such control 
is normally difficult to achieve in organisations like the police service, where there are 
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looser links in the cham of cominand, and a requirement to provide a variety of services, 
managers beheved that front line staff were in a position to affect policy through their 
discretion as to whether to implement a particular policy or not; thereby either makiug a 
policy redundant or at least rationing its use. 
Local influences over what the police actually do remains sfrong at the delivery end of the 
organisation, with the greatest influence coming from consumers of police services. Both 
sergeants and constables also believed that their colleagues, supervisors, and managers, 
consumers of police services, and public opinion have a very considerable influence over 
their day to day work: much greater than that from the cenfre, where they saw the Audit 
Conunission and the Home Office as having the most influence. 
New policy initiatives are decided through pohcy committees, using multi choices withm 
the policy process, resulting in marginal changes in policy. In terms of decision making 
there is evidence to suggest it is one of Bounded Rationality, 'satisfying' rather than 
'maximising', and it is, over-all, incrementalist, conforming to Ehnore's (1979) 
description of a 'systems management model', but consfrained within the organisational 
context, and prescribed by Cenfral Government, for example, through Policing Plans. The 
influence of local authorities and other agencies, within a Partnership Approach to 
policmg policy, and the implementation of Crime Audits under the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998, will also affect police policy making in the future: factors which were not 
present at the time of this research. 
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Policies often address problems of measuring, resourcing, and structure rather than 
niaMng radical changes to the actual policies delivered. 
Top corridor groups, using their positional power within the organisation can decide the 
membership of pohcy conunittees, suggesting evidence of Lukes (1974) 'third dimension 
of power' to shape the views of lower order managers, to accept the power of the Chief 
Constable in the local policy process, without any signs of overt conflict. The use of 
policy conunittees also permits organisational goals to be decided by a particular group 
according to its 'resomces and decibel ratings' (Hill 1997) even if this may be to the 
detriment of other more complicated theories of organisational power. 
For front line staff, the issue of police/pubhc compromise at sfreet level (Cain 1973, 
Shapland & Vagg 1988) remains: pohcy may change, but practice does not. 
The next chapter will consider issues relating to local autonomy in policy and practice in 
respect of the Citizen's Charter pohcy initiative. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE CITIZEN'S CHARTER 
Seen initially as an attempt by the then Prime Minister, John Major, to make his own mark 
on the political arena without moving away j&om Thatchersim (Doem 1993, Connolly et al 
1994), The Citizen's Charter: Raising- the Standards (H.M.S.0.1991), and the 
accompanying performance indicators, was imposed upon the police and other pubhc 
services. It set out to treat people more as citizens than subjects, more as consumers than 
citizens, and although the idea of charters in the United Kingdom was not new (Hambleton 
1991, Moore 1997), it brought the concept of reducing public expenditure and increasing 
effectiveness and responsiveness into public sector bureaucracies (Barron & Scott 1992). 
Despite the fact that it was neither a single charter document, nor founded on any concepts 
of democracy, 'The Citizen's Charter" has resulted in improvements in the general area of 
public service provision (Wilson 1996). However, although the services provided by 
public sector organisations can be improved where mechanisms are m place to encourage 
complaints, such organisations are imable to react to them with the same determination as 
those m the private sector, who have to compete in order to survive in their particular 
market spheres (Blackmore 1997). 
In managerial terms (Doem 1993) the following initiatives could be seen as a base for the 
introduction of the Citizen's Charter and the introduction of performance indicators: 
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• The Rayner reforms of the early 1980's with the mtroduction of .managers frorii the 
private sector into central government. 
• The formation of the Prime Ministers Efficiency Unit intended to seek out and redress 
public sector inefSciency. 
• The Financial Management Initiative (H.M.S.0 1982) introducing accountable 
management systems throughout government with responsibility delegated to lower 
management levels responsible for accountable performance within set budgets. In 
policing this was employed in specific operations and for individual officers' work as 
well as in the provision of management information systems and measuring techniques 
to monitor pohce performance (Sinclan & Miller 1984). 
• The 'Next Steps' progranune, allowing many governmental functions to be contracted 
out to 'quasi-mdependent agencies' with a strong emphasis on value for money. 
It was Home Office Cncular 17/93 'Performance Indicators for the Police', that set out the 
performance indictors required by the Audit Commission under the Local Govermnent Act 
1992. It made it clear that the indicators had been developed jointly by the Audit 
Commission, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, the pohce service, the Home 
Office and the Local Authority Associations (Aimex A. para 6). 
The Circular reduced the nmnber of performance indicators initially suggested by Her 
Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, and included a qualitative dimension requested by 
the Association of Police Officers. It required forces and police authorities to set and 
monitor local quality and performance levels, taking mto account local problems, with f i l l 
dialogue between them and the coimnimity: in spite of the problems associated with the 
bench-marking of public services (Coe 1999, Ammons 1999). 
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The circular required the force to mamtam forty six performance indicators under the 
following headings: 
• Call management. 
• Crime Management. 
• Traffic Management. 
• Public Reassurance Management. 
• Commumty Policmg Management. 
• Resources/costs. 
Of these 20 (43.5%) are required by the Audit Commission; 20 (43.5%) by H.M.I.C and 6 
(13.0%)byA.C.RO. 
There have been many difficulties regarding the reliability of measuring police activity 
pavidoff 1993); problems in defining quality (Walsh 1991, Hnst 1991, Waters 1998 [a], 
1998 [b]); gaps between the service customers expect, and that which managers think they 
should expect; and gaps between the standards set by the provider and the service it 
actually delivers (Bland 1997: 6). Nevertheless the concepts of total quality management 
(Shashkin & Kiser 1992, Zbaracki 1998) have found their way into the policy making 
process and the everyday working lives of members of police organisations (Warcup 
1992). 
The Citizen's Charter initiative 
The white paper 'The Citizen's Charter: Raising the Standards'{1991) describes its four 
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main themes (p4) as: 
• Quahty - a sustamed new programme for improving the quahty of pubhc services. 
• Choice - whenever possible providing choice between competing providers to improve 
quality. 
• Standards - the publication of the standards available and the ability to act where 
service is of unacceptable standard. 
• Value - public services must give value for money, vwthin the bounds of an affordable 
tax bill. 
The white paper went on to outline The Principles of Public Service (p5): 
• Standards - explicit standards prominently displayed at point of delivery. 
• Opermess - as to how services are provided, then cost, whether pubhshed standards are 
being achieved. 
• Information - as to services provided; targets, details of results achieved. 
• Choice - regular surveys to assess customer satisfaction. 
• Non-discrimination. 
• Accountability - services should be organised to suit customer needs not the needs of 
the staff There should be a well publicised complaints procedure. 
The Charter applies to all pubhc services and requnes a 'commitment to the reality of 
raising standards at local level' (p7) with individual organisations publishing their own 
charters, setting out then statements of service standards. 
Addressmg policing issues, it set out the need to provide a standard of service expected 
by the public, high-lighting measurable standards, objectives agreed through consultation 
with the community, and a fair, prompt and courteous response to the public. Forces were 
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expected to publish target times for response times to the more serious incidents and the 
answering of telephone calls (Audit Commission 1993:1994). 
The Citizen's Charter concluded that there would be close co-operation between Her 
Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Audit Conunission in setting and managing 
standards to improve efficiency and quality of service (H.M.S.0 1991:40). 
The White paper went on to suggest that organisations which consider they have achieved 
the charter standards can apply for an entitlement to use the Charter Mark. The key 
prmciples required to achieve the Charter Mark award (p6) are: 
• Publication of standards of service provided and performance against those standards. 
• Evidence that the views of the customer have been taken into consideration in setting 
standards. 
• Clear information of range of services provided. 
• Courteous and efficient service firom named staff. 
• Well pubhcised avenues of complaint. 
• Independent valuation of performance against standards. 
• Improving value for money. 
At the tune of its introduction The Citizen's Charter was criticised for attempting to 
introduce consimierism and private sector economics into the provision of public sector 
services (Economist 1991, Coote 1991, 1992). Alternatively the Charter Mark has been 
hailed as John Major's 'legacy to the nation' (Moore 1997). 
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Bynoe (1998:232-235) sees three possibihties for the future of the Citizen's Charter: 
• A retreat firom public consumerism which is very unlikely. 
• A Mk n Citizen's Charter - continuing the decline of citizenship towards that 
consmnerism. 
• A social rights perspective - setting out the rights and duties that services are expected 
to provide. 
The Devon & Cornwall Policing Charter 
The Devon and Comwall Police Charter was furst published in September 1993 and since 
1995 has been included as an appendix in Annual Policing Plans. Introduced as 'Our 
Commitment to you. A Charter for the PoHcmg of Devon, Comwall and the Isles of 





• Crime Prevention & Public Order. 
• Road Users. 
• Consulting the Conununity and Monitoring oiur Progress. 
Performance standards are given for each, and range from the quantitative to the 
qualitative. For example in respect of the Communication section: 
• If your call is an emergency and you dial 999 we aun to answer in ten seconds of the 
call being fransfenred to us by British Telecom. We provide a 24 hour service and aim 
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to answer all routine telephone calls within 30 seconds. 
• Whether your call is an emergency or not you will be answered politely by our staff 
who are tramed to help you. Whoever answers your caU wiU be prepared to identify 
themselves and tell you what action is proposed. 
• If you are told an officer is going to call, you will be given the opportunity to arrange 
a mutually convenient time. 
(Annual Report 1999/2000: Appendix C). 
The Force Charter does not set out specific services that the police will provide. It does 
not take the opportunity to set out the services that the pohce will not provide and where 
those services could be obtained. It does not take the opportunity to reduce demands for 
services to which the force does not intend to respond. 
Police perceptions of the development of the Force Charter 
A l l levels of management believed that the greatest influence upon the contents of the 
Force Charter came firom Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, the Chief Constable, 
the Audit Conunission and the Home Office. There was no suggestion that public opinion 
or the views of members of the organisation had any effect upon the Force Charter. For 
example: 
"I think the Audit Comniission and the H.M.I. Well what I think is that this came out firom 
Central Government. I don't know how they came out with it, or how the Performance 
Indicators were decided. It just seems that this is what we were told, this is what the 
response times will be, how they got fifteen minutes to get to an incident and not fourteen 
for example, I've got no idea. I think all this stuff came from Cenfral Government. They 
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were the only people who influenced us and had any say mthe matter unless there was a 
headquarters department uivolved.' [32]. 
And: 
'The Chief Constable, wanting to be very politically correct and being in the hme- light. 
I'm going to have a Charter tomorrow and get myself a Charter Mark so we can have it on 
the top of our letter-heads. Police officers are very cynical people and they tend to think 
that the Chief Constable has influenced this one because he wants a Charter Mark on the 
top of his letter heading, and what does this actually mean to people on the ground' [21]. 
More realistically: 
'The Charter isn't headlines anymore. It's on the back burner. We give information about 
how we are domg in respect of the Charter performance indicators and this is published' 
[11]. 
Considering the acknowledged affect the Citizen's.^  Charter has upon the Force, it is 
perhaps surprising to learn, that those interviewed had no knowledge of how the contents 
of the Force Charter had been decided. For example the top corridor view was: 
'My hearsay evidence on this is that the Chief Constable said that's a good idea I want one 
too. A few people sat down and put something together and the Chief said that's O.K. It's 
a gimmick, however once you do something like this, you have to live up to i t ' [13]. 
The view of Divisional Managers, is encapsulated by the following quote: 
'No. I thiELk i f you ask anybody they'U say well I don't know. ' X ' Department produced 
this booklet and there it is.' [21]. 
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Which was echoed by Ground Level Managers: 
'It was formulated in ' X ' Department follovwmg consultation with other forces and 
whatever Home Office docimients there were. I know firom my own perception of it that 
some of the Charter limits that vve set out were imreahstic, and had been identified as. such 
from the very begimiing, but the Chief is such a strong personality that his individual views 
were set out, some of which were contrary to those making the suggestions.' [29]. 
Maintaining interest in the Policing Charter 
If we accept that there was little local consultation during the formulation of the Force 
Charter, how then does the force maintain interest in their Charter, firstly by the public and 
secondly within the organisation. There was overwhelming disappomtment that the Force 
Charter, published locally, had no interest to local people, despite the fact that the 
performance of the force was measured and could be compared nationally. The majority 
of all those interviewed believed that public interest was awoken once a year through the 
publication of its charter results in the local press: 
'I don't think the public are very interested in the Force Charter. It gets an annual impetus 
in that we pubhsh our Charter results in a local newspaper once a year. If you put it to the 
test very few people would know of its existence.' [5]. 
Interest v^thin the organisation was also seen to be problematical: 
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'I don't think there is any staff interest at all to be honest. It'sjust too many slogans really 
I think. A lot of these things are not revolutionary, they just encompass what we should be 
doing.' [27]. 
There was a suggestion that the Force Charter was kept promment through the constant 
reminder of the need to achieve performance targets, but this also applied to those 
contained in the Annual Policing Plan: 
'We have to give a quality of service and a lot of their training is actually targeted at this, 
in that the service is something that you and the force are going to be judged on, so let's 
give a good service. It might be the tenth burglary you've been to in four days but it's that 
person's jBrst. There's a lot of training effort going ui on this, and i f you look at Plymouth 
now, and at the response teams, they are very young in service. If you have an officer with 
more than four years service then you think they are old sweats. So through their training 
the term 'service provider' is lodged in their minds. To provide a good service. This is 
also put over at public consultation meetings to the public' [21]. 
More cynically: 
'It's because they've got to do it because the big stick waves over them and they get told 
off i f they fail to do it. They know they are under pressure to answer vwithin the set time 
and i f they fail to give their name or number or crime reference number to a victim they 
get a shitty note.' [34]. 
A manager within the Criminal Investigation Department described the local effect of the 
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Force Charter in the following terms: 
'Well they're all given the Charter, and the Quarterly Review tells management right the 
way down through, what we are doing in respect of it, teUs them that we are not meetmg 
oin targets and management then move manpower accordingly. That is exactly what's 
happening in this division in respect of oin response times. With burglary it has given me 
emphasis, because we have to do so much in respect of house burglaries imder the Charter, 
and I've got to make sure it works. Whereas in the past I didn't really have to account to 
anyone. Our burglary figures were what they were, the only person I was accountable to 
was the Divisional Commander who was accountable to the Chief and then to the Pohce 
Authority, but now its much more intense that we get it right, which is good.' [16]. 
Confusing Sisals - Force Charter, Charter Mark, Annual Policing Plans 
Duriiig the course of these interviews it became increasingly apparent that there was some 
confusion between the Force Charter and the Police Authority Annual Policing Plan. 
However the presence of performance indicators and their affect upon local policing policy 
and practice is a constant factor, and where these indicators originate is urelevant. How 
this has affected local pohcing autonomy can be gauged firom the following comments: 
'I am a great believer in simplicity and the simpler it is the better it will work. There are 
lists for this and goals for that, people end up gettmg confiised. We are spendmg more 
time doing the measuring then doing the job. In my view the resoiurces we are putting out 
now are less than they were twenty years ago.' [17]. 
And: 
'I am getting very confused between the Force Charter and the Annual Pohcing Plan. It 
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shows how long it is since I saw a copy of the Force Chaiter, because I can't remember 
what the document was all about. There are so many Performance Indicators that they just 
can't remember them all, that's the trouble, you know, speaking with the lads on the 
ground when they come in [from pafrol], which is why we have given them a single page 
'flyer' in the hope they will be able to read and digest it. They .come on duty at three 
o'clock and they will be told, don't worry about reading that, the Force Charter worry 
about it later on, because there's a burglary at so and so, or an accident at so and so, and 
that's what you're up agamst. You keep ramming it down, you know it's such a lot of stuff 
to take in, it really is. They are saturated with information if you like.' [32]. 
And duplication: 
'There is a lot of duplication between everything at the moment. There should be one 
docimient with a list of performance indicators showing what they refer to and what they 
are. One document. It is gettmg very confusing for people. There are so many things 
which relate to one subject giving the view that "We've done this before'". It would be 
better to have one document.' [14]. 
And Emphasis: 
'There is now more emphasis on the Annual Policing Plan. It is more our bible now and 
more of an issue. The H.M.I criticises the Chief for not getting people to be accountable 
enough on issues in the Annual Plan and so we spend more tune looking at performance 
indicators the plan.' [11]. 
And density: 
'The Annual Policing Plan is a very dense document with lots of information. A lot of the 
public would not be interested in much of the data and information in the Annual Plan. But 
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the Charter gives them the basic standards .of service vi'hich is what the pubhc wants to 
know.' [9] 
FinaUy, as one divisional manager commented: 
'You know with the best will in the world we can sit here and talk about what should be. or 
what shouldn't be, but the reality is, oiice you get outside, is totally different. I'm not a 
negative person, it's just a matter of volume. Everybody wants to give a good service, well 
most people, as best as they can, but everybody has their own areas to worry about. If 
you're a Detective Constable you want to clear crime and so on. Everyone has their own 
tunnel vision about the job, depending upon what their work is.' [19]. 
Outcomes of The Citizen's Charter 
As in other areas of public service provision, the Citizen's Charter has had a considerable 
impact upon local police managers: now having to contend with issues of quality of 
service, through performance indicators and consumer accountability. 
However, both the 'top corridor' and middle managers saw the Citizen's Charter as having 
a positive impact upon the police service. 
In terms of Quality and Performance Indicators, for example: 
From the top corridor: 
'The Force Charter however has improved services to the public particularly for victims. It 
has highlighted awareness of giving a quahty service and can be seen through survey 
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results for. example, that officers now treat victims more, effectively,..because it's 
monitored through service reviews. The words Quality of Service have become 
incrementally more accepted as a part of the pohce culture. The implementation of force 
charters and awards has had a great impact upon policing. However the Force Charter is 
more relevant to local people than the award of the Charter Mark.'[2]. 
This is reflected by Divisional Managers: 
'I thmk it made us take a close look at ourselves, and sharpen up our act a bit on day to day 
things. That we, you know, we tended to devote all our energies to things we thought were 
important. Things like answering letters and getting people to incidents on time were 
lower priority and I think it made us take a closer look at our daily business. So it was 
probably quite a good thing.' [48] 
This has led to improved services, as reflected by these top corridor staffi 'Quite a radical 
effect, particularly on the culture of the organisation. Over the next five years this will be 
more, so vwth the concept of satisfymg our customers. No more, "we're the pohce" 
business. This has totally turned aroimd. Satisfying 'Joe Public' is now the munber one 
priority now that performance indicators are now involved. A quite big effect. How do we 
speak to the public? Much more politely! We are now gettmg to incidents within standard 
times, giving information to people, providing leaflets, all of which is geared to making the 
bureaucratic experience less so for the public. It evolved out of social cncumstances. If 
John Major hadn't of done it then someone else would have.' [12]. 
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- And from Divisional Managers; 
'I don't think a great deal. I think there were already influences which effected the way we 
became more accountable and addressed certaiu issues and I don't think that the Citizen's 
Charter has made any difference whatsoever. It's for the benefit of the Chief Constables 
more than anything else.'[20]. 
The majority of ground level managers also saw the Citizen's Charter as makmg the police 
more accountable, particularly by enabling the pubhc to be more aware of their rights: 
'Its a matter of makmg us accoimtable. First of aU it was good to get it and now once 
we've got it we've got to keep it but its given us things we have got to achieve. We have 
got to achieve time limits in telephone answering, we've got to achieve time limits in 
getting to scenes. In other words, where in the past where we had a responsibility to do it, 
we would just say we are domg to do our best, it does now give us accountability to 
members of the public who can say, you're not meeting yom Charter, which makes us look 
at omselves, address ourselves, and see if we can do what we said we could do.' [16]. 
One manager, whilst reflecting this general view, was more outspoken: 
'I think to be honest and you may have heard a snort there. I thmk the Citizen's Charter 
was John Major's great idea and I can imagine people in the Cabinet Office shuffling 
embarrassingly, saying oh yes, well let's go along with it. My impression is that its a 'P.R' 
thing its very limited, in fact it's a nonsense. It's the same with the Health Service. You 
will get one person in one hundred thousand, Mr Awkward, who will get the Citizen's 








Front line staff were split over the idea that the Force Charter had increased public 
awareness of the services provided, with 33% neither able to agree or disagree on this 
point. However only 24% agreed that it had improved the quality of service they provided. 
Althpugh 61% of those who were members of the force prior to the introduction of the 
Charter felt that the consequent performance indicators decreased the level of discretion 
available to them m their work, 53% agreed that the mtroduction of the Charter had in fact 
made no difference to the way they carried out their work. 
There is no doubt that it is possible to speculate from this research, that police officers 
below the level of senior managers, believe that the problem of supply and demand are 
unportant variables when it comes to providing pohcing services, to the poiut where front 
line staff are more concemed with satisfying this demand, than they are in complying with 
Charter targets. 







, . A.C.PO 








LOC AL PUBLIC OPINION ' ' 
Diiects 
C onsults 
Contiibutes - - - — 
Fig. 22. 
In retrospect it can be argued that the Citizen's Charter was the precursor to the 
introduction of Annual Policing Plans, which in their turn gave rise to the present Annual 
Performance Plans, and it is the development of annual plans which will be considered in 





The pohcy process, consisting of many policy networks, includes independent people, 
pressure groups, and other organisations, each having some knowledge and or interest in 
pohcing (Leishman et al 1996: 17-19). This chapter will consider how these pohcy 
networks influence the contents of annual pohcing plans. It will show that these plans 
have become more complex over time, by comparing the 1995/1996 Annual Policing Plan 
with that of 1998/1999. 
The outputs of these plans will then be considered to miderstand how they affect the 
practice of front line officers during then day to day duties. 
The Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 (now consolidated into the Police Act 1996) 
imposed a responsibility upon Police Authorities to publish a costed Aimual Policing 
Plan, setting out local policuig objectives. These objectives must be in line with Cenfral 
Governments' Key National Objectives, (now Ministerial Priorities) and their associated 
performance indicators, set locally, but open to criticism from Her Majesty's' Inspectorate 
of Constabulary. 
The Home Office 
Home Office Circular 27/1994 - Policing Plans, makes it clear that the Police Authority 
will be required to issue a local policing plan. The Chief Officer of pohce will be required 
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to produce a draft of this plan but. the final contents, of the plan rests with the Pohce 
Authority. The Annual Plan represents 'a shared understanding about policing priorities 
and objectives'(2.3), but in carrying out the objectives of the plan the Chief Officer 
'retains the direction and control over the force and it is open to him to depart from the 
plan i f in his operational judgement he (sic) considers it necessary' (2.4), but he or she 
must explain to the Police Authority the reasons.for any deviation from the plan. 
The circular went on to indicate that pohcing plans have the following objectives: 
• To act as an agreement between the Chief Constable and the Pohce Authority as to the 
priorities for policing the area during the year. 
• To tell the public what policing services and standards they can expect to receive. 
• To aid performance monitoring by the Chief Officer the Police Authority H.M.I and 
the Home Office. 
The Circular also makes it clear that Annual Policing Plans will be one of a number of 
documents which set out police performance, and that it may need to be supported by more 
detailed in force plans for divisions or basic command imits, as well as any force charter 
documents. 
Annual Policmg Plans will, the cncular suggests, include: 
• A statement of the Police Authoritys' priorities for the year and the financial resources 
available. 
• The National Key Objectives. 
• Performance indicators set by the police authority within the parameters set by the 
Home Secretary. 
The plan should also contain an assessment of the policing of the area, an idea as to the 
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broad approach to its pohcmg, an indication of the consultation process undertaken " to 
produce the plan, any partnership initiatives with otter agencies, how performance against 
the plan can be monitored, and the financial resources available to execute the plan. 
Both Chief Constables and Police Authorities must publish their own Annuaiileports 
relating to the policing of their areas. 
National Key Objectives/Ministerial Priorities 
The following Key National Objectives were mtroduced by the Home Office on 1st April, 
1995, and remained imchanged for three years: 
• To maintain and if possible increase the nmnber of detections for violent crimes. 
P.I: The number of violent crimes detected per one himdred officers. 
• To increase the number of detections for burglaries of people's homes. 
P.I: The number of burglary dwellings detected per one hundred officers. 
• To target and prevent crimes which are a particularly local problem, including drug 
related cruninality, in partnership with the public and local agencies. 
P.I (1): On crime prevention, work remains in hand, to develop a PI aimed at 
reducmg repeat victimisation. 
P.I (2): On drug related crunmality, work contmues to develop a high level. 
P.I based on the White Paper, 'Tackling Crime Together.' and 
measurement will be assessed by measurement of the number of 
if arrests and disposal of offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1971, per 1,000 population. 
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• To provide Mgh visibility policing so as to reassure the public. • 
P.I: Public satisfaction with levels of foot patrol and mobile patrol. 
• To respond promptly to emergency calls from the pubhc. 
P.I (1): Percentage of 999 calls answered within the local target time. 
P.I (2): Percentage of responses within local target time to incidents 
requiring iminediate response. 
On 15th August 1998, Mr Alun Michael, Minister of State at the Home OfSce for the new 
Labour government, wrote to the President of The Association of Chief Police Officers 
setting out proposed new Key National Policing Objectives and Performance Indicators for 
1998/99. He emphasised that these objectives were produced in consequence of 
recommendations from a review by a Home Office Task Force, which consisted of 
representatives from the police service and pohce authorities, who reported to a 
Consultative Group on Key Objectives and then to Ministers. 
The Key National Objectives for 1998/99 were: 
• To deal speedily and effectively with yoimg offenders and to work with other 
agencies to reduce offending. 
P.I (1): The percentage of cases dealt with v«thin pre-trial time 
guidelines and the percentage of cases meeting joint perfonnance 
management quality targets. 
P.I (2): In consultation with other relevant agencies, to have 
established local mechanisms to measure activity on, and the success 
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of, work in partnership to provide a quicker and more effective local, 
response to youth crime. 
To target and reduce local problems of crime and disorder in partnership with 
local authorities, other local agencies and the public' 
P.I (1): To have established local mechanismsin partnership with other 
agencies to measure activity on and success ui tackling problems 
of crime and disorder with local targets for performance. 
P.I (2) : To have mechanisms in place locally to measure forces' 
success in tackling repeated victimisation. 
To target drug-related crime in partnership with otter local agencies. 
P.I : The niunber of arrests for the supply and possession with intent 
to supply controlled drugs per 10,000 population. 
To maintain and, if possible, increase the number of detections for violent crime. 
P.I: The percentage of violent crimes detected. 
To mcrease the number of detections for burglaries of people's homes. 
P.I (1): The percentage of primary and overall detections of burglaries 
of dwellings. 
P.I (2): The number of such detections per 100 officers. 
To respond promptly to emergency calls firom the public. 
P.I (1): The percentage of 999 calls answered within the local target tune. 
P.I (2): The percentage of responses within the local target time to 
incidents requiring immediate response. 
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For the 1999/2000 Annual Plan these National Key Objectives were changed again. Now 
called 'Ministerial Priorities' and were based upon Home Office 'Overarching Aims and 
Objectives for the Police Service' which set out: 
A Statement of Purpose: 
'To help secure a safe and just society in which the rights and responsibilities 
of individuals, families and communities are properly balanced' 
Aims: 
• ' Promote Safety and order. 
• Reduce crime and the fear of crime. 
• Contribute to delivering justice in a way which secures and maintains public 
confidence in the rule of law. 
Objectives: 
• Keep order (and restore it where necessary) and reduce anti-social behaviour. 
• Reconcile conflicting rights and freedoms of the public. 
• Improve safety and reassurance of public, especially those at risk of harm. 
• Contribute to improving road safety and the reduction of casualties. 
• Disrupt organised international crime. 
• Prevent terrorism. 
• Reduce crime through investigation, detection, and addressing the causes of crime. 
• Reduce the fear of crime. 
• Provide high quality, timely evidence contributing to a fairly conducted 
prosecution. 
• Deal with suspect fairly. 
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• Help meet the needs of victuns and witnesses. 
Pevon & Comwall Annual Policing Plan 1999/2000 Appendix A) 
Supporting these, the Home Office set out three Muiisterial Objectives namely: 
1) To deal speedily and effectively with yoimg offenders and to work with other 
agencies to reduce offending and re-offending. 
2) To identify and reduce local problems of crime and disorder in partnership 
with other local authorities, other local agencies and the public. 
3) To target and reduce dmg-related crime m partnership with other local agencies 
via the local Drag Action Teams m line with the Government's strategy "Tackling 
Drugs to Build a Better Britain". 
These aims and objectives were also to be read alongside nine National Performance 
Indicators, one of which, for example is: 'The niunber of arrests for supply and possession 
with mtent to supply controlled drags per 10,000 population and of those how many 
related to heroin.' (Devon & Comwall Annual Plan 1999/2000 p 11). 
In broad terms it can be argued that for the first time central government is attempting to 
define the role of the police in England and Wales. 
The Research 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 
Reference to the planning process is first seen in the report by Her Majesty's Inspectorate 
of Constabulary for the force in 1991 where it praises a 'long tradition of co-operation and 
partnership with its public', with a 'clear commitment to continue this co-operation' 
through the endorsement of the Victims Charter as force policy, 'which plays a major part 
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in his [the Chief Constable's] Planned Policing Strategy. (p51). 
The 1992 Report comments that, unlike most forces who set annual aims, the Chief 
Constable beheves that 'many objectives cannot be achieved within a 12 month cycle' and 
that current force aims and objectives are no longer set on an annual basis but are 'flexible 
in time scale, responding to the nature of the particular problem being addressed' (p24) 
which appeared to satisfy the Inspectorate. 
However it is the 1994 Report which set the pace for more detailed and critical comments 
on the force plannmg processes, being linked, no doubt to the proposed annual planning 
requhements of the PoUce and Magistrates Cowts Act 1994 and Home Office Circular 
27/1994. It concluded that it was important that the 'organisation moves forward as one 
and this requires meaniugful consultations with all concemed, followed by precise and 
detailed planning at ah levels..'. The Force Strategic Five Year Plan, although 'well 
crafted' was criticised in that: 
• It did not attribute clear accoimtabihty to those who were managing change. 
• Did not include imambiguous time scales for change. 
• Did not include clear measures against which performance could be measured. 
• Failed to cost proposals or include broad financial considerations to facilitate 
longer term financial planning. 
• Did not describe a procedure to inform the public or the workforce of 
developments so that direction or behaviom could be modified. 
• Did not acknowledge the importance of human resources in the organisation and 
the appointment of quahfied professional 'non-police' staff to key positions 
both managerial and non-managerial. 
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It went on to indicate that without the inclusion of these points the good work already 
completed would be lost, and a fragmented approach would result. 
The 1995 report places a great deal of emphasis upon annual pohcing plans. It criticised 
the force for not taking its Sfrategic Plan to include the year 2000j-and whilst accepting 
that Home Office Circular 27/1994 provided for the structure and format of the Annual 
Policing Plan to 'be a matter for forces and police authorities' (2.2), it went on to suggest 
that it should complement and support the force sfrategic plan. It also pointed out that the 
performance indicators in the Aimual Plan for 1996/97 made measinement difficult ui that, 
apart from the Charter perfonnance indicators, none of the indicators in the plan were 
quantitative, but were stated mainly in terms of "to increase" or "reduce" based upon 
previous years performance (2.6). The Inspectorate was however 'unpressed with the 
determination of the Chief Constable and members of the Police Authority to produce a 
plan which represented their collective values' (2.8). 
Varying from the view of the Audit Commission (1994) that the Annual Plan should 
provide the 'what' and the Chief Constable the 'how', and that of Home Office Circular 
27/1994, which emphasised the operational freedom of the Chief Constable, the report 
went on to suggest that the Aimual Policing Plan should be '...precise on the what but also 
broadly mdicating the how. "Whilst this guidance goes beyond the legislative requnements, 
it is within the spirit of the proposed development of a partnership between the force and 




The report also criticised the involvement of staff in the consultation process during the 
production of the plan, particularly the commimication process through the organisation, 
which it believed could be improved if divisional conunanders 'occasionally met service 
deliverers face to face' (2.21) and suggested that implementers in the policy process 
should have greater ownership of local policing plans. 
In respect of divisional policing plans the Inspectorate tmderlined the importance of 
allowmg departmental/divisional conunanders 'delegated authority to produce their own 
plans to support the local environment' but only if they are linked to the 'corporate aims 
and objectives in the local policmg plan'. (2.25). 
The main complamt in respect of the 1995/96 Aimual Policing Plan was the lack of 
'specific performance targets' (2.26) and of the Five Year Strategic Plan, imtil 2000, in 
that it was not an effective 'business plan' (2.2). 
A large proportion of Her Majesty's Inspectorate Performance Review Inspection report of 
the force for 1996 dealt with the issue of policing plans. The report criticised the link 
between operational and support strategies in respect of the five year Strategic Plan (para 
2.1; 2.2) but praises the introduction of the youth issues section introduced as a 
consequence of local consultation (para 2.3), as well as pointing out that it complies both 
with the Key National Objectives; Home Office Circular 27/1994; and a letter from the 
Home Secretary to Chief Constables of 14/12/95 to include 'Traffic' as an issue. Overall 
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the Inspectorate considered that the document was a 'clear readable and practical 
document which provides an unambiguous statement of what is to be achieved' (para 2.4) 
but does little to secure 'the improvement in confidence of ethnic minority groups' (para 
2.5). 
The 1997 Inspection Report referred to the following developments in producing the. 
1997/98 Plan: 
• Brief analyse of the crime profile. 
• Overview of internal planning mechanisms. 
• Greater reference to the role of the Special Constabulary. 
• Use of predictive techniques in target setting. 
• Greater emphasis on the role of public consultation, 
(para 2.14) 
The first four of these issues were put forward by the 1996 Inspection Report as 
improvements which should be considered by the Force in respect of this, the next Annual 
Policing Plan (1996: para 2.3). An example of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary 
congratulating the Force for taking up its earlier reconunendations. 
The 1997 report went on to suggest that Divisional Commanders have sufScient flexibility 
to set their own targets for each of the objectives provided in the Plan Template set out by 
headquarters in order to 'address their local problems' (para 2.20). 
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Consultation 
Opportunities for public consultation in respect of the Plan is provided through an agenda 
item at one of the Police Liaison Meetings, run jointly by the Police Authority and the 
police, in each of the district council areas of the force, between June and September each 
year. 
This was done by askmg those present to list their policing priorities for the force as a 
whole for the forthcoming year, initially to the meeting as a whole, with their replies 
written on a flip chart, but with their ultimate views expressed on a ballot paper giving 
their top five priorities, which are handed in at the end of the meeting. 
At the same time, focus group meetings are held with police staff to gauge their views 
about the contents of the Annual Policmg Plan. 
The views expressed during this consultation are then discussed at an Annual Senior 
Officers' Planning Seminar, to present a draft plan for the attention of the Chief Constable 
and other Chief Officers at a Chief Officers' Strategy Weekend, where the contents of the 
draft plan are decided. The draft plan is then given to the Police Authority for discussion 
and their approval, and has to be published by 1st April each year. 
It should of course remembered that almost two thirds of Police Authorities in England 
and Wales had their aimual policing plan drafted by the police (Weatheritt 1997:12). 
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Police liaison meetings " 
Sixteen Police Liaison Meetings were held in the research force area, each congruent with 
local coimcil political boundaries. Eight of these meetings were attended, to assess the 
level of local public consultation in deciding the contents of the Annual Policing Plan. 
The length of this agenda of the meeting and the attendance of these meetings can be 
summarised as follows: 
POLICE LIAISON GROUP MEETINGS 
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Total 38 32 76 42 51 42 39 54 
Under 18 yrs 0 6 0 1 4 3 0 6 
Councillors 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Pol. Auth. 1 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 
Police Officers 9 4 4 3 6 5 4 3 
Length of 
Meeting (Mins) 
35 20 20 20 20 15 45 20 
Fig: 23 
At all of the meeting attended the first item on the agenda was the Focus Session for 
policmg priorities for the next Annual Policing Plan. The. Clerk to the Police Authority or 
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a police officer from Headquarters Executive Support Branch, infroduced this part of the 
meeting, by pointing out that this focus session was intended to achieve a public 
assessment of the priorities for the force for 1998/99, and imderlined the importance of 
looking at force wide key issues, to think force-vwde and not to merely consider local 
problems: 
'We want broader issues not just for your sfreet but for the Devon & Comwall 
Constabulary.' [Gp.3]. 
'We need to find out what will be in next years annual plan, oiur on-gouig plan. Key issues, 
but at a more force wide level, rather than a local one.' [Gp2]. 
"Think force-wide, think about force wide issues, about where we need to commit our 
resources. A steer to target key issues which effect you. Many local issues will be 
reflected in our force issues but please try to prioritise these issues.' [Gp 5]. 
At one meeting the Police Authority Member who chaned the meeting complained: 'There 
is a difficulty of those present to imderstand the purpose of the Focus Section in that local 
issues continually interfere, for example cycling on the pavement; excessive use of police 
vehicles at road accidents, enforcement of laws relatuig to litter and drinking in public 
parks. Local issues are taking over policy issues for the Policing Plan rather than general 
issues.' [Grp 8]. 
An overview of the policy issues suggested by those attending these pubhc focus group 
meetmgs is given in Fig. 24, overleaf 
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POUCYBSUES SUGC^TED ATMEETENGS 
Oh order of preference) 
GROTIP 1 GR0TTP2 • GROTTPS GROUP 4 
Damage Violent Crime Alcohol Com. Policing 
Youth Issues Car Theft Quality of Life Country Police Stations 
Alcohol/Drugs Drugs Cyclists Cyclists 
Police Patrols Alcohol Abuse Road Traffic Bfewkers 
Calllfendlmg Police Patrols Police Patrols Broken Bottles 
Quality of Life Quality of Life Com Policing Drugs 
Road Traffic Road Traffic Drugs No Country Constables 
More CCTV Burglary Noise Low Sentencing 
Conununication Better Response Better Local Knowiedge 




GROT IP 5 GROTTP 6 GROUP? GROUP 8 
Drugs Road Traffic Drags Community Policing 
Cyclists Community Policing Car Crime Patrolling 
Police Patrol Quality of Life Damage Schools Liason 
Burglary Youth Issues Police Patrols Qualaity of Life 
Noise Alcohol Rural Patrols Drugs 
"Violent Crime Youth Issues Alcohol 
Air Weapons Vandalism Violent Crime 
Arson Multi-agency 
Car Crime "Victim Support 
Vandalism Quality of Life 
Cyclists Alcohol 
Dogs Speeding 
Public Relations Cyclist 
Response Burglary 
Neighb'hood Watch Response 
Fig: 24 
People attending could generally be described as 'middle-aged' and 'middle-class'. They 
came with their own agendas, found it difficult to think 'force-wide' and had little 
imderstanding of what the focus sessions for the Aimual Plan was intended to achieve. 
Their interest in the Plan was mimmal. 
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The focus sessions proved to be a difficult process, with the Clerk to the Police Authority, 
needing on many occasions, to expand local complaints into wider policy issues, for 
example 'Quality of Life'. This can be illustrated by the following comment from the 
floor of one meeting: 
'I don't know much about what goes on in the Police Authority and the police, but the 
public need to know, to understand how it all works. As far as accessibility to pubhc 
meetings is concemed I can only get there by bus, which is very difficult. I can't 
understand why it is called a public meeting because it is too private. There are too many 
people who cannot attend this meeting'. 
And a quote from a Police Commander who was surprised by the lack of interest in the 
Plan: 
'I thought the focus group would have lasted longer so I have not brought too much with 
me tonight.'(Grp 4). 
These meetings conformed in many respects with earlier research regarding pohce/public 
consultative group meetings, for example that most peoples' concem for crime is 
parochial, and the meetings do not represent the community, regardless of how the 
concept of commumty is defined (Morgan & Maggs 1985, Morgan 1987, Morgan 1989) 
and as Johnston (2000: 87) points out, are in need of greater critical and constractive input 
from the public. 
Police focus groups 
The consultation process contmued within the force, with the infroduction of staff seminar 
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and focus group meetmgs. Four often internal focus group meetings held in one division 
of the force were attended. Initially they were slow to attract thie attendance of response 
police officers and members of the C.I.D, this did improve, but there was a consistently 
high number of traffic wardens and un-swom (civihan) staff. No Special Constables were 
at any of these meetings and no officers above the rank of Sergeant was present, apart from 
the Divisional Commander or his deputy who infroduced and closed the meeting and his 
staff officer, who remained for the duration. 
The infroduction to these meetings was based on the premise that the Divisional 
Commander feh it unportant that staff should be given the opportunity to give then views 
of their priorities for a future pohcing agenda. In all cases it was based upon the need to 
work withm limited resources. As one senior officers said: 
'To get the best out of what we've got, as we live in a world of finite resources.' IPF4]. 
The meetings were asked to choose and discuss their views on policing priorities for their 
division and when these had been listed on a flip chart to complete a personal top five, 
from this a list of priorities was agreed at each meeting. Drugs; burglary; violent crime; 
high profile policing were the areas which caused the most concem at all the observed 
meetings. There was great awareness from staff of how pohce resources were used, and 
the services they were expected to provide, as one officer said: 
'We should be addressing how these issues will work, how we v^ll deal with them, 
because every plan will have these issues. That list is what we're here for. The problem 
we should be tackling is how we do it.' [PF3] 
And: 
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'Don't let the public dictate to us which is what they often do. We are getting sent to jobs 
we don't really need to go to.' [PF4]. 
There was, of course, the ever present police cynicism at all the observed meetings about 
the requirement, aims, and the consequent effects of these focus groups: 
'How much has this meeting cost us today? Is this meeting necessary? Is it a good 
training exercise? This meeting mil have no effect on the plan. You've got to be -very 
naive if you think this will have any effect on what happens.'[PFl]. 
The issues brought out from these internal pohce focus groups are smnmarised below: 
ISSUES SUGGESTED AT INTERNAL LIAISON MEETING 
GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 • GROUP 4 
More police patrols More resources Drugs Drugs 
Drugs Less wastage Burglary Quality of life issues 
Youth issues Forward planning Violent crime More resources 
internal 
communication Better training Offender targeting Better training 
Public order Drugs High profile policing Better management 
Fig: 25 
As vwth the Police Liaison Meetings, the majority of those who attended the pohce focus 
groups were more concemed with parochial problems, than force-wide policy matters. 
Consultation - a difficult concept? 




From the top comdor: . 
'Pubhc opinion has a strong influence. Great weight is placed upon pubhc opinion in 
respect of the content of the plan. The plan must reflect local public views, which the 
force does do. I have to say that the public in general are very cynical about this.' [8] 
More forcibly two people interviewed commented: • 
'Well I would ask, does the Home Secretary hsten to the public, or does he just take a 
common sense view of what he thinks are the public fears. I am not aware of a 
consultative process carried out by the Home Office to substantiate the National Key 
Policing Objectives. At a force level public consultation at the county shows indicated that 
disorderly behaviour and vandalism was quite high on the list of public fears of crime and 
for public concem. I don't think that these problems are going to find their way into the 
Force Annual Plan.' [3]. 
Employee influence was also seen to be difficult to achieve: 
'Pt's] Very important but it is difficult to give examples of something that has gone into 
the plan directly from their influence. If the plan is to mean anything it must belong to the 
people in it. We're not very good at this but we are getting better. Some divisions give 
officers and staff responsibility for a particular area of the plan to ensure that it is 
delivered' [4]. 
Divisional manager's views were similarly critical: 
'Public opinion; a great amotmt of emphasis is placed upon focus groups etc, but when you 
actually look at the numbers it's not representative, m fact it's a bloody joke. We only had 
about eighteen people tum up and eight of them were pohcemen and women. So it's 
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essential, but we're not very good at i t ' [31]. 
And for Front Line Managers: 
'Public opinion, yes I would say the Chief Constable does hsten to public opinion, but that 
pubhc opmion is not local public opinion, it's national public opinion. National public 
opinion is effectively the mover for local opimon. They have become the same.' [34]. 
Annual Policmg Plan 1995/96 
The first Pohce Authority Annual Policing Plan produced by the Police Authority was for 
the financial year 1995/96, vsdth an introduction from the Chief Constable and the 
Chairman of the Police Authority and it set out their aim: 
'To provide the highest standards of policing for people in Devon and Comwall and the 
Isles of Scilly.' This has remamed constant throughout all the policmg plans pubhshed to 
date. 
The plan reproduced the Key National Policing Objectives and the Force Aim and then its 
goals under the following sections: 
• Goal 1 - CRIME. To tackle effectively, ui particular dmg related crime and public 
disorder, wherever possible with the cooperation of other individuals, groups or 
agencies, whether statutory or volimtary. 
• Goal 2 - DRUGS. To reduce abuse of confrolled dmgs and associated crime. 
• Goal 3 - OPERATIONAL POLICING. To provide an appropriate and effective 
response to demands from the public for pohce assistance or attention. 
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• Goal 4 - PERSONNEL. To optimise the use of all our staff to meet the requirements of 
policing. 
• Goal 5 - CONSULTATION. To enhance the public's understanding of policing issues 
and to create ownership of a shared vision and commitment to agreed strategies. 
Each Force Goal was further sub-divided into objectives; each objective came with its own 
target and performance indicators. For example. Goal 1 - CRIME, was divided into four 
objectives each with their respective Targets and Performance Indicators. In this case the 
first objective vras set out as follows: 
Objective 1: To reduce the level of aU crune in Devon & Comwall. 
Target: To achieve a reduction in overall Force recorded crime 
P.I: Overall Force recorded crime for 1994 was 109,809. 
Objectives, targets and performance indicators are set out in general terms, no 
commitment is made to quantify these criteria. Objectives can have more than one target 
or performance indicator attached to them. The Pohce Authority Plan 1995/96 gives 
targets which look to exceed the respective perfonnance for the previous year therefore 
last years results became next years Performance Indicators. 
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ANNUAL PLAN 1995/96-







Objectives Targets P.l's. 
Fig. 26 
The Plan for 1996/97 moved towards giving a set target for the following year, with 
performance for the previous year for comparison. This method was continued in the 
1997/98 Plan, but full annual figures were not given, being either Apr - Dec or estimated 
statistics. Arguably anyone wishing to compare results of performance indicator statistics 
can look to the Police Authority Aimual Report for this information. 
The Annual Plan 1998/99 
The Annual Plan for 1998/99 (pl3) pointed out that focus group sessions were held in 
'schools and other educational establishment throughout the force area' asking 'some 430 
young people between the ages of 11 and 18 ' to vote for their policing priorities for the 










• Sexual Offences 
• Violent Crime 
• High Visibility Policing 
• Burglary 
• Weapons • . 
• Vandalism 
From the responses of all sixteen pubhc focus group meetmgs and from internal force 
consultation, the Police Authority chose the following top ten local pohcing objectives for 
the force for the 1998/99 Plan: 
• Drags 
• Quality of Life Issues 
• High Visibility Policing 
• Burglary 
• Licensing Issues 
• Traffic Issues 
• Violence 
• Vehicle Crime 
• Youth Issues 
• Community Policing 
The Plan points out that 'the Police Authority in consultation vwth the Chief Constable set 
the following key policing priorities for 1998-99 (pl6): 
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Operational Policing - Crime 
• Drugs 
• Violent Crime 
• Burglary (Dwelling) 
• Vehicle Crime 
Operational Policing - Pubhc Reassurance .. " 
• High Visibility Policing 
• Emergency Response 
• Injury Road Traffic Accidents 
Commimitv Affairs 
• Youth Issues 
• Community Safety 
The Plan focused strongly upon partnership with other agencies, youth crime and local 
crime problems/community safety: 
The concept of partnership acknowledges the police service caimot tackle issues vwthin 
the community alone. Pohce officers, special constables, and im-swom staff across the 
Force spend many hours in pro-active work with other agencies or individuals, their 
aim being to improve the quality of life for everyone in the community and maintain a 
vital Imk with the Constabulary (p30). 
Reference is made to 'partnership' and 'other agencies' on eleven occasions in the plan, 
almost twice a many times as in the previous Plan. This would appear to reflect the recent 
changes in the National Key Objectives, and the forthcoming requirements of the Crime 
and Disorder Act 1998. 
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Targets and Performance Indicators in the 1998/99 Plan can be shown by this example 
from the Drugs section of the Plan: 
Target: To increase the number of detections by 5% for the supply and 
possession with intent to supply confrolled drugs. 
P.I: The number of detections for supply or possession with intent to 
supply. (1997/98 forecast 640 detections) 
Seven other performance measures are also given in this section, includmg the National 
Key Objectives. 
Although mcluded in the 1997'98 Plan and the 1998/99 Draft Annual Pohcing Plan, the 
pubhshed 1998/99 plan does not include details of performance agamst indicators for the 
previous year, or part thereof 
The 1998/99 Annual Plan includes 'The Pohce Statement of commitment to Fair 
Treatment and Equality of Opportumty'(p9) a paragraph which was not in the Draft Plan 
for that year and has not appeared ui previous Aimual Policing Plans. 
Targets and performance indicators 
Examination of the Annual Policing Plans for the last five years indicate an increase in the, 
number of policing priority targets with performance indicators having increased from 





of members of the division. However their discussions do not cascade out and members 
do not consult with their peers. Through the section five weekly meetings the divisional 
plans are discussed. The Police Authority hold pubhc meetings around the force to gauge 
their views. The force plan is also guided by the Audit Commission and the National Key 
Objectives. Consultation defines local issues which, gives the material for the Force 
Aimual Policing Plan. The plan belongs to the Police Authority and then to the Chief 
Constable. Senior Officers planning conferences are held in October of each year which 
force a stage in the process. The product from of this goes to the Chief Officers Planning 
Conference which produces a draft aimual plan that Divisional Commanders take to then 
staff and ask how they should go about making a divisional plan within the force plan. 
The Force plan is the 'What 'and the Divisional Plans are the 'How' - in theory.' [3] 
However changes to these plans tend to be incremental: 
'The plan tends to change very little and the Force Annual Plan, being the first year of a 
five year plan, says what you hope to achieve during the next twelve months. Therefore, 
imless there is something new on the policing agenda, the chances are that the annual 
policing plan wiU remain relatively the same year in year out. Things to be changed are 
defined largely by outside influences such as a change in government priorities, national 
key objectives or public priorities, perhaps heightened by the media, domestic violence is 
probably a good example of that' [1] 
For divisional managers 
Divisional managers identified the same major processes as the 'top corridor': 
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'Well the concept is one where every year the Chief Constable calls a senior officers 
seminar, and I think he tries to encourage as many senior managers within the force that he 
can to the weekend seminar at 'Middlemoor', That's normally done in September, when 
there is some indication as to what the key national objectives may be about, and what the 
public have indicated should be there, because of the focus group activity that goes on at 
the consultative group meetmgs. Obviously what we feel.as senior managers ought to be 
the operational priorities within the force, or our perspective on those national key 
objectives that we may be aware of, or what we did last year. So in theory there is a 
consultation exercise and in practice there is a consultation exercise. I don't think that it is 
effective, in the sense that these things are very often prescribed any way from the cenfre. 
So if the Home Secretary says we will have a focus upon dwelhng house burglary, crimes 
of violence drugs, then no Chief Constable is really going to say, no I'm not gohig to do 
that. But I don't see any harm in that because that's probably what we would say needs to 
be done any way. So its a common sense approach. The key national objectives are 
sufficiently wide enough and they address areas which we, professionally, would agree 
needs to be addressed anyway. Whether the actual weekend seminar is a consultative 
exercise m the true sense of the word is probably where I'm more cynical. I think it's an 
opportunity for people to say what they think needs to be done but I often wonder if there's 
a prepared agenda anyway' [31]. 
Divisional Managers saw it as a 'top down' process: 
"The Chief Constable sets his priorities in Ime with the national key objectives, sets his 
auns and intentions for the year and then it's those which are taken down through 
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consultation to divisional .level. And agaiii through consultation, based upon the Chief 
Constables auns, divisions build their own plan and aims, and hopefully produce their own 
plan as well. This local consultation was carried out both with the public and staff through 
focus groups.' [20] 
And: 
'I still see it as very driven by the Chief Constable, and that overall it is a top down 
process. The Chief Constable is very much driving his team as to what is included m the 
plan ,and so we see top down control and we have to fit in with what's there. Also I don't 
think the Police Authority are addmg value to what's in the policing plan cinrently. I think 
they're having to learn their role in actually having to set priorities in the areas we are 
looking at' [53]. 
For ^ ound level managers 
These managers, tended to be more critical of the processes involved: 
'I attend local police consultative committees and the force sent members of ' X ' Dept 
from Headquarters. We asked people what then priorities were and the same old chestnuts 
came up, the drugs and the auto crime and people were throwing those in. I don't know 
how representative they were, because at the meetings, when you consider a city of 
200,000 people in Plymouth, I think about 20 people turned up when the people of ' X ' 
department did then survey for the plan. So how representative is that? And again how 
representative is Plymouth of Devon & Comwall, because Plymouth is often seen as a wart 
on Devon & Comwall, and if you cut it off Devon would be a nice place to live. So they 
did have a consultative process but I'm not convinced that actually produced what people 
out there thought then priorities were, because I consult with groups, councillors, local 
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resident associations almost on a weekly basis and they're interested in parking, groups of 
youths wandering around and quality of life issues, so I'm not convinced that it is 
representative.' [21]. 
They also viewed the process as. an even more top downapproach than 'top corridor' 
ordivisional managers: • . ' 
'The whole idea of the policing plan in the force at this time is that it cascades down from 
the top to the bottom. The major objectives are set out at headquarters in line with the 
Home Office National Objectives and any other major issues that the force wants to look 
at. It is then cascaded down through the divisions and through to the divisional annual 
plans, and the divisional plans have their own. objectives, in there which again are in line 
with the force plan. So we are looking towards achieving the same end.' [23]. 
Comments on the central influences on the Local Annual Policim Plan 
As Reiner points out debates about policing invariably return to the questions of 
accountability, confrol, and who governs (1992: 249), particularly in respect of policy 
issues. 
From the top corridor 
It was generally accepted that an Annual Policing Plan was produced only because it a 
legal requirement, for example one said: 
'Historically, without legislation we wouldn't go down the route we have been forced to 
take. Legislation has dictated the reasons that underpms the force annual plan.' [8] 
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Home Office influence was noted by all on the top corridor, ranging fr^ 
'Yes they have, influence because they dictate the key sections which should be in the plan, 
for example partnership and target setting' [6]. 
To: 
'The Home Office has the greatest influence of aiiy of these groups you have in your list,. 
over the contents of the plan. Every year they set the five key national- objectives, these 
mean those areas where police responses should be concentrated. Those objectives form 
the major part of the force annual plan. The Home Office also controls the budget of the 
force, because they set the cappmg limit for which the constabulary can go to the 
community charge and tax payers to get the revenue. As money is the major area for 
resource allocation this is why they set the policing objectives and they control the finance. 
They also set down through Home Office Circulars the style and content of the force 
annual pohcing plans.'[10]. 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary were seen as a strong influence, for example: 
'Any shortcomings they may have foimd in the last plan would be implemented'[13]. 
The background influence of the Audit Commission was also noted: 
'The Audit Commission are not actually consulted in respect of our annual policing plan 
but they provide the performance indicators and the papers for example Street Wise. They 
are influential.'[3] 
And that: 
'The Audit Commission has no direct influence, but is indirectly influential in respect of 
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their papers on targeting resources and value for money, decisions on what your priorities 
should be. They are quite an influential group which comment upon the way funds are 
spent.' [2]. 
The majority of those interviewed suggested that A.C.P.0 had no influence over the 
contents of the plan, .one going as far as to say: 
'A.C.P.0 could well be the least influential of all the groups.' [4]. 
From divisional managers 
The Audit Commission, the Home Office and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 
are seen by these managers as the main source of central influence: 
For example: 
'I would say that the two that stand out most are the Audit Commission and Her Majesty's 
Inspector of Constabulary, sorry three, and the Home Office. The Home Office driving the 
Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary, following on from any consultation they would 
have had. I don't see any influence from public opinion.' [44]. 
'The H.M.I well yes they do influence it by virtue of their support for any Government 
initiative or Home Office initiative and so I am quite siure that this years inspection will be 
crime reduction based, whereas last years inspection was intelligence-led pohcing crime 
detection based. So this years plan inevitably reflects crime reduction, m a way, as a 
priority and yes they are quite influential. So too the Audit Conunission. The Audit 
Commission put more influence clearly on what the Police Authority are asking the Chief 
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Constable. Home Office, yes, riot through circulars but because the Home Office is now 
so instrumental in the Crime and Disorder Act. What is going on there is that Jack Straw 
is using the Home Office, as I know from friends in the Home Office, that for two years 
before this government was appointed, he was in and out of the Home Office formulating 
this very sfrategy. Therefore it.must be a very strong influence arid the new national key 
objectives, I-forget what they are called now, but clearly they are setting the new national 
key objectives, or the modem equivalent, which are basically the same thing. [45]. 
From ground level managers 
Ground level mangers also saw the Home Office and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Constabulary and the Audit Commission as having the most influence over the Aimual 
Pohcing Plan: 
'I think the ones that are really driving at source are the Audit Commission and this filters 
down to the H.M.I and I see them today as little more than a puppet of government. I think 
probably pohce authorities do have more of a role in interpreting the local needs of the 
force, that's how I see them, and being able to franslate it into what is required in Devon & 
Comwall, you know what they want. I would say that they are the main influences. Pubhc 
opinion, I don't know, I mean yes up to a point, but I think now the ones that are really 
pushing thmgs is the Audit Commission.' [25]. 
And: 
'H.M.I, yes a definite influence and A.C.P.0 definitely, but I've got no doubt at all that the 
pressure from the Home Office is able to bear on chief officers has increased and the 
independence of the Chief Constable I believe has eroded. (A) because of their selection 
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procedure as senior ranks are managed by the Hoine Office, you don't get promoted unless 
they approve and (B) the rev^ a^rds remuneration and contracts are all based upon factors set 
by the Home Office in respect of him.' [26]. 
Comments on the local influences 
From the top corridor 
All those interviewed believed that the Police Authority could influence the contents of the 
plan in that: 
'They have been very complimentary about the plan, and there is of comse always a 
dilemma with the annual plan as it is the Police Authority's plan. This begs the question -
How does the H.M.I influence the contents of their plan?'[6]. 
But: 
'It could be argued a great deal, but they don't necessarily have a great affect on the 
content of the annual plan. I think this will change as they become more famihar with the 
planning process. Overall they do influence the plan.' [8] 
The Chief Constable in person appears to be seen by all those interviewed as having 
considerable influence over the contents of the plan. This view varies in its strength of 
conviction. From the suggestion that: 
'The Chief Constable is responsible for producing the draft of annual policing plan for 
presentation to the Police Authority. He is also very significant in respect of producing the 
contents of the plan.' [3]. 
To the strongest viewpoint: 
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'The Chief Constable is very influential.. Our Chief is very detiail conscientious and he 
reads and makes prolific alterations to the plan. He questions the targets, he questions the 
methodology and he questions the structure of the plan and its grammar. He is very 
influential.' [4] 
The general, -view, in respe9t of Police Staff Associations (Pohce Federation and 
Superintendents Association) and other Unions was that they generally had.no influence 
over the contents of the plan. The most forceful conunent was: 
'They take part in the senior officers plarming weekend but what is apparent is that they 
are dis-interested in becoming actively uivolved in the strategy making and delivery of 
force policy. They want to be there in a listening and criticising role but do not want an 
active part or any responsibility for decisions taken within the policy makmg process. 
There is a form of cabinet responsibility here, where you argue your case in the meetings 
but once 
strategy has been decided vwthin the meetings everyone must be bound by the decision.' 
[10]. 
From divisional managers 
Divisional Mangers saw the Chief Constable as the greatest local influence over the 
Aimual Policing Plan: 
'The Chief Constable m person. Can you ask an easier question? A lot of this stuff 
naturally m his role is prepared for him but we do have a Chief Constable who does dot the 
I's and cross the T's and does actually look at what's in the plan to ensure that it's 
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something he can dehver on. Because obviously that's his job. He's accountable to the 
Police Authority on it, so I think he's got a major role in it, and also m terms of allowing 
resources to get on and do the work. But he doesn't get to the nitty - gritty side of it. 
Employees in the organisation, I think this had been a difficult area for us. Whilst we have 
had Ihe will to try and set up focus groups, discussion groiips, or whatever, I don't think 
they have been particularly "satisfactory, and it may be because of this top down approach 
that they see as a fait-accompli. Also to be quite honest, they're too bloody busy, and they 
actually think they don't want to think about those things. When we've consulted, in my 
last division, I did it more bottom up and we had some very valuable things come up from 
rural divisions because tiiey could tell me about this or that, whatever and it worked quite 
well.' [53]. 
They also saw the Police Authority as having some influence: 
T think the Police Authority have a measure of influence in as much as they must approve 
the Chief Constable's plan, hi fact it does now become the Police Authorities plan under 
present legislation and they have for instance, in the 1997/98 plan, they have actually 
included something which the Chief Constable didn't. So I suppose you could argue that 
this proves that they have some executive authority.' [31]. 
Views in respect of public opinion were less enthusiastic: 
'Public opimon, well I still think we have an arrogant approach to public opinion. Whilst 
they're going through the mechanisms of police liaison groups and the focus groups that go 
on, and data gathering, we're not uito a wide cross section of the community. In fact we 
are into a very specialist group of people, age group, class group etc and we've gone out in 
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different ways to try and get information from the public and I suppose we get the same as 
with our staff. Do the public really want to get involved, are they informed enough about 
what they're being asked about, to make considered and constructive suggestions? But the 
arrogance comes, in that we know damned well that the public are concemed about quality 
of life issues, ^yhat's happening in'then own locality. Yet the plans don't reflect that 
because we've got what we call professional judgement on-it, and say, yes of course 
they're not mentioning murders or burglaries and that's our core busuiess and we've got to 
do it. And we haven't got it right yet, haven't got the balance to listen to them.' [53]. 
From ground level managers 
Ground level managers saw local influence coming from the Police Authority, public 
opinion and the Chief Constable: 
'I would say the new make up of the Police Authority through the Home Office has 
probably had to a large extent the majority of mfluence. They are probably informed 
through the H.M.I and the Audit Conunission and I think they would like to think that it 
reflects the majority of public opinion ,and also the police as well, but this is not always 
the case.' [28]. 
Again where public opmion is considered, it is often seen as being in the back-ground: 
'Public opinion in its broadest sense I think must somehow influence the decisions made 
by the Home Office when they come to decide the key national objectives, but how they do 
that I don't know' [24] 
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Or a difficult concept: 
'Public opinion is a problem because everybody wants the same thing but everybody wants 
it a different way. So I feel that the public have been made to feel that they have been able 
participate, but the only thing about this is that i f you or I were told that a survey had 
taken place, do you accept what's said?-Because i f you go back and say,, well who j^ aid 
this, and where, and why, and how? The people who have done these surveys don't like 
that very much. Once you start asking questions upstans like that, then you are really 
made to feel out of order.' [19]. 
The Police Authority view 
A l l the members of the Police Authority who were interviewed saw their Authority as 
being able to mfluence the contents of the Plan:. 
'I think the Pohce Authority has a tremendous input. There's no doubt about it, that when 
we are cnculated with the draft copies of the annual pohcing plan the Chief Constable will 
always discuss in depth, his team, his senior team, will always discuss it in depth with us. 
And if there's any amendments that the Authority members want to make then, you know, 
we know very well that if we make a case it will be changed. But if we don't make a case 
then we accept that the Chief Constable, being responsible for operation matters, will 
probably be right. He'll talk us out of it, but I think the Pohce Authority has got 
tremendous influence.' [9]. 
Many also saw the Chief Constable as being influential: 
'The Chief Constable and his senior officers would have an input because they are going to 
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discuss the pubhcs' perception of the priorities and decide, in the main, with the key. 
objectives how they fit into the pohcing plan.' [8]. 
However there were those who also saw influence coming from the Home Office and Her 
Majesty's frispectprate of Constabulary: 
'The Home Office. I don't know;. I wouldn't like to throw that out, because one must 
always be aware of what sort of comes out from their on the air waves, as it were, to be 
aware. You have to be aware of i t . I'm quite sure we're influenced by it, you know, what 
they are wanting and so forth. You might say 'poo - poo' to this sort of thing but you know 
very well at the end of the day that you have to tow the line.' [2]. 
And: 
'H.M.I, yes, fine, O.K but we are conscious of the fact that, correction, I am conscious of 
the fact that they are the mid-station between the Chief Constable and the Home Office. 
And whilst they may have a wider view of the issues beyond the force area, I do tend to 
take note of what they say, particularly in relation to this particular force. But theirs is a 
stand back view of things and we can't always do that, they lend a critical eye as we know, 
but they do not have to take into accoimt all the reasons why things are done, or why things 
are not done, or are unable to be done. It's usually finance.' [4]. 
Opinions about the amount of 'hands-on' mvolvement the Pohce Authority and its Clerk 
have in writing the plan varied, however most members felt they had sufficient input: 
'I think we have sufficient input. I'm sure we could get more input if we wanted it. It's 
simply just making the point that we do need to have more input. Unless we had an 
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authority set up here which is bigger than the one'we've got, and this is quite a lean Pohce 
Authority, what's the point in replicating what's down the road anyway [ i.e. police 
headquarters].' [7]. 
.But there was concern about the control over items reaching the agenda of Police 
Authority meetings: 
'It is really delegated down to the Clerk. He's got close liaison obviously with the 
treasurer because most of the headaches as with all committees are financially based, and 
obviously he looks at the and has close contact with the Chief Our agendas, as do most 
agendas in local government in its widest sense, seem to follow a particular pattern and 
there are just slight amendments as it goes along. But what happens is that the Clerk, he'll 
call me as the *, reportmg anything that comes up, and so he confers with me to put 
things on the agenda. We have a pre-meeting anyway, maybe a week or so or may be 
longer than that, before the full Authority meetmg, when the Chahman, Vice-Chairman, 
Clerk, Treasurer, the Force Financial Officer, the Chief and probably his deputy are there. 
So that we chew these things over, and stuff that is relevant to it, that's a sifting effect, 
taking out some things that there is no need to put to the authority anyway. Some of it is 
basically information - full stop, and also it might well bring in stuff which we might feel 
ought to be placed in front of the frill Authority. [4]. 
•Removed to preserve confidentiality 
Divisional Policing Plans 
Local pohce commanders were given the opportunity to produce their own Policmg Plans, 
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for each Division. Four Divisional Plans foir 199.7/98 were taken as examples, representing 
about half the number of Force Divisions at that time. Two documents give the same 
precis of how the plan was formulated, namely through: 
• The Home Secretary's National Key Pohcmg Objectives. 
• Local objectives set by Police Authority-after'listening to pubhc views'. 
• Performance targets set by the Police Authority. 
• The financial resources available. 
The other two give a more detailed description of how the plan was devised, including: 
• Public and internal police consultation. 
• Monitoring and evaluation of previous performance/crime trends. 
• Policing priorities set by Government and the Police Authorily. 
Al l four plans set out their Divisional Key Policing Priorities. These follow the same 
headings as given in the Police Authority Annual Policing Plan, namely: Operational 
Policing; Public Reassurance; and Conununity Affairs. They also include a section for 
'Investors in People' under the heading of Persoimel & Training. There is no reference in 
any of these docvunents to policing budgets. 
There was a variance between performance indicators, both between Local Plans and the 
Police Authority Plan. For example under the heading 'Emergency Responsethe Local 
Plans examined all had a different indicators in respect of unmediate response times, with 
three of the four plans having lower performance indicators than shown in the Police 
Authority Plan. 
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The Plymouth Division of the Force produced copies of Local Pohcing Plans for the public . 
and" also for their staff in respect of 'Ward Officers', 'Response Officers', 'Crime 
Management', and 'Support Staff. The documents pubhshed for Divisional Staff set out 
in detail all the performance indicators required for both the Force and the Division for the 
year, and set .out how staff in these departments are expected to contribute to the 
attainment of these goals. . . . 
The divisional plans examined suggest that, although they closely follow the force plan, 
both in terms of design and the key national objectives, there is scope for local 
commanders to make their own adjustments. 
Divisional plans - the top corridor view 
Top Corridor staff agreed that there was considerable freedom for divisions but most 
added the caveat that they must follow the Force Plan: 
'Within the consfraints of the force atmual plan. They must satisfy the general areas of 
that. They were given quite a lot of scope and a free range within the guidelines of the 
force plan which were the general areas they worked within.' [13]. 
One person interviewed said: 
'Initially for the first year they were given fremendous freedom but they didn't want it. 
They wanted to be guided and led and given a template on how to do it. They are 
becomuig better at it now but quite clearly divisional plans must correlate with the force 
plans and achievement can only be through divisions.' [10]. 
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For the future one interviewee said: 
'It will be tighter in fiiture but they must include those points which are in the Annual 
Force Plan, which I don't tlunk they did before. So I think they will not have quite so 
much freedom now as they have had before.'[15] , .- - ; 
Divisional Plans are seen as a means of enforcing perfonnance indicators from the Force 
Plan, which in tum are based upon the National Key Objectives from the Home Office 
through the police organisation to local commanders and ultunately to the individual 
officer. As one interviewee noted: 'A l l divisions have to follow the force plan, based upon 
Home Office Key Objectives.' [2]. 
Divisional plans - the view from divisional managers 
They believed they has some freedom to produce their own divisional plans: 
'We are given a good bit of freedom. We have to produce a plan that will support the 
force plan above the divisional plans, we're talking now about unit plans or whatever. 
There is complete autonomy there. But we have to produce a plan that will support the 
force plan. [39]. 
Consfraint from the Force Plan was often quoted: 
'Limited, limited. They have some but it has to be in a fixed format set by ' X ' Department 
which is not easy all the time. It has to fit into the force plan obviously, and again to be, 
really, to be quite honest, I think it plays lip service to a lot of the local problems that the 
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small amomit of local consultation brings up. When I talk about local consultation Imean'. 
police liaison groups which are a handful of converted people, usually elderly and well off 
and pro-police, who attend and do very little to influence. We sent out some 
questioimaires, the questionnaires were great but I feel that the people who answer 
questioimaires are not the people we want to get to really. [48]; 
Divisional plans - the views of ground level managers 
The views of ground level managers were mixed. Some felt there was considerable 
freedom: 
'I think they have a lot of freedom, I think in reality. In practice you've got to link your 
plans v^th the force plan. For good organisational reasons there has got to be a trickle 
down cascade effect from the centre but its the tactical freedom. I mean once the 
objectives are set, and I pick up the same tune from the cenfre, how I actually effect those 
plans or operationalise them, then that's where I have the greatest freedom. I set my own 
P.I's, effectively now they're approved by the Chief Constable, so if he didn't agree with 
them I wouldn't be allowed to have them, because all our plans are approved by the Chief 
Constable and I know that he has queried some of the divisional commanders plans this 
year. So whilst I make a conscious effort to make sure it links and that's how it should be 
but how we tactically achieve it I have a great deal of latitude. [31]. 
But only as additional local priorities: 
'The local policmg plans now completely reflect the priorities that have been identified in 
the force plan, so therefore operational policuag personnel matters and fraining matters, 
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They agreed that pohcing plans mean that the police give too much priority to tasks on 
which they are measured, with just over 83% either agreeing or strongly agreeing: 








(n = 77) 
6.5 
• Agree Strongjy 
• Agree 




However they believed that policing plans had made no difference to the way most police 
carry out their job, with just over 45% either agreeing or strongly agreeing that this was the 





Inspectorate of Constabulary. Once agaiii examination of. published '.docuinents from 
H.M.I, the Home Office, The Audit Conunission and Force Aimual Policing Plans, 
illusfrate the sfrong influence that these groups have upon the contents of the local Policing 
Plan, a view that is supported by members of the organisation. 
For example managers saw cenfral influence over the contents of the Annual Plan coming 
primarily from The Home Office, The Audit Conunission, and the H.M.I, and locally from 
the Chief Constable, who was seen as having the greatest influence, being responsible for 
the production of the draft Annual Plan; although they believed that the Police Authority 
did have some influence. 
Police Authority members believed that they had some confrol over the contents, but 
admitted to the power of the Chief Constable. 
Consultation was seen as a problem at all levels, both internal and external, and despite 
efforts to employ a 'rational comprehensive model' of decision making, by necessity this 
was reduced to one of 'muddling through'. 
Although Her Majesty's Inspectors reported that there was sufficient flexibility for local 
commanders to produce then own area policing plans, the general view was that this 
flexibility was limited by the need to follow the Police Authority Plan and its Ministerial 
Priorities, and a perceived reluctance to produce exfra local targets and perfonnance 
indicators. 
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Front line staff saw Annual Plans.as placing greater influence on tasks upon which they 
were measured without a marked increase in quality. They were undecided about pubhc 
influence over their work but they saw greater influence coming from both cenfral 
government and the local Pohce Authority. 
However over forty five percent of those who were menibers of the force prior to the 
infroduction of Annual Policing Plans, believed that plans had made no difference to the 
way they carried out then work. 





DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY 
Although domestic violence has been defined as 'gender neutral' (Buzawa & Buzawa 
1990: 9), with evidence to suggest that men can also be the victims of such violence 
(Mirrlees-Black 1999, Stiraus 1999 ppl744), it has. to. be acknowledged that it was 
pressure from womens' groups and the feminist movement which placed it firmly in the 
policy arena. 
Since the 'first wave' of feminism (Heam 1996: 25) of the early twentieth century and its 
're-emergence in the 1960's' (Dobash & Dobash 1992: 73), as well as widely published 
feminist academic research (Walklate 1996), the issue of male/female power relationships, 
particularly in respect of domestic violence and female rape, has provoked considerable 
reaction (Dobash & Dobash 1979, Hammer & Saunders 1984, O'Donovan 1985, Kelly 
1988, Stanko 1988, MacKinnon 1989), and produced 'their own politics of victimisation' 
(Rock 1990:178), even if the images represented have had more unpact than their theories 
(Heidelsohn 1989). 
The lack of state support for female victims has been highlighted (Mawby & Gill 1987, 
Dobash & Dobash 1992, Wilhams 1992), as has their treatment m the crimmal justice 
process (Pamas 1967, Pamas 1972, Punch 1985, Womens National Conunission 1985, 
Home Office 1986, Uglow 1988, McKimion 1989, Walklate 1989, Bourlet 1990, 
Buzawa & Buzawa 1990, Reiner 1992, Jones et al 1994, Guardian 1997, Kelly 1999). 
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Milestones of change • . • 
The impetus for change in pohcing domestic violence has been world wide. Research in 
the United States of America on policing domestic violence, the starting point for many 
British pohcing initiatives (Morgan 1997, Pollard 1998), involved the vwder use of police 
arrest powers in domestic violence situations. Knovra as the Mirmeapohs Experiment 
(Sherman & Berk 1984).it was later replicated in London, Ontario. 
This so called 'victim protection - offender arrest' policy, it was argued, would reduce re­
offending and was widely circulated to British Police Forces (Sheptycki 1993). It was a 
policy which consequently received their considerable support (Edwards 1986, 1989, 
Sheptycki 1993), even though it was questionable that this lessenmg of police discretion 
would overcome the 'particular situational factors' which have shaped police action in the 
past (Martin 1997). 
These factors included: 
• The public/private crime divide (Womens National Conunission 1985: 51). 
• The parties involved, their values and previous domestic violence history (Hammer 
1989, Home Office 1997[a]: para 1.4). 
• Any assumptions by some young people that violence towards females was 
occasionally acceptable (Zero Tolerance Trust 1997). 
• That communities themselves would push for greater police intervention in policing 
domestic violence (Walklate 1998: 64). 
Within the United Kingdom one of the first milestones of change was the so called fly on 
the wall documentary made by Peter Greaf in 1982, which illustrated the imsympathetic 
attitudes to female victuns exhibited by some British police officers. This dramatically 
changed public opmion, putting pressure on botii the Home Office and the police, to 
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change then: pohcies in respect of pohcmg doniestic violence (Bourlet 1990; 65). 
Subsequent changes to the criminal law, intended to enhance the power of victims in cases 
of domestic violence, affected police pohcy and practice, for example: 
• The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provided that wives could be both 
competent and compellable witnesses agauist husbands in criminal proceedings, unless 
•jointly charged (Zander 1985:17-118). 
• The Family Law Act (Part W) 1996 (see Lockton & Ward 1997, Bird 1996) provided 
means of protecting the residential rights of victims of domestic violence, with the 
facihty for powers of arrest in certain cases. 
• The experimental use of Domestic Violence Courts to encourage victims to give 
evidence in such cases (Guardian 3rd June 1999). 
• The experimental use of Restorative Justice to enable reconcihation and the re-
buildmg of relationships (Paradme & Wilkmson 2000). 
However two Home Office Circulars to the Police have been the most instrumental in 
changmg attitudes towards the policing of domestic violence. The first, 69/1986 -
'Violence Against Women' (Home Office 1986[a]) made it clear that the pohce must 
ensure the safety of spouse and children at domestic disputes, although it made littie 
change to policy (Freeman 1987, Edwards 1989) except in the Metiopolitan Police where 
the use of arrest powers was emphasised (Sheptycki 1993, Mullender 1996: 4). The 
second Circular, 60/1990, 'Domestic Violence' (Home Office 1990[a3) related solely to the 
issue of policing incidents of domestic violence, and made it clear that the Home Secretary 
had been influenced by concem from the public about domestic violence and a 
requirement to ensure the protection of victims from physical attacks that take place in the 
home. 
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Since the research was completed an additional Circular (19/2000[b]) 'Domestic Violence' 
has been pubhshed placing more emphasis upon local pohce pohcy and greater 
prescription of how incidents of domestic violence should be policed, and a further Home 
Office Document 'Domestic Violence: Breaking the Chain Multi Agency Guidance for 
Addressing Domestic Violence' (2000[c])'which gives detailed advice on a-partnership 
approach to pohcing domestic violence. 
THE RESEARCH 
Home Office Circular 60/1990 
The summary to the Circular underlined the message that ' all police officers involved 
in the investigation of cases of domestic violence regard as their overriding priority the 
protection of the victim and the apprehension of the offender. To this end they should be 
made fully aware of their responsibility to respond as law enforcement officers to requests 
from victims for help, and of their powers to take action in cases of violence.' ( ibid para 
30). It then goes on to set out a number of policy reconunendations to Chief OjSlcers: 
• Liaise with other agencies and voluntary bodies. 
• Consider establishing dedicated domestic violence units. 
• Set out a force pohcy statement. 
• A need for positive action in all cases of domestic violence. 
• Employ an effective recording system of offences. 
• Reconunend officers not to use reconcihation where there is a suggestion of violence. 
• Provide medical facilities for victims. 
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• Ensure officers are aware of their powers of arrest. ; 
• Ensure officers consider charging offenders and explain need for victims to give 
evidence. 
• Use bail to protect victims when no charges are brought. 
• Pass background informatioii on to Crown Prosecution Service. 
• Arrange for continued support for victim prior to coiirt. . 
• Advise Crown Prosecution Service ifvictim wishes to vvithdraw complaint. 
The Circular concludes with a message from the Home Secretary in which he states that: 
He hopes that chief officers will find the advice and reconunendations in this circular 
helpful and that they wiU implement them fiilly m their force areas (ibid). 
Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary Reports 
Whilst the influence of these Home Office Circulars brought about a 'flurry of police 
activity' (Leishman et al 1996: 196) throughout England and Wales, it was pressure firom 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, which sought to ensure the implementation of 
these policy recommendations. 
Taking for example. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary Reports for the Force, 
between 1990 and 1994, the followuig number of references to domestic violence issues 
were made: 
• 1990 One paragraph. 
• 1991 One paragraph. 
• 1992 Seven Paragraphs & three recommendations. 
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• 1993 :, Four paragraphs & one recomniendation. A review 
of action taken in respect of 1992 recommendations. 
• 1994 One Paragraph. A review of the 1993 reconunendation. 
The report of Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary in respect of the force for 1990 
was carried out before Home Office Circular 60/1990 had tune to take effect. Paragraph 
(4.4) of this report refers to domestic violence issues: it states that the force '...has a 
decisive and caring attitude towards domestic violence' and where there has been a 
complaint and evidence of an offence it has been 'recorded as a crime'. Where children 
are involved and if appropriate families are directed to other agencies. The Inspectorate 
considered that, 'Force Standing Orders clearly set out the procedures for officers dealing 
with cases of domestic violence.' No recommendations were made by the Inspectorate in 
respect of force policy or practice regarding this issue. 
The report for 1991 has one paragraph (5.7) relating to issues of domestic violence and it 
emphasises the need to respond to this problem by: 
• Setting out a Force Pohcy Statement and Strategy which, it was noted, was then 
currently in preparation. 
• Setting up Domestic Violence Units. A policy that the force had decided not to 
implement, due to problems of size and geography, instead appointmg Liaison 
Inspectors in each division to provide a co-ordinated and inter agency approach to this 
issue. 
This pohcy appeared to satisfy the Inspectorate, which made no reconunendations. 
The report for the 1992 inspection contains the greatest coverage of force policy and 
practice in respect of domestic violence issues. It re-enforced the importance set out in 
Home Office Circular 60/1990 of taking 'positive action against the perpetrator by arrest 
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when justified' and the welfare of children (para. 3.3), and goes on to pomt out that the-
Force Standing Order relating to domestic violence was 'in being prior to the current 
Home OfBce Guidance and did not fully embrace the radical changes in attitude in the 
guidance' (para 3.4). Once again pointing out that a new Standing Order was 'currently 
being prepared'. Comment is made of the failure to set up Domestic Violence Units, and 
the Inspectorate, although in agreement with their current policy, required, the force to 
reinforce and monitor its commitment to domestic violence policing policy. The report, 
although praising a multi-agency initiative in Plymouth, criticised the force for not 
routinely referring incidents of domestic violence to other agencies. 
The Inspectorate reconunended that the force: 
• Considers producing an advice leaflet for domestic violence victims. 
• Undertake an evaluation of domestic violence incidents after implementation of its 
new Force Standing Order. 
• Introduce a structured domestic violence referral system. 
(p21). 
The Inspectorate report for 1993 noted that the force follows the principles of the Home 
Office Circular and the publication of its Policy and Procedure Guidelines. Due to delay 
in pubhshmg these guidelines, no monitoring of domestic violence had taken place and it 
recoHunends that this should now be carried out. 
In respect of the recommendations set out in 1992, the Inspectorate reports that: 
• The force has produced leaflets for victuns of domestic violence. 




• Guidelines in respect of a structured referral system had been issued so that liaison 
could take place locally on this issue. ; . • > 
The 1994 Report points out that the force is tacklmg domestic violence 'in accord with 
Home Office guidelines' (para 5.17). The Inspectorate welcomed the introduction of 
nominated trained officers to co-ordinate the policing of domestic violence and having 
ppmted out the advantages of Domestic Violence Units, '...understands consideration is 
being given .to the formation of dedicated units', (para 5.17).- In respect of 
recommendations made in their 1993 report the Inspectorate notes that the monitoring of 
incidents now occurs (p47). 
Reports for the thematic performance review inspections of 1995 and 1996 do not make 
reference to domestic violence issues. 
Examination of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary reports reveals a change of 
emphasis in respect of domestic violence policy over the five Force Inspection Reports 
between 1990 and 1994. 
The 1990 report was complimentary; the force had a caring and decisive attitude to 
policing domestic violence and Force Standing Orders clearly set out procedures for 
policing them. 
The 1991 report was more critical and compared force policy with recommendations set 
out in Home Office Circular 60/1990, emphasisuig the need for the Force to publish a 
Force Policy Statement and Strategy and set up domestic violence units. 
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The Report for 1992 was the most critical in respect of Force domestic violence policy; it 
made direct reference to home Office Circular 60/1990 in respect of positive police action, 
that there was as yet not published Force Standing Order about police procedures for 
dealing with domestic violence, and commented about the lack of Domestic Violence 
Units. . 
The 1993 Report notes that the force is following the principles of the Home Office 
Circular 60/1990 and has published its Policy and Procedure Guideline, with the 1994 
Report noting that the Force is tackling the problem of domestic violence in accord with 
the Home Office Circular, and that the Force is considering the setting up of Domestic 
Violence Units - which were subsequently introduced. 
It is clear that Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary had taken up the issue of 
pohcmg domestic violence (both policy and practice) and intended to ensure that the force 
implemented the recommendations contained in Home Office Circular 60/1990. 
The force policy statement 
The resultant force policy and procedures document states that, 'It is the overridiug duty of 
police officers and civihan staff, when dealing, with domestic disputes, to protect victims 
and children firom violence. They will treat domestic violence as seriously as other forms 
of violent crime by making full use of the relevant powers of entry and arrest, and avoid 
the dangers of seeking conciliation between assailant and victim, when an assault has 
taken place. Domestic violence is a crime and should be recorded and dealt with 
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.accordingly.' 
Force policy goes on to detail police powers and all the recommendations given "in the 
Home Office Circular are addressed. 
The role and responsibilities of staff employed in Domestic Violence Units are defined. 
These include: 
• Improving the awareness of staff to the issue of domestic violence. 
• Support and help victims. 
• Co-ordinate this help through the other statutory and volimtary agencies which may be 
involved. 
Unlike the Home Office Circular, force policy is 'gender neutral' in that it does not show 
any suggestions of bias towards violence against women, but rather refers to terms such as 
'partner', family members', 'people in a close relationship', and 'children'. It emphasises 
the need for officers to use 'positive action'. 
Comparing the contents of Home Office Cncular 60/1990 and Her Majesty's Inspectorate 
of Constabulary Reports of Force inspections between 1990 and 1994, "with the contents of 
the Force Policy Statement, it can be seen that together they have brought about a major 
change in force policy and practice in the policing of domestic violence. 
Therefore, in terms of local police policy and practice, 'Cncular 60 [can] be seen as an 
important directive, reflectmg government and Home Office Pohcy.' (Mawby & Walklate 
1994: 99), having itself been influenced by international policing initiatives, national 
public opinion and academic research papers. 
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These.local policy and procedural changes can be summarised as follows: 
• A Force Pohcy Statement, which sets out the requirement of 'positive action.' by 
officers when they pohce domestic violence incidents. 
• The introduction of Domestic Violence Units in each division of the force, staffed by 
dedicated officers and setting out their roles and responsibilities. 
• The requirement to monitor the policing of domestic violence incidents, both by line 
supervisors. Domestic Violence Units, and Divisional Managers,. 
• The requirement to record the policing of domestic violence, incidents through the 
submission of a completed 'pro-forma' to their respective Domestic Violence Unit, 
setting out details of the incident. 
• Close co-operation with divisional Child Protection Teams, and with other agencies. 
• Flagging up on the force command and control computer system of domestic violence 
incidents where there is concem for repeated incidents. 
The force is one of a majority of that have produced a Policy Statement, and one of the 
mmority mth. dedicated Domestic Violence Units (Grace 1995: vii) albeit that Domestic 
Violence Officers have had 'little impact on the general police response to domestic 
violence' (Grace 1995: 55). 
The making of domestic violence policy - who influences? 
Managers at all levels beheved that the main pressures on local pohcy in respect of 
domestic violence came from public opinion, in all its forms, from the Home Office, and 
Her Majesty's frispectorate of Constabulary. 
a) Public Opinion 
'Something which has evolved over tinie, witii the benefit of hindsight. Outside nifluences 
are important but at the end of the day we make policy and take into account of all these 
factors and opinions of those who have any relevant knowledge. We have implemented as 
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public pressure has forced us to do it. It. [domestic violence] was once not even 
considered a police iissue'[13]. 
With public opinion exerted through pressure groups: 
'Public opinion yes, I mean, yes in terms of pressure groups rather than people tummg up 
at public nieetuigs en-mass and saying we're really worried about domestic violence. 
Pressure groups really.' [35]. 
And- ' . • - . 
'Like other areas for example searching problems which resulted in P.A.C.E, came about 
as a result of pressure groups. With domestic violence it was brought about by the feminist 
movement, which had a large part to play in pushing those issues, and I have got to say that 
what we did before was abysmal, until we were made to look at ourselves. This had a lot 
of impact on our policy. A large amoimt of police policy is influenced by outside factors. 
We tend to reflect social change not to be leaders of it.' [18]. 
b) The Home Office and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 
In terms of local autonomy over the policing of domestic violence, the influence of the 
Home Office and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary provoked as much comment 
as that in respect of public opinion: 
'The Home Office and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, but really the Home 
Office Circular which drove it and the H.M.I beat us up for not implementing-it. I do 
know there were several members of the Police Authority who questioned me very closely 
at tiie time, why we weren't doing it, and were very critical of the Chief, and went back 




'Now we have Doniestic Violence Units in each division with dedicated officers to provide 
better service to victims. This is totally reactive from other agencies. Politically whatever 
is flavour of the day we do it. If the Home Office says, this is good practice, so we do it. 
Sfrategically we are not totally m confrol of our policies: in the vast majority we are totally 
reactive to local political audit and consumer pressure. We are here, to police the 
community and we should respond to: customer pressure and issues raised by the public. 
[12] 
Home Office Cnculars were seen as important in respect of policing domestic violence 
incidents: 
'I think that force policy in respect of domestic violence started from a Home Office 
Circular and it ran from there. [2]. 
And: 
'Home Office Circulars, definitely. Our policy in respect of domestic violence is basically 
word for word the same as that home office circular.' [28]. 
The views from managers at all levels of the organisation suggest that public opinion, the 
Home Office, and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary have had the most influence 
over force policy and practice in respect of domestic violence issues. 
Domestic violence -the local policy making process 
Managers were asked how they would describe policy making in respect of domestic 
violence policy; most considered it to be an incremental process: 
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'Incremental, yes. We looked at other police' forces and other agencies and their reactions 
and decided that the best method wasthrough iiiter-agency working. I believe the force 
has a considered and well thought out strategy which has been fiilly validated by a pilot 
scheme.' [6]. 
And: 
- 'I think it was incremental. For example this is shown by the time it's taken, to get all 
divisions fiilly involved. I'm not sure the force is purely re-active m deciding policy, we 
can be pro-active as well.' [3]. 
And fiom a variety of sources: 
'In general terms the majority of police policy is decided intemally but it is an interesting 
mix. Ofl;en we read about a policy idea and say we should try this, and small ideas grow. 
It's a strange mix, and of course, nothing is unique in this world. Look at zero tolerance 
level policing in New York and you find that this has already been done in the United 
Kingdom. Such elements of policing policy can be found everywhere.' [10]. 
Control over the implementation of domestic violence policy 
Interviewees were asked their view upon how the force monitored the effectiveness of 
domestic violence policy. In all cases reference was made to: 
• Statistical retums - from recorded crime/arrests. 
• The supervising of domestic incidents on the force computer command and confrol 
system. 
• Reports of officers who attended incidents. 
• The number of referrals to domestic violence units for further action. 
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For example; 
'We have statistics on it, as each doiriestic violence miit puts details oh, the force computer 
system. We can measme the quantity of referrals and arrests which relate to domestic 
violence and can look at the numbers, but have no idea of the quality. We do surveys of 
victims of crimes and we have to take out any references to domestic violence. It's 
difficult to measiue the quality of service they receive, or "the effectiveness of it because 
it's a very sensitive issue.' [11] 
And; 
'How effective it is in the police service, we've had to be very explicit to rank and file and 
say this is what you will do otherwise you're looking at neglect of duty, because people 
with then own opinions are very reluctant to deal positively with private violence, due to 
their own value systems or what they do themselves.' [28]. 
Policing domestic violence - the outcomes 
a) For top corridor and divisional managers 
These managers, none of them dnectly involved in front line policing, believed that 
present force policy in respect of domestic violence was one of 'positive action' or 
'positive arrest'. 
The view of two members of the top corridor are typical: 
'The force takes a positive crime focused approach to the problem of domestic violence, 
with positive action by officers on the ground and the encouragement of a multi-agency 
approach to support this, together with specialist police back-up teams.' [8]. 
And: 
' A tightening up on the issue of what we do. I have heard this described as a positive arrest 
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policy. Also a feeling amongst some people that the issue of domestic -violence is 
increasing, probably because our domestic violence units- are recording more cases.-
However there is no sohd evidence here, but I'm sure it has increased.' [11]. 
The issue of increases in recorded crime as a result of this policy is noted by many of 
thesesenior managers. 
Divisional managers had stronger concerns about the way the way domestic violence 
issues had been policed in the past: 
'We've made leaps and bounds. We have a positive arrest policy. Every division has a 
domestic violence squad, well when I say a squad each division has a person. Incidents are 
now collated, recorded and we look into the action taken by the officer and the actions 
checked. We don't treat domestics like we used to. It's now a positive arrest policy. As I 
say, you know, we are looking to prosecute but constantly frustrated that despite of 
agreements with C.P.S. They won't prosecute despite changes in legislation where you 
don't have to evidence from the complainant to proceed. In reality despite all those things 
when the victim withdraws the complaint there is hardly ever a prosecution. That's not 
our fault' [48]. 
Managers at this level had sfrong views about changing police attitudes to domestic 
violence: 
'Its gaUoping into the 21st century if you like. We have come a long way in the last two or 
three years . We've moved away from the old attitudes of domestic violence and I don't 
think I need to expand on what I regard as the old attitudes. We are now exfremely 
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positive in our response to it, to the extent that now if you look at a [message]" log and ah 
arrest hasn't been made you will be asking questions as to why it wasn't made. The old-
fashioned values attributed to the pohce service, although they may exist to some small 
extent m some parts still, are largely gone, and we are into early intervention positive 
enforcement. If that means that in some peoples views we have wasted om time because 
the complaiharit withdraws later on, then that is not a cbnsideratioii.'[35}. 
As well as better understanding and greater compassion for victims of domestic violence: 
'We haven't been very good at dealing with domestic violence for years and years and 
years, we've, to use a police term, 'cuffed' ninety five per cent of it. It is a crime, it is 
something which I think the statistics say that a women suffers sixty three, if it is a female, 
she suffers sixty three acts of violence on her before she decides to report it once. We've 
been very poor at dealing with it, so domestic violence policy is designed improve our 
working relationship in that respect. To make the way we deal with it better.' [38]. 
Divisional managers in particular, also beheved that there had been a change in police 
culture over the last twenty or thirty years, for example: 
'Its a measure of both the police and public pressure. I think the impetus to address 
domestic violence slightly differently was external. The pressure to do so was external, 
through H.M.I.C and various pressine groups that exist, but I thmk there's also been a 
change of culture in the police service. We are a much younger organisation than we used 
to be and pohce officers now come firom a different background to the men predominantly 
men that tutored me when I joined. They were ex-service all Second World War veterans 
and that sort of thing, and they themselves had a different culhire and view of life and of 
the role of women m society. So I think it has been of benefit, a beneficial change of 
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culture, brought about by a more educated society.which we recruit from, with greater 
equality between men and women. It's stil^ l not right, but there is greater equality between 
men and women now than there ever was, and all that has tended to make the change of 
police tactics in regards of domestic violence easier to achieve.- We've got a good 
Domestic Violence Unit in this division, in fact it was a model for the Force. It's now 
moving down into youth and avenues that are niulti-agency based.. It's made positive 
changes and I think can only get better. The inain influeiice is an external," and more fertile 
environment for it to grow in, than previously when I joined. Pohce officers are totally 
different to those when I joined thirty years ago and that's not being disrespectfiil to them. 
They were men who reflected society of their time as we do today. As society changes so 
do the police. This is the case in terms of policing policies which relate to social issues.' 
[31]. 
This was a recurring theme: 
'Domestic violence policy is probably a very good example of the force responding to 
social change, in other words greater concem about domestic violence. But I think also 
that would have been re-enforced by the fact that people would have joined the police 
force in fanly recent years who would have shared a different view about domestic 
violence than if they had joined twenty years ago.' [22]. 
Because: 
'I think, again, that the young officers on tiie sfreet, they are more, I was going to say 
politically correct, but they are more aware than people of our generation. If you like, that 
women who continually get beaten up by the same husband, well that that's not a correct 
thing to do, and even if the woman withdraws her complaints, and all that sort of thing. 
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even then.more ought be done.'[33]. 
Local policmg pmctice, through the implementation of force pohcy, has also been effected 
by the criticisms of lack of support for female victims within the criminal justice system 
and this was highlighted at this level of management: 
'Previously as a commander in —— * I, had the school of thought that at domestic violence, 
incidents it was only necessary for the police to be the mediator and the gauge of success 
was for the pohce to leave the scene all quiet and without being attacked. As it was a 'left 
wing' borough I was forced to re-consider my views and look again at the problem. The 
result was that I was transformed in my views and realised that the only correct way to deal 
with im-provoked violence and assault in a domestic situation was for it to be dealt with in 
the same way as i f it had happened on the street. Outside influence caused me to 
implement this and make it force policy.'[10]. 
* Removed to preserve conJSdentiality 
There was a general belief that force policy represented an acknowledgement that acts of 
violence committed in private, within a domestic environment were criminal acts and 
should be dealt with and recorded in the same way as those committed in pubhc: 
'Pubhc opinion in its broadest sense, was the initial factor which influenced the policy 
through press and media coverage.' [26]. 
And: 
'Public opinion has changed the way in which we deal with domestic violence and the 
pohce react to opinions rather than leading it. It also resulted in media coverage of the 
way we deal with domestic violence which has changed our practices'[34]. 
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b) For managers at ground Level 
The mterviews would suggest that greater legal support for female victims coupled with 
the importation of the 'victim protection - offender arrest policy' have had tibie greatest 
effect upon the practical policing of domestic violence incidents: 
'The policy is very good, excellent now. I wasn't a great believer of it in.the begmnmg but 
from personal experience, I beheve it has worked very well. It is a positive arrest policy. I 
didn't agree with it mitially I must admit, but certainly I can think of one or two incidents 
where, believe it or not, I actually had letters from individuals who had been arrested and 
thanking us for takmg action at the end of the day, because they realised that they had got a 
problem and now they can cope. They actually thank us and I now think there has been a 
reduction' [17]. 
And: 
' A positive response to domestic violence. It has changed attitudes to policmg and 
involving other agencies. However the positive arrest policy nearly always ends up with 
the male being arrested and of course it takes two to tango and it is often the case that the 
woman could also be arrested, but of coinse this would lead to other problems if you have 
children in the house. The result is that usually the man gets busted and spends a night 
mside.' [27]. 
Whilst others were concemed about the about prescriptive stance of force policy: 
'I think we have gone one step too far in domestic violence in terms of taking discretion 
out of the way in which we deal with individual uicidents. A rigid policy that says we will 
act and we will arrest and in my experience as a response Inspector I have had difficulty in 
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eriforcing that pohcy, as it has taken away my discretion.' [29]. 
c) For front line staff - putting policy into practice 
Constables and Sergeants were asked to rank the strength of influence placed upon the 
formation of Force domestic violence policy. 
For the sergeants the greatest influence over force policy came from the centre, with 
Office/Centiral Government (69% believing them to be very influential and 27.6% 
influential), H.M.I.C ( 51.7% seeing them very influential and 41.4% behevmg them to be 
influential) and the Audit Commission (20.7% seeing them as very influential and 65.5% 
as being influential). Locally senior managers and the Chief Constable were seen as 
having a strong influence, and public opmion (13.8% believing the public to be very 
influential and 41.4% as influential). Only front line staff themselves were seen to be less 
influential. 
For the Constables the greatest influence came from the Home Office/Cenfral Government 
(with 71.4 seeing them as very influential and 22.2% as influential) and H.M.I.C ( 42.9% 
seeing.them as very influential and 44.4% as influential). The Chief Constable (with 
87.6% seeing him as either very influential or fluencies), senior managers (35.9% seeing 
them as very influential and 53.1% as influential) and pubhc opinion (18.8% seeing it as 
very influential and 50% as influential), those with the least amoimt of influence were 
front line staff (sergeants and constables) with 40.6% seeing them as not being very 
influential and 14.1% as not being influential. These details are set out in Figures 34 and 
35 on the following pages. 
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INFLUENCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POUCY - CONSTABLES 
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Officers were asked how they thought force pohcy had changed working practices in 
respect of domestic violence issues. The overall view was that there had been 
considerable change, particularly in respect of positive action: 
'Dramatically, we have gone from dealing with the issue by stating 'its private sort it out 
amongst yourselves' to positive action [arrest/prosecution]. Follow up support from 
Domestic Violence Officers, liaison with C.P.S., Probation, Courts, referral to Social 
Services and counselling.' (076) 
There was some concem about the resultant rise in crime statistics as a result, for example: 
'It has increased violent crime figures, making the recording of very minor assaults now 
almost obligatory by officers attending domestics. These offences in the past months have 
now been counted into the violence in public places figures leaving force aims at keeping 
the decrease downs to +5% impossible to do.' (008). 
And some concem about police discretion; 
'There is a much more positive approach by officers now. It takes some responsibility off 
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the victims of domestic violence to initiate action. Only note of caution - some victims are 
'playing the system' - i.e. telephoning the police suggesting assaults knowing their partner 
will be arrested. However there is still some discretion.' (059). 
Whilst the opposite view was expressed: 
'It has removed aiiy modicum of discretion and common sense policing, even when it is 
obvious to those concemed what action is required, in favour of dictatorial methods, which' 
at times cause more problems then they are supposedly designed to resolve.' (163). 
There were also more extreme views: 
'I feel the force policy discriminates against the male involved. The police officer 
attendmg a domestic situation will, 99% of the time, side with the female because he is 
aware of the policy.' (023). 
Concluding comments 
There is no doubt that pubhshed papers from the Home Office and HM.I , when compared 
to Force Policy, have had the greatest affect upon the policing of domestic violence issues. 
It is a good example of police policy being influenced by pressure group and academic 
pressure, in this case, not placed upon individual police forces, but dnectly at the Home 
Office and Central Goverrunent, who consequently sought to change policy from the 
centre, through Home Office Circulars and H.M.I inspection reports; resulting in a force 
policy which exactly reflects the advice given by the Home Office and its implementation 
policed by the Inspectorate. 
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This is, once again, reflected in the views of managers from all levels who saw influence 
over force domestic violence pohcy as coming from The Home OfiBce, H.M.I.C, and 
public opinion in its widest sense. 
The research confirms that police attitudes towards the policmg of domestic violence is 
much more enlightened thain it was twenty years ago. Many of the managers who were 
interviewed were embarrassedby earlier pohcy and practice. 
For ground level staff, force policy has been influenced from a variety of sources, however 
the greatest influence was seen to come from Cenfral Government, H.M.I.C, the Audit 
Commission and the Chief Constable. They felt that their own front line staff had the least 
influence. 
Police officers generally see then role as being one of taking 'positive action' in terms of 
an 'offender arrest'victim protection' model, which they support; apart from some concem 
for the correspondmg increase in reported crimes, which result from such a poUcy. 
The issue of police discretion was seen as more problematical by constables than it was by 
sergeants. In terms of length of service m the police, those with less than five years 
service, ten years and under fifteen years service and twenty five years or more service, see 
it as more of an issue. Although senior managers suggested that officers entering the 
police service had a more worldly view of domestic violence issues, those with less than 
five years service formed the group who had the greatest problem with discretion in 
policing this policy area. Even though the nimiber of female respondents is small, they do 
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not see policy as being detrimental to their discretion. 
The policy making processes is an example of an incrementalist approach, one of 
successive limited comparisons, consequent to external pressures, buildmg firom the 
gromid and taking alternatives that vary slightly firom existing policies and altering them 
over time, until the desired objective is achieved. 
Through the use of the force command and control computer system and 'Domestic 
Violence Report Forms' the implementation of force domestic violence policy can be 
easily monitored, both by line supervisors and Divisional Domestic Violence Unit 
Personnel making it a pohcy which is perceived as bemg very much top down controlled. 
hi terms of police practice, it is interesting to note that, although there are some problems 
in respect of discretion in dealmg with incidents of a domestic nature, officers from all 
levels of the organisation are willing to accept and describe force pohcy as being one of 
'positive arrest'. 
There is a suggestion that the feminist's view of the 'politics of victimisation' has been an 
important mfluence upon the pohce organisation in this policy area, and a perception that 
pohce officers today are much more aware of the social and economic issues which effect 
peoples' behaviour and the problems that various groups may experience vwthin society; in 
particular the power relationships between men and women m domestic relationships, 
even if many officers had formed this view before they joined the organisation. 
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Meanwhile the Home Office appears to be content with present domestic violence policy, 
particularly the issues of positive iutervention by the police and their 'increased awareness 
of domestic violence issues' (GTace,1995: iii). A view illustrated by the followiug 
comment by the then Home Secretary, Jack Straw: 
Like racial harassment, domestic violence is one of those rare fields where we want to 
see an increase in recorded crime. We have left the dark days when people were told 
to stop bptheriiig the police over 'mere domestics', but it isn't acceptable that oh 
average it takes 35 alleged assaults before a case comes to cotut. (The Guardian 
03/06/99:9). . 
The major sources of influences over local domestic violence policy are illustrated 
overleaf: 
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EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES POLICY 
To understand the problems associated with equal opportumties pohcies within the police 
service it is necessary to consider aspects of police culture which can affect this issue. 
There is evidence to suggest that it is a culture based on social isolation, danger, resistance 
to change, male domination, and professionalism; as well as exhibiting aspects of racism, 
sexism and homophobia (Brown & Campbell 1991, Reiner 1992, Brovra & Campbell 
1994, Holdaway 1996, Walklake 1996[a], Brown 1997). This is taken as tine, even i f it 
transpires that the police do not, as a consequence, necessarily act in a discriminatory 
manner (McConville & Shepherd 1992:169), or that then views might in fact be nearer to 
the norms of society than has been suggested (Scripture 1997). 
Leishman et al (1996:193) suggest that equal opporttmities policy can be considered using 
two approaches: its relationships with the public, and the internal dynamics and 
composition of the pohce organisation. Each approach can be discussed in three areas: 
women, ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians. 
Women, the police and equal opportunities 
The affect of the relationship between the police and the pubhc, particularly on womens' 
experiences of the criminal justice process, has been well documented (Dobash & Dobash 
1970; Chambers & Miller 1983; Hanmer et al 1989; Gelsthorpe & Morris 1990), and 
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discussed earlier in this work. The importance of considering the relationship between the 
pohce and the public, as well as internal structures, in respect of women in the police 
service has been highlighted by Holdaway & Parker (1998). 
Historically women in the police service have been subjected to apathy, neglect and 
prejudice, particularly between the two world wars, when they could be employed as 'an 
adjunct to the regular police, '[but] they cannot properly be sworn in as constables or be 
regarded members of the police force' (Exeter City Council Watch Committee 
01/04/1919). 
Despite the findings of the 1920 Baird Committee report recommenduig more 
policewomen and their greater use m the pohce service, the 1924 Bridgeman Committee 
Report and the Royal Conunission into the Police of 1929, the 'face of male prejudice' 
prevented any progress (Pollard 1985: 47). The second world war brought a greater 
emancipation of women in the world of work and the pohce service saw a wider use of 
policewomen but within 'separate departments wdth their own structure and pay scales' 
(Brown & CampbeU 1994: 84), which was set to remain for some thirty years. 
Traditionally women in the service have been expected to take on an extension of what 
was perceived to be a traditional maternal role (Bryant et al 1985) a history which has 
continued to affect peoples attitudes towards them (Radford 1989). 
The Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 made it illegal to directly or indirectly prevent 
women firom accessing opportunities in employment, promotion, obtaining any other 
benefits of services, or subjecting them to any detiimental practice. However its 
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implementation within the police service 'has been and stiUis long and tortuous' 
(Walklate 1996[b3:191). 
Following Heidensohn (1992; 101-102) the implementation of equal opportunity policies 
allows policewomen to impact upon pohcing in the following ways: 
i) By maintaining the law, making the bureaucracy more representative, bringing 
change and new ideas into policy, 'feminising' the police, breaking down the male 
culture of the service and providing opportunities for women both as individuals 
and a group. Although there is no guarantee that there will be 'service by 
policewomen to women' (Hanmer & Saimders 1991, quoted in Leishman et al 
1996:198). 
ii) It is likely that as more women enter the service it will be easier for them 
to survive their daily working life (Walklate 1995:116) as well as providing 
greater opportunities for positive changes to police culture through 'new and 
different perspectives on employment' (Colgan & Ledwith 1996:1). However it has 
been suggested that this could only be successful i f women made up 25% of the 
workforce (Moss Kanter 1977). In March 1998, female officers represented 16% 
of the total strength of the police service in England and Wales (Prime et al 1998). 
iii) A more participative, self determined, femuiist management approach (Alimo-
Metaclf 1993; Martin 1993) may also assist in breaking down the dominant male 
culture, despite the tension which exist between the public and private 
expectations of working women (Hall 1980, Handy 1985: 62 - 63, Frone et al 
1992, Morris & SinaLyon 1996:176-177, Franks 1999). 
There is a considerable body of research which describes a more negative response to 
women in the police service: 
That they are subjected to widespread sexual harassment ( Smith & Gray 1983; 
Jones 1986; Her Majestys' Inspectorate of Constabulary 1993) but when 
confronted with such allegations many organisations give the view that they 
are isolated and individual (Cairns 1997). 
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• Under-representation in specialist departments (Coffey et al 1992) but more 
likely to be over-represented in those dealing with offences against women 
children or domestic violence (Brown, Maidment and Bull 1992). 
Poorer promotion ^prospects (Halford 1987; Low 1993; Guardianl/10/97:4; 
Pohce Reviewl 1/12/98:7) even though female officers are as concemed about 
promotion as male officers (Holdaway & Parker 1998). However nearly 95% 
of officers above the rank of hispector in England and Wales are male (Prime 
et al 1998); resulting in reduced job satisfaction and motivation (Pole & Pogrebm 
1988). 
Brown & Campbell (1995) give the follovmig reasons for resistance against the full 
integration of women into the police service: 
i) Supposed physical and emotional mferiorily of women. 
ii) Unsuitability of police work for women. 
iii) Lack of career mindedness of women. 
iv) Premature retirement of women through marriage or child bearing, 
(ibid: 84) 
Race and ethnic minorities 
Although assimilation and integration were the buzz words associated with the increase of 
immigration that was encouraged by the British government after the second world war 
(Williams 1992), such assimilation failed to materialise. This resulted in many ethnic 
minorities, particularly black groups, seemg themselves as being excluded firom the rights 
of full citizenship (Jewson 1990, Yuval-Davis 1999) and consequently they looked inwards 
to the consciousness of then own community, that which included 'respectable' adults, in 
order to 'share a common cause' (Reiner 1992:102-103). 
In Britain these groups make up 6% of the population but oidy 2% of the pohce service 
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(Economist 24.10.98: 37), with black and Asian officers usually occupying low-visibility 
jobs not compatible to the types of roles seen by the organisation to lead to career 
progression (Dizaei 1998). Research findings suggest that black and Asian officers face 
problems of racial prejudice both from the public and other police officers (Holdaway 
1996, 1991; Leishman et al 1996) but for ethnic women such prejudice is more gender than 
racially based (Neyroud 1992). . . • • 
Although the 1971 House of Conunons Select Conunittee on Race Relations and 
Immigration noted that 'in order to work in a multi-racial conummity then the force must 
itself be multi-racial' (House of Commons 1972:56), it was not vmtil the Scarman Report 
of 1981 that the Home Office responded by setting up a Working Party (Home Office 
1982). 
The subsequent report recommended the follovwng initiatives to recruit from ethnic 
groups: 
• Special education schemes. 
• The removal of strict physical requirements for potential police officers. 
• Al l serving police officers should 'make it clear that black and Asian officers are 
freated in the same way as white officers both by their colleges and supervising 
officers' (para 11). 
The consequent response in recruitment of black pohce officers was slow, and one of the 
reasons given for this was that those who join will not only be subjected to racism within 
the service will also receive opposition or hostility from friends, relatives and members of 
the black community (Hope 1995;37-45). 
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The Pohce and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 made racially discriminatory behaviom' 
specific offence mider the Police Discipline Regulations, however research conducted by 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (1996,1997 [b]) identifies the following: 
• Police officers using racially inappropriate language and behaviour. 
• Lack of intervention in this respect of this by Sergeants and Inspectors. 
• Ethnic minority officers felt unsupported by their management, leaving 
them rehant upon the support of colleges from similar backgroimds. 
• Promotion and entry mto specialist departments was slower for ethnic minority officers 
than for white officers. 
• Lack of commitment to equal opportunity policies by the majority of officers and a 
corresponding lack of confidence by minority group officers to such a commitment by 
senior managers. 
Their follow up report Winning the Race - Policing Plural Communities Revisited 
(1999[a]) noted an unsatisfactory response to these conunents by 'a large section of the 
police service'. 
It is quite clear that in such circumstances the ability of ethnic minority officers to 
significantly challenge and change the police culture, the grievance system, and the 
confidentiality of some welfare departments of racist and sexist stereotypes limited 
(Kushnick 1999: 8, para 4.3). 
The inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 (MacPherson 1999) again brought 
the issue of police attitudes towards race and ethnicity under closer scrutiny, both publicly 
(for example BBC: 11.1.99; Channel 4: 17.1.99) and academically, through the issue of 
institutional racism within the Metropolitan Police (despite this being refuted by the then 
Commissioner, Sn Paul Condon, [MacPherson 1999]), and therefore by default, to 
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policing in general (Waddington 1999:2). 
Despite the continuing debate in the wake of the MacPherson Inquiry, the fact remains that 
the assimilation of black and Asian ojfficers into the police service remains problematical 
(Eze-Anyika 2000). Compared to white officers their recruitment is limited, their role 
deployment is different and their resignation rates are higher (Fielding 1999). 
Gays and lesbians 
The problems surrounding police reaction to gays and lesbians both as colleagues and 
communities is similar to those between the police and black and Asians (Burke 1993), 
where for many years the police have been seen as infamous in their treatment of 
homosexuals (Graef 1989: 189) with lesbians and gay men afraid of the pohce 
(Richardson 1997). The conventional wisdom of police officers, moulded under a 
machismo canteen culture, is confradictory to that of the gay and lesbian commimity. For 
heterosexual police officers, homosexuality is seen as a threat to society, and as such, any 
condonmg of such activity vidthin the police would damage the services' integrity in its 
efforts to maintam social order and morality (Burke 1992). However the fact remains that 
there is no accurate record of the number of homosexual or lesbian police officers in the 
service (Leishman et al 1996) 
The pohce service has made efforts to reflect societies' changing attitudes to homosexuals 
and lesbians, but not without disagreement. For example the Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire was quoted in the Police Review (18/1/91:105) as saymg that homosexuals, as 
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long as they remamed within the law, should not be treated any differently m the police 
service. Whilst an editorial in the same journal commented that homosexuality amongst 
men was 'immoral, unnatural and irreligious'. Similar dichotomies can be seen over time: 
an advertisement by the Sussex Constabulary for gay police officer in Gay News in 1995 
was received less tolerantly by some police representatives (Pohce Review 26/5/95) and 
similarly, an advertisement placed m Gay Times by .the South Yorkshne Police, was 
supported by the Chief Constable but criticised by police officers and police 
representatives (Guardian 9/1/97:4). 
Although there is a dearth of literature on the subject (Burke 1993) there is evidence to 
suggest that homosexuals and lesbians are now more readily accepted within the police 
service, facilitated through consultation with gay and lesbian groups, by the setting up of 
the Lesbian and Gay Police Association (Richardson 1997), and through their 
representation in popular television police series, such as 'The Bi l l ' . 
Home Office Circular 87/1989 
It was not until 1989 that the Home Office issued guidelines requiring the police service to 
take positive action in respect of both policy and practice in respect of equal opportunities, 
and only then because of recent iimer city distinbances and a grovwng number of 
discrimination cases being brought by women pohce officers (Walklate 1995:117-118). 
The response was tmenthusiastic, polite and limited (Low 1991) and it was 1993 before all 
pohce forces had pubhshed a written equal opportunities policy (Anderson, Brown & 
Campbell 1993). 
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The curcular pomted out 'tbat the object of equal opportumties policies m employment was 
to ensure that fair and non-discruninatory treatment is given by management to all 
applicants for employment with the organisation, to all the employees of the organisation 
and by those employees to each other' (para 2)... That.'the implementation of equal 
opportunities policies is particularly important in the police service' (para 3) and that such 
policies were not solely concemed with aspects of 'race sex or marital status, in that 'no-
one was immune from unfair discrimination' (para 4). It was not enough for a force to 
'claim it was an equal opportunities employer' (para 9) but must put into place a written 
statement of equal opportunities policies, which should: 
a) Demonsfrate a commitment to eliminate xmfair discrimination. 
b) To make the commitment clear to members of the force and 
potential recmits. 
c) To focus the action of senior management in monitormg the 
application of equal opportunities policies. 
d) To demonsfrate the commitment to xmdertake remedial action where 
necessary. 
The cncular expected forces to make a 'genuine commitment' to the development and 
unplementation of effective equal opportunities policies, that should be: 
a) To ensure the best use is made of the abilities of every member 
of the force. 
b) To demonsfrate the wiUingness of the police to show that all members of 
the service are firmly opposed to discrimination in the service and in their 
deahngs with the public, (para 13). 
Police forces were expected to publish 'a final policy statement, taking into account any 
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difficulties encountered during the implementation stage' (para 15). A check list for 
implementing equal opportunities policies was produced in respect of candidates for 
appointment (in terms of height/educational requirements, quotas for percentage of 
women/ethnic minority members), deployment (in terms duties, specialist departments' 
disproportionate representation in particular areas of policing), promotion, training, 
promulgation of the policy to staff and grievance procedures. 
Details of grievance procedures imder the relevant legislation was set out in an annex to 
the circular and suggested examples of force policy statements. 
The Research 
The force policy document 
The Devon and Comwall Constabulary published a Force policy in respect of equal 
opportunities in 1988, 'pre-emptmg Home Office Cncular 87/1989 by a year' (H.M.I.C 
Force Inspection Report 1993). 
The first four paragraphs of the document sets out force pohcy in respect of equal 
opportunities, the remainder is taken up with details of grievance procedures. 
The Force makes it clear that it 'opposes all forms of unlawful or unfair discrimination on 
the grounds of colour, race, nationality, ethnic or national origin, sex, marital status, 
sexual orientation or disability', and aims to '... .achieve and maintain a work force which 
reflects are far as possible, the conraiunity in which it operates' and that 'decisions on 
240 
recruitment, selection, training, promotion and career development are based solely on 
objective and job related criteria'. 
Her Majesty's' Inspectorate of Constabulary 
The report of Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary for the inspection of 1990, noted 
that the force 'had not yet introduced an eiqual opportunities pohcy for civihan personnel' 
(para 2.7) and this was an issue which should be developed. The report made no mention 
of women or ethnic groups within the force. 
However the 1991 inspection report for the force pointed out that the Chief Constable was 
aware that 'female officers were imder-represented in the supervisory ranks of the force' 
that the force was 'taking steps' to identify the reasons for this although the Inspectorate 
were satisfied that 'every opportunity is given to all officers to qualify for promotion' (para 
2.19), and that 'the career development of female and ethnic minority officers is 
considered in precisely the same way as all other members of the force' (para 2.18). It 
fiirther noted that in respect of its criticism in the 1990 report reigarding equal opportunity 
policy for civihan staff, the Chief Constable had 'pointed out that the force was not 
without a equal opportunities policy m respect of civilian staff but has reviewed its 
guidelines to reflect Home Office guidelines and best practice'(Appendix A (i) (3)). 
The 1992 force inspection report noted that there was no specific Equal Opportunities 
Unit, but that this was the responsibility of the Superintendent - Career Development Unit. 
It noted that a comprehensive review of equal opportumties polices had been undertaken 
leading to many amendments and the incorporation of new areas of pohcy, the force 
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having already 'adopted the guidelmes of Home Office Cncular 87/1989' which was 
'reflected in the existing structure', (para 2.26). 
Her Majesty's Inspectorates' Report (1993a) for the force for 1993 has six paragraphs 
relating to equal opportuiiities polices: 
Firstly (para 2.8) it notes that 'no ethnic minority recruits were appointed in 1992;and there 
are only three such officers cimrently serving' and suggested three matters be reviewed to 
reflect best practice in equal opportunities policy in recruiting staff: 
1) The policy of home visits to candidates was in 'danger of not being 
objective and could be construed as discriminatory.' 
2) The residential qualification for recruits restricting applications to only 
those resident in Devon & Comwall could 'particularly mitigate against 
ethnic and other apphcants' fi-om elsewhere. 
3) The practice of restricting female representation on the final selection 
board to the one female Chief Inspector in the force. 
It then goes on to note that maternity leave and the use of pregnant policewomen was 
causing the force 'some concem' (para 2.11) especially where there is long term absence, 
and the difficulty of fmding non-operational work for them during the last three months of 
pregnancy. The inspectorate suggested the application of 'career-breaks' or 'part-time 
working' in these cases. 
The report points out that the original Force Standing Orders were being reviewed and that 
the issue of equal opportunities had been brought to the attention of staff, through leaflets 
and 'a comprehensive management guide' (para 2.21). That the Force 'recognised there 
was under-representation of females within the Traffic Department in particular and 
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surveyed all such officers who were qualified to apply. However, it was found that there 
was little interest amongst them, despite having attended advanced driving courses, and 
recommended that advanced driving courses should only be offered to those 'with a 
commitment to becoming traffic officers...which may attract more female applicants' 
(para 2.22). The report was critical that 'only a limited niunber of women have achieved 
managerial positions' (para 2.27) and that further research should be carried out into career 
opportunities for women. 
Overall her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary is satisfied the Force is now making 
good progress in equal opportunities, (para 2.23). 
At this point it is worth noting that, investigating equal opportunity policies in twelve 
police forces, (Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary: 1993) found that policy was 
being blatantly breached, Avith some Chief Officers not committed to equal opportunities. 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary report of the inspection of the Force for 1994 
points out that 'On the whole good progress has been made in equal opportunities', the 
Force now having an Equal Opportunities Unit which he hopes '..can be expanded to visit 
divisions on an advisory basis' and provide 'facihties to individuals for confidential 
coimselling.' (para 2.19). It Was noted that an internal survey was being carried out to 
evaluate levels of traming and staff awareness of equal opportunities pohcies but would 
have been enhanced if carried out by an external agency. 
The report went on to state that, 'The representation of women in specialists posts could be 
improved with only 11 female officers on traffic duties out of a branch establishment of 
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228, and 23 female officers on CJD duties out of a branch estabhshment of 254, or 4.8% 
and 9% respectively.' It noted that in respect of the traffic branch, applications for 
forthcoming vacancies 'would be particularly welcome from women officers, whilst 
ultunate selection would still be on merit' (para 2.22), and that female officers overall 
form 12% of the 'regular force' with female supervisory officers only 0.9% of the force 
compared to 23% for males (para 2.23). 
Finally the report recommended that the Force should employ civihan, professionally 
qualified personnel officers in divisions and that 'equality of access to career opportunities 
for all staff would be improved by: 
a) Implementing new, more formal selection procedures for local specialist 
squads. 
b) frifroducing a similarly clear and open procedure for 'acting' ranks. 
c) Monitoring selection for informal career development attachments to 
specialist departments on territorial divisions in order to avoid any 
suggestion of bias. 
(ibid, 8.1. (ii)and(vi)). 
The 1995 inspection report for the Force made comment upon the on going problems in 
recruiting women officers onto Traffic Branch, in this case based upon the difficulties of 
attracting females to take on firearms duties, requfred through the infroduction of armed 
response vehicles in the Force traffic department. 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary then carried out a second national thematic 
inspection in respect of equal opportunities policies, 'Developing Diversity in the Police 
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Service" X1996) which although identifying examples of good practice found examples of 
'tokenism and indifference' and a 'worrying lack of faith in the grievance system' 
(1996:9). 
Consequently (as m 1993) the Force aimual inspection report for 1996 contauied heavy 
reference to equal opportunities policies, including an Appendix relatiug solely to this 
subject. 
The report again repeated comments of the difficulty of attracting women officers into the 
traffic branch, and despite previous efforts, recommended further canvassing of female 
officers to discover how to overcome the perceived barriers of recruiting women into 
certain specialist posts. It praised the Force for the thoroughness of its review of the 
effectiveness of equal opportunities policies and its good use of the recommendations 
detailed ui the thematic report 'Developing Diversity in the Police Service', but criticised 
the failure of the Force to chculate copies of the thematic inspection report to divisional 
Chief Inspectors who were responsible for implementing equal opportunities policies. 
Such reports should be circulated to personnel managers as 'essential reading' who should 
receive suitable training and clear pohcy guidelines. 
The Appendix to the report contained Force perfonnance against eleven recommendations 
contained in their report 'Developing Diversity in the Police Service' (1996): 
1) A business case for equal opportunity, through a service-wide 
reflecting local achievement. Force response: addressed through 
the Investors in People Programme. 
2) Implement strategies for disabled staff and customers. Force response: Pohcy 
adopted by the Force and building services under consideration. 
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3) Recruitment targets for all groups; positive action for minorities; all 
appointments to be on merit Force operates an objective and equitable selection 
process and guidelines exist for recruitment to reflect local commimity. 
4) Carry out constancy review to identify most successful techniques to 
assist ethnic minority recruitment and prospects of its achievement. For Home 
Office to progress. 
5) Part time working and job-share available for all grades/ranks. Force 
review highlighted need to improve managerial commitment to the value of 
such schemes. Force to consider extending such schemes to ranks above 
inspector. 
6) Post-exit reviews at least three months after leaving. Force procedures 
to be drawn up. 
7) Appraisal for police and civihan staff to ensure comprehensive structure of 
succession planning and career development. Force has introduced appraisal 
system for civilian staff and police officers as part of the Investors in People 
Programme. 
8) Wider and more probing research into why women and ethnic officers are 
underrepresented in specialist squads and supervisory ranks. Home Office 
to research. 
9) The acceptance of the business case for equal opportunities to improve 
performance and the identification of training requirements to achieve this end. 
Recommendation previously noted from report in respect of fraining issue. 
10) Statistics on civilian staff maintained and nionitored in same way as for 
police officers. Force to draft monitoring sfrategy to cover all staff 
11) These recortimendations from the thematic report sub-headed 'Agenda for 
Action' to be used as check hst for good practice. Accepted by Force 
and used as part of their equal opportunities review. 
The 1997 report notes that the Force has an equal opportunities standing group which has 
staff association and divisional representation and reports to the personnel and training 
sfrategy sub-committee. It is responsible for monitoring force responses to the H.M.I.C's 
'Agenda for Action' recommendations referred to above. 
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The hispectors remam disappointed with the 'paucity' of female officers in senior posts of 
the Force and again remark upon the difficulty of recruiting female officers into the traffic 
department, imderlming the fact that attempts have been made to understand the reasons 
for this by sending questioimaires to all female members of the force but with 
'disappointing results' (para 4.11) and suggesting that their perceived role of the traffic 
department and its' requirement for firearms trained officers may impact upon this 
problem. 
The 1998/99 Force Inspection Report noted that there had been an mcrease in female 
officers who 'now constitute 15.3% of police staff which they suggest was 'mirrored m 
supervisory positions' and that 'Women are well represented in some specialist 
departments, for example in C.I.D, family protection and tiaining.' (para 4.10). 
However representation of ethnic minority officers and civilian staff was below average, 
with only five such officers ( a short-fall of thirteen) per 1,000 ethnic minority population, 
although the report accepted that there was a very low ethnic population m Devon and 
Comwall which 'limited scope for increases' (para 4.11). 
The Inspectorate recommended that the force should 'take an early opportunity' to 'bring 
fully up to date the Force's approach to equal opportunities issues' (ibid:21). 
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The Management perspective 
From the top corridor 
There was a diversity of views from top corridor managers in then perception of the force 
equal opportimities in its broadest sense. Ranging from: 
'The force claims to be an equal opportunities employer which broadly speaking it is. 
That's what I understand by the policy on equal opportunities.' [13]. 
To: 
'It's a long policy dociunent covering recruitment, ethnicity, and grievance procedines 
which has been reviewed and changes made. The force now has a civilian officer dealing 
with grievance procedure, not a police officer, formerly it was a Superintendent. The 
system is probably not being used to any great degree. The force has monitored members 
of staff to ensure they have knowledge of the grievance procedures and it is becoming 
more acceptable.' [2]. 
Others considered it to be a matter of fairness and equality: 
'When I applied for my present position the job was advertised with specifications for the 
applicant. Written assessment, marked objectively, and an mterview. I'm sure that five 
years ago this wouldn't have happened. The job would have been given through the 'old 
boys network'. It's been for the good and gives me the opportunity to apply for a job 
which I wouldn't of had before. When opportimities do arrive then the force should give it 
to those who merit it. I'm worried that people are abusing the grievance procedures usmg 
at a threat to get what they want' [12] 
But 
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'There is a strong view within the police;service that.it is not our fault that women do not • 
serve for as long as men and that the organisation will not get the same jfrom their 
investment in a woman as in a man, and this will mean that a women will not be promoted 
over a man for that reason. The needs of the force must always come first, and the needs 
of the individual shall meet those of the force, but where there is conflict the needs of the 
individual comes second'[10]. 
Some suggested that it was to overcome organisational culture: 
'This issue is still high on the political agenda. I think there is some conflict that the 
interpretation of the statutory requirements imposed upon us has been effected, when 
perhaps the real problem is dealing with change in culture and attitude. Whereas, being 
firmly committed to it, our Force response is a little over the top, because the real issue is 
cultural change which is difficult to attain.' [1]. 
The Divisional Managers - caught between the top and the bottom of the managerial 
pyramid! 
Most divisional managers saw the policy as relating to the issues of fahness and equality: 
'I would say that force policy is very good. There is a clear equal opportunities policy in 
being and it is adhered to, and people do get post on merit, regardless of age, sex, 
whatever. Staff are made aware of this, there is a grievance procedure in being, which is 
used, and you could say the more grievances there are, the more successful the system is, 
because people are aware of it now. Again those figures are published as part of the 
annual plan. Personally speaking, I'm not aware of any difficulties in that area, people are. 
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and do, make .use of the system if they feel that they are aggrieved.' [43]. 
And: 
'I think divisions employ equal opportunity policies more or less to the letter. I think equal 
opportunities stops at Headquarters, at A.C.P.0 level, and I think there's lip service paid 
there, and at tunes its pressed to the pomt vi^ here, i f it were actually confronted in some 
form of tribtmal, I think there would be some very embarrassed faces.' [45]. 
Ground Level Managers - closer to practice than policy! 
Most of these managers also felt that the force equal opportunities policy was intended to 
ensure fairness and equality, which some saw as successM: 
'It means to me a far more open persoimel pohcy in the force. An attempt to try and match 
skills to particular jobs by trying to create a better structure for selecting people for jobs, is 
the impression I get. Although I don't suggest for one minute that happens on every 
occasion but in the majority of cases it does'. [24]. 
With this, the most extreme comment to the contrary: 
'It hasn't changed over the years if you're a black one legged lesbian you got more chance 
of gettmg promoted. Sometune ago there was a memo that went out to policewomen 
asking them if they were interested in going on traffic, when no rephes were received 
anotber letter went out. I don't know why they're not interested, but this was almost 
reverse discrimination. The only thing I would say is, that on my staff I have five 
policewomen who have taken maternity leave, had babies and come back. Now, I know 
we accommodate this part-time scenario, but I can see a stage, as time goes on, where it is 
going to be difficult to accommodate them. Particularly where they want to work day 
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shifts during the week because of their personal problems or circumstaaces and of course, 
the other people on the same sections say, hang on why am I doing all the bum shifts, and 
although we try and accommodate it, you could actually have a bit of bad feeling here.' 
[19]. 
The influences over local equal opportunity policies 
Managers at all levels saw the major influence on force equal opportunities pohcy coming 
fi-om Her Majesty's Iiispectorate of Constabulary, the Home Office, legislation, the Audit 
Commission. 
Top Corridor Managers refer to Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary as having the 
greatest influence from the above groups: 
'Most impact, the H.M.I. They may comment upon it and I think that these comments may 
have resulted to a change to the policy. H .MI had a lot of influence.' [11]. 
And: 
'H.M.I.C probably a fair amoimt because they ask, "Do you have a grievance procedure? 
Does it work?" They have influence through the inspection process and the resultant 
report back to the force.' [2] 
Or, more positively: 
'The H.M.I had a very great effect. It was re-written as a result of an H.MI Thematic 
Inspection. The Home Office, yes significant. They give guidance which is reflected in 
the policy. [5]. 
Divisional Managers also made much of the influence from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
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Constabulary: 
'I think the most influence I have felt on equal opportunities has to have come from Her 
Majesty's frispectors of Constabulary. I think that has been a very healthy influence. I can 
see that influence now coming into play very much from the racial things and the 
Lawrence Enquiry we talked about earlier, and that's where that pressure will come. And I 
think where equal opportunities was flavour of flie year a few years back, that's why 
divisions, because we're the ones that are inspected so closely, that's why divisions are so 
bloody good at it. But because the old boys brigade is sfrong and how it's not m. the public 
interest to embarrass Chief Constables too much, the H.M.I is a little bit easy going on 
themfrankly.'[45]. 
But included the influence of the Chief Constable: 
'The H.M.I will obviously look at it and I was questioned on it last year by the H.M.I, as it 
was my responsibility in division for it and as such I ensured that all first Ime managers 
were instructed as to their responsibilities in this respect, both civilians and pohce, and 
tried to get them some fraining. The Home Office Circulars have got a lot to do with equal 
opportunities because we based a lot of force policy on that. The Audit Commission, I'm 
not too sure whether they look at that or not. We do get criticised under equals 
opportunities perhaps in some high profile cases up country, where they beat us about the 
head with that and they give advice. I think that the biggest player to make sure it works 
by example and by policy are the Chief Officers. That's particularly true in this force as 
the Chief rules on everything.' [18] 
And legislation, with this manager being one of the very few to make mention of ethnicity: 
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'Well clearly there is legislation which is a major factor but well I don't know if we would 
have done it i f it weren't for legislation. I remember in the early days having one of the 
influencing factors as the thought that there would be tribunals and money. Most of these 
things come down to money don't they, and you sometimes need those sort of things to 
wake people up and think, you know, we just haven't thought about that. I wonder i f 
people are not being treated fairly. Oh dear yes. To some extent ,1 mean I can give you a 
perfect example of that, I mean you know, I was talking yesterday to someone about stop 
checks on ethnic minorities. Now if you ask anyone in Comwall about stop checks and 
ethnic minorities they will say, well you know we have actually got so few people of 
ethnic minorities that, you know, its not a problem. But i f you actually look at the figures 
and say that i f you've got one per cent of your population as ethnic minorities and 10% of 
your stop check are ethnic minorities *, then, even though its very small numbers, then 
clearly you've got it, so you know, you've got to monitor it. That's to say that that's not 
the way things are here but you can see how things can be mis-interpreted by people, not 
sort of realising that there is a an issue involved in this and as I say the Staff Associations 
obviously, agam I think to a certaui extent, I thmk, the staff associations really follows on 
from legislation. Rather than being leading authorities and in fact many of the things 
. follow through legislation really to bring it to a point where we are actually actively and I 
suppose most of us really like to think that, from an ethical point of, view that we've 
always been equal opportunities people. To actually get to the stage of having a policy and 
making sure that it is driven with grievance procedures and what have you. I mean the 
over ridmg factor of that is the legislation which actually leads to it.' [47]. 
*Not based upon statistical fact 
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Views from ground level managers reflect those of their senior mangers: 
'The policy is certainly cenfrally led either A.C.P.0, Audit Commission or where it has 
come from in terms of the cerifre. The Home Office it is cenfrally led, I think as a result of 
legislation. A.C.P.0 have had to take it on board sunply because they are more liable,the 
force is more legally liable and so that has attention.' [29] 
And 
'I think wasn't it in this force that we were ignoring equal opportunities for years and it 
was the H.M.I, I think it was that said, here hang on what are you doing. So the H.M.I 
kicked us up the backside I believe. The H.M.I kicked us into shape but politics started the 
government, so I suppose the major influence has got to be the H.M.I.' [25]. 
Some saw legislation alone, as the main mfluence: 
'Legislation has the foremost influence and pushed the force into equal opportunity policy, 
as we have an obligation to make people aware of equal opportunities under legislation. 
So legislation has led it. I am aware then that the fraining package was designed within 
force but was presented to our A.C.P.0 officers to see if they were happy with that.' [24]. 
Representation of women in specialist squads 
Managers were asked their views about how the force reacted to comments in Her 
Majesty's frispectorate reports criticismg the under representation of female officers in 
specialist squads. Most Top Corridor Managers believed this response lay in 
positive recruitment and canvassing female officers: 
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'We are under represented in every specialist branch in the force with the exceptions of 
domestic violence units and child protection departments. We have attempted positive 
discrimiuation for women, not in terms of standards but iu'that females are always called 
for interview, whereas males are paper sifted prior to interview.' [10]. 
Whilst others feh that opportunities for female officer had improved: 
'I believe there's now the opportunity for female officers to belong to specialist squads 
and they can have preferential treatment to get them there. We have moved a long way 
from the 'standards quota' in this respect, bearing in mind the total percentage of females 
in the force. However the personal motivation of the individual female officer is often the 
motivating factor in whether they become members of such squads.' [8]. 
This motive issue was remarked on by other interviewees, for example: 
'The force tried positive recruitment especially in respect of the fraffic branch auned at 
female officers. The bottom hne is that none of them wanted it. In a free organisation as 
we feel we are, if they don't want to do it then the organisation should not force them. My 
question is, has the organisation asked them what it is about the speciahst squad that 
makes them [women] reluctant to apply? For example, is it something inherent in that 
branch which makes it unacceptable for women to join? For example, is the fraffic branch 
chauvinistic? How well are women accepted in what is often a male oriented department? 
I would suggest, for example that fraffic officers are more authoritarian in their views, 
which may in some way exclude women from joining and we told him why. [5]. 
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Traffic Branch and C.I.D, were the speciahst departments referred to by most managers, 
for example: 
'Traffic and C.I.D is our current concem and we are involved in discussions and surveys of 
our female officers. Why for example why do they not apply for specialist posts. We have 
tried affirmative action that targets women as applicants btit they do not apply for the 
traffic branch for example, and we want to know why.' [4]. 
Many divisional managers also believed that the force had employed positive recruitment 
methods canvassing female officers to join speciahst squads: 
'There have been occasions, noW if we're talking about equal opportunities, where adverts 
have gone out for members of squads, that the force is particularly looking for female 
officers to try to balance things out and satisfy an equal opportunities figure. [23]. 
The theme of "men's work /women's work" was also developed: 
'Well in some squads for example they are over represented, i f you look at the Child 
Protection Team and the Domestic Violence Unit. It's not some kind of gender bias that's 
at work, or gender stereotyping, its just the way it seems to work out. We have had male 
officers, in fact at the moment there are male officers in Child Protection and there has 
been a male Sergeant and Constable in the Domestic Violence Unit for some time. 
Perhaps these are bad examples because the female officer do excel in that sort of 
environment and the victims find it easier to talk to them. I think there is an old thing 
about policewomen which dictates why there aren't so many, and I think you've got to 
look at how long they actually stay in the service. I mean there was a time when I think 
the average service length was four years but I don't know what it is now. But in order to 
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get into a specialist squad you've noimally done some time to gain expertise, and then you 
migrate into specialism, normally when you've got about seven or eight years service. So 
if the average [female] is leaving after four, then they're not there to be had anyway. It's 
not necessarily gender bias that's at work, it s just the demography of the force and the fact 
that a lot of police women do not pursue a career, and that says more abput the job share 
career break and, maternity situation, which we're a lot better at now. Al l the procedures 
are in place, better than they were in the past, the sad fact is that women have babies and 
they leave the job to have them' [31]. 
And: 
'I think something's got to be done about female representation across the board. I had a 
discussion with the Deputy Chief last week because I went away to a Pohce 
Superintendents Association Meeting with 170 delegates, of which three were females, and 
he said, doesn't that reflect the police service, and I said yes. I mean there is insufficient 
representation of females through the ranks and we do not understand why that's the case, 
though I can give some suggestions to it. We've got tokenism still gomg on. It seems that 
C.I.D departments have a quota, which they don't allow the floor to go above and we have 
a lack of acknowledgement of the need to have women in this department and I flagged 
that up when they moved to armed response vehicles - females don't work on traffic. We 
have done some road-shows, to get out and try and encourage women in, invited women 
only into a safe enviromnent with presentations. I haven't really had any feed back on it 
but then they suddenly weiit to this model of having people all armed. I'm not sme how 
many police women want to be armed police officers. I think you may have a cultural, sex 
thing there and so all the good work was immediately undone.' [53]. 
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Front line mangers saw positive discrimination as the major response: 
"They imdertook, when advertising for staff in those particular units, to undertake positive 
action, which is not positive discrimination its positive action. By saying that we're under 
represented they will not receive favourable treatment but that they would be welcome if 
they apphed, or that their apphcation would be welcome and then they would have to be 
judged and perform in the same way as anyone else to get that job. However I know of 
some examples where women were actually contacted in respect of some jobs and asked 
why they hadn't put in for it. The impression that gives is that there is positive 
discrimination, even though probably it isn't' [24]. 
However some managers saw it as a cultural issue: 
'I have given a lot of thought to this. The problem vwth it is that you get an un-equal 
opportunities policy. You get an opportunity where you need a lady for example, The 
Regional Crime Squad have actually advertised for three month attachments for ladies on 
the squad because they haven't got enough. Unfortunately, and I'm not anti-women, I'm 
pro-women, unfortunately they don't last long in the job because of pregnancy etc which is 
fine, I understand that but not many of them return to the job. If they do they're part time 
and they don't want to come into the squads because they've got family commitments. 
I'm sure if it were the men who stayed at home it would be the opposite way round. What 
you find is that if you get a career girl, because of the pressure to have equal opportunities 
and to have women it becomes unequal, because they say they must have some women, or 
we will be blamed by equal opportunities for not having women. You get bias the wrong 
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way and you may not necessarily get the best person for the job. Can I say, and I have 
worked with many police women who are much better than policemen, that I am not 'anti' 
but it is an awkward situation which is difficult to resolve and I think that we will always 
be criticised for it and that is because they do an average of five years and a man does an 
average of thirty.' [16]. 
Outcomes - front line staff 
Front line staff were asked how important it was that the force should ensure that female 
staff are not under represented in all specialist posts. Just over 60% of constables did not 
believe it was either important or very important, but a little over 50% the sergeants, 
believing it to be either important or very important. 
IMPORTANCE OF FEMALE REPRESENTATION IN SPECAILIST 
SQUADS 
Over-all front line staff were less concemed about the importance of female representation 
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in specialist posts: 

















Sergeants & Constatjies 
(n = 94) 
• Very Inportant 
• Important 
• Un-irrportant 
• Very Un-lnportant 
Fig. 41 
Front line staff were asked how force equal opportunity policy had affected the situation of 
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Fig. 42 
They were asked how this policy had affected the situation of members of racial and ethnic 
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Fig. 43 
They were asked how this pohcy had affected homosexual and lesbian police officers in 
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Sergeants & Constables 
(n = 94) 
• Inproved 
• Made Worse 
• No Change 
• DonlKnow 
Although the sample contains fewer female officers, it is interesting to note that, although 
both male and female staff believe that force policy has had a positive impact upon the 
situation of women in the force, 25% of female officers felt that it had not changed their 
situation in the force. 
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AFFECT OF FORCE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES POLICY ON 
WOMEN - BY GENDER 
(n = 95) 
Font line staff were asked if they had any comments to make about force equal 
opportunities policy. This attracted a large number of replies, with fifty officers (53%) 
making some comment. The most common view was that staff for specialist posts should 
be selected on merit alone. The following quote is a good example: 
'The best person, best qualified for the post, irrespective of sex, colour, etc.'(197). 
Some believed that there were difficulties for minority groups within the organisation: 
'It is difficult for a group who are in a minority in terms of over all numbers to be fairly 
represented on specialist departments' (388). 
Whilst there were several comments about males becoming the most discriminated against 
group, for example: 
'White, heterosexual males are clearly at the bottom of the ladder.' (293) 
For others it is not so clear cut: 
'The policy has heightened awareness of minority groups but 1 do not know if this has been 




'Gay groups are still 'closeted' and not spoken about openly - why?' (94). 
Concluding comments 
The police service has been a male dommated organisation since its early beginnings, with 
a reluctance to integrate women into its ranks, even after the introduction of equal 
opportunities legislation. Sunilarly, but for different reasons, racial and ethnic minority 
groups face the same integration problem. Lesbian and homosexual officers are only 
recently, and slowly, being recognised and accepted v^thin the service. There is the 
suggestion that the organisation is now giving too much emphasis on career opportunities 
for females and members of ethnic minority groups, with a claim from one officer that 
white male heterosexual officers are becoming "a minority group". 
Although legislation has been the main instigator of equal opportunities policy, supported 
by Home OfSce Circulars to the police, it can be seen that reports from H.M.I (both 
national thematic reports and local inspection reports) have been very influential in the 
development of force policy in this area. This is reflected in consequent force responses, 
where aU recommendations made by H.M.I are considered. 
Managers from all levels of the force believed that the Home Office, H.M.I, legislation and 
the Audit Coimnission have had a great deal of affect on force equal opportunities policy, 
but of these, with, as in the case of domestic violence policy. Her Majesty's frispectorate of 
Constabulary has the sfrongest influence. 
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Most of the debate regarding Equal Opportunities policy, both from Her Majesty's 
frispectorate of Constabulary and from members of the Constabulary revolves around 
gender rather than ethnic or racial issues. However there is a problem of recruiting 
members of racial and ethnic mmorities into the force, partly because of the lack of such 
groups within the conununity policed. 
Problems are expressed of recruiting female officers into specialist squads because of the 
issues of marriage, child-birth and family conunitments, which are perceived as a barrier 
for women. Encouraging female officers to join the Traffic Branch was highlighted as a 
particular problem, where the reasons for under representation remain that of a perceived 
incompatibility of the role for women and physical requirements of the job. However front 
line staff believe that force equal opportunities policy, regardless of how it was influenced, 
has improved the situation for women, members of racial and ethnic mmority groups, and 
lesbian and homosexual officers in the force. 
The following flow chart gives an over-view of the major influencers in this policy area. 
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The next chapter will consider the relationships between key players in the policy process -




RELATIONSHIPS - LOCAL AND NATIONAL 
Relationships between the key players in the policy process have aheady been discussed. 
Of these, the research subjected the relationship between the Police Authority and the 
Chief Constable, and the relationship between Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, 
the Audit Conunission and the Force to closer scrutiny. 
• The Police Authority because of its greater involvement in the policy planning 
process. 
• The Chief Constable because of his influence over the Authority. 
• The Inspectorate of Constabulary because of its re-modelled approach to the inspection 
process. 
• The Audit Commission, because it represents a national quasi-independent influence. 
This Chapter mil give the views of the 'top corridor', divisional managers, front line 
managers and members of the Pohce Authority about the sfrengths and weaknesses of their 
relationship, followed by the views of pohce managers about the relationship between the 
force, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Audit Commission. 
The Police Authority - the police headquarters view 
Top corridor managers beheved that the present Police Authority was much more critical, 




'Greatly improved in general, in respect of all three elements. The Fohce Authority have 
become more focused more challenging as they are now more accustomed to their present 
role. They have undergone a cultural change and they have certainly moved away from 
any rubber stamping ethos which they may have had in the previous arrangement. They 
are now very probing wilh conunittees which consider various issues fr>r example 
performance reviews. The new 'independent' members tend to flex then muscles more and 
because of their business knowledge and other skills they are starting to become a very 
much sfronger mfluence upon the police authority.' [8]. 
And: 
'Yes. We shouldn't forget that the old Police Authority were not involved m the same way 
that they are now. The new authority independent members have added something which 
wasn't there before. They are more critical and more analytical. They will grow in 
confidence over the years in then role and it is my ardent hope that they will take the 
elected members of the Police Authority with them in this process. The elected members 
bring politics with them and they are more mmdful of their own local political issues, 
which are important to them rather than having an overview of the force.' [5] 
The Clerk to the Police Authority was also the subject of conunent: 
'My experience of the new Police Authority both in its members and leadership is that it 
has the potential to be more dynamic than in the past. I have personal experience of the 
Clerk to the Pohce Authority taking a more pro-active role and seen hun personally 
analysing data the Chief Constable has published to test its veracity and its impact upon 
the public' [1]. 
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The Police Authority - the view of divisional management 
As with top corridor managers, the divisional managers interviewed also believed that the 
present Police Authority was more critical, more analytical and more aware of the fiscal 
constraints of policmg, than its predecessor. For example: 
'Yes they are in my experieiice, and I think I have a peculiar input there-in because of the 
fact that I was a staff officer during the change over time. I saw the transition and I saw the 
move from 'the middle England I am a member of the Police Authority this is a social 
badge, aren't I clever', from that, to meaningful participation by not all, but m the main, 
people who really wanted to a make a difference. Who wanted to understand and who 
were prepared to confront the Chief Constable. I don't feel that the previous Police 
Authority was about that at all, the new Pohce Authority are about, well the new members 
certainly are about, confronting the Chief Constable, challenging him to justify some of his 
actions and the more I see of that the more comfortable I feel that the Constabulary will 
actually give the commimity what it wants.' [45]. 
For many their knowledge was more anecdotal, with some agreeing, for example: 
'I have experience of workmg with the new Authority but none with the old, but 
anecdotally its a yes to all of those questions, but also I would say that they too are 
growing into their new role and as time goes on they begui to feel more comfortable and 
want to flex then muscles quite legitimately and feel their space and make their presence 
felt. The fact that there is a very close working relationship between the Police Authority 
and the Chief Constable and his corporate planning team has helped that great deal. [22]. 
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However some fomid it more difficult to ascertain: 
'It's difficult to say. I was in ' X ' Department when we had the old Police Authority and 
when we had the new independent members and I have to say it depends very much on 
individual members who make up that Pohce Authority. For instance at the moment there 
is one individual member of that Police Authority whose backgrotmd is in banking and 
finance and I have to say she is very analytical, she's got- an eye for detail and- she does 
pick up issues of that sort. There have been previous members of the Police Authority of 
that ilk and it tends to be those one or two, as aside from the professional politicians, that 
pick up some of the more critical management and financial issues and that's most 
noticeable. So I think in terms of personalities at the moment, I think there are one or two 
on the Authority that are quite critical, and in terms of managing a large busmess they've 
got a good head and are quite decisive but I don't see that very often in the majority of the 
Pohce Authority.' [50]. 
And some didn't know: 
'I am aware of it but only because of what I have read. I have had no practical 
involvement with it and I couldn't really conunent on it' [38]. 
The Police Authority - the view from ground level managers 
During the course of the research it became apparent that, as managers became more 
distant from police headquarters and consequently had less contact vdth top corridor 
managers, the less knowledge they had of the influence of centtal groups such as the Pohce 
Authority. 
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Arguably, as a consequence of this fact, in contrast to the views of managers on the top 
corridor, of the fifteen ground level managers interviewed, seven felt that the present 
Police Authority was more effective than its predecessor, seven felt that they were imable 
to assess this and one manager felt it was less effective. 
These views can be summarised through the following conunents: 
'I know that before tiiere was a perception that they were 'tweeded gentlemen and ladies', 
magistrates and country folk, who more or less danced to the Chief Constable's tune and 
thought he was a wonderful chap. Now I do know that there is a much closer involvement 
between the secretariat of the Pohce Authority and the Chief Constable and I do know that 
they have actually made changes, almost imposed changes to the force plan that was first 
produced for them last November.' [26] 
And: 
'My only contact with them really has been through the Police Liaison Meetings. They 
have lessened the elected people, so some would say therefore, that the voice of the 
community has been lessened, with more control fiom Whitehall more control from 
Cenfral Government, the effectiveness of which I would question. We have ended up with 
two mfluences over the Police Authority, the Home Office, and the Chief Constable, and if 
he is a sfrong character he isn't going to take much notice of what the Home Office is 
saying, well only then if he's got to. People on the ground need to have a say and this new 




'I don't think i f has made any difference to us on the. coal face whether the Pohce. 
Authority have more or less power. I don't have any involvement with it really. It's a 
change which I do not believe has made any difference to what we actually do.' [27]. 
This last comment again illustrates the gap between police managers and the Police 
•Authority, in that the further renioved they are from the top corridor of local policing, the 
greater the gap becomes. 
The Chief Constable - the top corridor view 
The influence of the Police Authority is dependant upon its relationship with the Chief 
Constable. For the latter group a good relationship is described as .one which acts as a 
sounding board for local opinion, but which does not ultimately question the Chiefs 
decisions.'(Reiner,1992:251) 
Most top corridor managers felt that the Chief Constable's uifluence over the Police 
Authority was considerable: 
'Considerable. I know the Chief Constable has well developed influencing skills and he 
can influence the decisions of the Pohce Authority to a significant effect, but not entirely.' 
[4]. 
And: 
'His influence is such that he will present an issue, they will debate and accept it. They 
still accept what he suggests but there is a much greater dialogue. He still has an 
enormous influence over them. He is a very powerful person.' [6]. 
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As well as the issue of professional knowledge: 
'Quite a lot of influence, because he has the figures and facts prepared for him and he can 
use these to prove his arguments. He has a team to provide information which gives him 
power through knowledge over the Pohce Authority.' [9] 
Although there was agreement that the Chief Constable could influence the Police 
Authority, only three cases were provided to illustrate this: 
• 'Telephone call handling there was a difference of opinion and some conflict here.' 
[14] 
• He [the Chief Constable] gives them information on policy performance which he 
thinks they should have For example the Performance Quarterly Review keeps them 
happy. It costs about £6,000 to £7,000 a year to produce but this is a small price to pay 
to keep the Police Authority happy and of his back. The information is fairly 
innocuous. [2] 
• The 'Pescado' question. The Chief Constable sought the support of the chairman of 
the previous Police Authority who gave him one hundred per cent support over a 
politically contentious issue.' [1]' 
To further test the relationship between the Chief Constable and the Police authority, 'top 
corridor' managers were asked i f there had been any disagreements in deciding the 
contents of the Aimual Policing Plan. The overall view from the top corridor was that 
there was very little or no disagreement between the Police Authority and the Chief 
Constable: 
'It got virtually rubber stamped. The force was happy that they added a little, but it was 
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over-all a very amicable arrangement.', [12]. 
When there was a problem it was easily resolved: 
'There were differences of opmion but they were easy to work through. When we couldn't 
put something into the plan we told them why. In my view there should be a meeting 
between the Police Authority and the Chief Constable to discuss how everyone felt about 
what we all want to put into the plan and to come up with a draft after the Chief Officers 
aimual planning seminar.- The Chief Constable however wanted the draft plan to be his 
document. This year there is a seminar covering issues includuig results of the Chief 
Officers Seminar to discuss the issues raised.' [6]. 
The Chief Constable - the divisional managers' view 
With the exception of three managers who beheved their experience did not allow them to 
comment, all those mterviewed believed that the Chief Constable was able to influence the 
Police Authority: 
'I'm certaui the Police Authority hsten to him and I think he argues his pomts in quite a 
persuasive way his points. I have heard him say at 'Policy Advisory Group' that "....the 
Pohce Authority took this view but I persuaded them that...".[39] 
Others saw this influence as one relating to operational and non-operational matters: 
'I think with the particular set up we've got here, in Devon & Comwall, and the 
relationship between the Chief Constable and the Chairman of the Police Authority and the 
members, I would say that the Chief Constable has an enormous influence. I've never 
witnessed this but a majority of the Police Authority perhaps feel more comfortable with a 
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particular course of action and the Chief Constable has. to nianoeuvre them into another 
comse of action. What I do think happens is that the Chief Constable is very careful about 
how information is fed to the Police Authority, how the Police Authority mteracts with the 
Constabulary, his relationship with the clerk, in terms of feedmg information to the Police 
Authority. He very much keeps operational issues at arms length, So I do sometiihes think 
that he has handled the Police Authority extremely well and got decisions through them or 
resources from them when on any kind of more dispassionate or objective bed of facts you 
might have expected the Police Authority to be more robust in examining the decision 
that's been made.' [50]. 
Again, as managers become more removed from the top corridor, then detailed experience 
of the relationship between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority lessens 
considerably. The formulation of the Annual Policing Plan was used as a basis for their 
perception of this relationship: 
'Being on the sharp end, imless you get some feed back from the Divisional Commander 
from Policy Advisory Group meetings or something, you really don't hear much, and you 
don't get much from the way he presents his plans to the Police Authority meetings. And 
even if you listen to the press reports, which I do, I am not really aware that anyone has 
been that critical' [18]. 
And: 
'I think, probably at the present time, he still retains a considerable degree of influence. 
The only examples there are is that the Chief Officer, when you look at the documents he 
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presents to the Pohce Authority, or proposals he makes, very rarely do they not goalong 
with his recommendations. Now, whether or not that's because he carefully tailors them to 
know what they will accept and what they won't, or there are negotiations before and 
outside the meetings, is another matter, so its very much a question of rubber stampuig, but 
I really don't know. I don't work at that level to-be honest' [35] 
Divisional mangers felt that generally there were few disagreements between the police 
and the Authority in respect of the contents of the Annual Plan, and many feh that the 
Police Authority were able to make adjustments to the draft docmnent prepared by the 
police: 
'I'm not aware of any great problems. I know that the Police Authority exerted their views 
in respect of the plan, I think it was two years ago, in that there was one area, I think it was 
road traffic accidents, when they said hang on we want that in. And I think that the police 
view had been, hang on that isn't really your domain and quite rightly so, mind you, but 
the Police Authority said, never the less, we want it in, so it was in.' [40]. 
The fact that the police produced the plan for the Authority was seen as important: 
'This is the third year now that they have been presented with the plan and they actually 
review it. I'm not aware of any discrepancies or variance of opinions, I think its their plan 
but we produce it. I mean its really our plan which they are just rubber stamping because 
they haven't got the knowledge of the internal workings of the organisation or its problems 
and they don't spend enough time with us to know how to be able to influence the plan. 
That's my view. They have a lack of knowledge to produce the plan even if they had more 
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staff and I thiiik its the right way round T think we're producing it but ttiey are actively 
involved in the consultative group meetings and the focus group side of the consultative 
group meetings. They run that side and last year they ran the focus groups with a police 
officers, so they were actively involved in the gathering but the actual writing and the 
actual plan itself was written by pohce officer which I think is quite correct.' [30]. • 
The Chief Constable - views from ground level managers 
For the same reason ground level managers found it difficult to comment on the 
relationship between the Chief Constable and the Authority, in deciding the contents of the 
Aimual Policing Plan. Most of their comments were anecdotal. For example: 
' A great influence because he has said, 'I'm the professional police officer ' and although 
I've never been to a police authority meeting I've been to a number of meetings he's been 
at and because of the strength of character of the bloke I can see him wielding total 
influence, especially over people who are not as charismatic and forceful as him.' [21]. 
The view of the Police Authority 
Police Authorily members were asked if they thought that the present Authority was more 
analytical; more critical; and more fiscally aware than the 'old style' Police Authority. Al l 
members interviewed believed it was. 
Two members who were also members of the previous Police Authority said: 
'Yes, I think it is very different because of its very nature. We have been reduced from 45 
to 19 and of course the old Pohce Authority had councillors and magisfrates. This Police 
Authority has councillors, magisfrates and what we call nominated people. I was not at all 
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happy with those proposed changes when they came in and I spoke against them and was 
very vociferous, it worried me. I don't think there is any cause for complacency just 
because it works well for Devon & Comwall. We do happen I thmk to have good 
nominated people but that is because we, the already settled members of the new Police 
Authority, that is the magistrates and the local coxmcillors, were determined to know 
something about those people who had been nominated. We didn't have any choice in the 
first instance who or from which group they were going to be nominated from, that was 
from the Home Office. There was a sort of advertisement for anyone who was interested. 
However the advertisement was such that one found out about it afterwards, m that I think 
it went in to one Sunday quality newspaper and unless you actually read the small advert 
you could miss it. Even the County Coimcil didn't know about it, the officers there, and 
we didn't know about forms or anything and it did franspne of course that they were 
people on a Home Office hst anyway, who they got m touch with inunediately. These 
were people who always indicted that they were happy to do it and of course it was the 
time of Michael Howard so you can imagine the calibre possibly. We in Devon & 
Comwall actually, by the time of selection,, ended up with twelve names from which we 
had to select six because there is one more on our authority because of the Isles of Scilly. 
We actually met all twelve and we selected that way. I'm glad we did that, I think we did 
quite well as a result of i t ' [2]. 
And: 
'It's certainly a different animal. When the new Authority set up was initiated through the 
'94 Act', I was fortunate enough to be the representative of the Authority who sat with the 
Home Office representative and the third member, to vet or make the recommendations i f 
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you like, of the appointed members. They call them the independent mernbers but I never 
use that expression, because we've got politically mdependent members, so they're 
appomted members. It's changed in so much from the financial point of view. Under the 
old Authority here of course we had forty five members. Just a small group of those 
menibers understood what was going on and I would hazard a guess -and this is not a 
criticism, though I suppose it is, well it's an observation, that 75% of the members, of the 
old Authority would come to the meetings nod when tiiey had to, shake their heads when 
they had to, and went away having had a good meal. Now under the new system you've 
got to be so much more focused. Everyone, everyone on the Authority, new Authority set 
up has a task to do. We've just gone.though a system now where we have sub-committees, 
where we involve everybody somewhere along the Ime. In the old days of course there 
weren't enough panels or sub-committees to go around so you only had a small handfiil 
who would be active, the rest would just tum up on the day.' [4]. 
One member who was not a member of the old style Police Authority commented: 
'I would go from my background in education that's all changed now and until we had 
new legislation it was tea and biscuits with the head once a term and I think the old Police 
Authority with forty five members was very much hke that. A great majority of members 
would have no input what-so-ever. You came to a meeting you took your money and you 
went. It's just not like that nowadays, in the same way that govemors have a great deal of 
responsibility and are in and out of schools all the time, where they need to be aware of the 
legislation and what is happening, because in the end the buck stops with you. I think that 
is very much true with the Police Authority as well. You know we've got nineteen 
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members here and every one of us has a vital role to play in monitoring, particularly in the 
fiscal side of things anyway, very much so, we need to be on top of that but basically again 
you know its the 'P.R' side, the perception of the force. I think we deal a lot with that. We 
are always monitoring complaints and things like that and seeing how we can develop that. 
It's the interaction with people and Ithink .from thfe pohcing point of view its the every day 
people i f you like because the police who are doing the job are so colomed by the 
criminals if you like, that much of the day their job is with ordinary people and sometimes 
I think the Police Authority has got a role in there, in that agam it comes to being a bridge. 
I think we are actually quite a good liaison if you like between the force and the 
community which expects so much from their pohce force.' [6] 
Members of the Police Authority also believed that the Authority could be mfluenced by 
the Chief Constable. Some felt that he had a sfrong influence over them: 
'Oh absolutely! The Chief Constable can influence Police Authority members. He 
wouldn't be any good at his job if he couldn't. It's like the Chief OfiBcer of a Local 
Authority they can influence then members to the extent that they're successful in doing 
that, then in some respect, that's how then success is judged. Examples of this -1 guess 
the new telephone system was a prime example. A lot of misgivings among Police 
Authority members about the removal of confrol rooms in the outpost of the Authority area 
like where I come from,-*. Not very happy about it, but we didn't really have 
compelling evidence to show it was a mistake. After the event the system didn't work well 
but its workuig better now, but not as well as it ought to work. So I think that's a big 
example and that actually related to the public because they were on the receiving end of 
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not being able to phone the poliee, getting their calls lost'etc/[7^ 
* Removed to preserve confidentiality. 
And: 
'I thmk yes he does, but I thiiik quite rightly so, and I think it would be very wroiig if he 
didn't have the opportunity to have an input. It doesn't necessarily mean to say that the 
Authorily members need to take that advice or act upon his comments but I think it is very 
unportant that the Chief Constable has an input. There would be cases where, maybe 
we've made a decision because he's been able to give us additional information and I think 
that's very different' [8]. 
Whilst some continued the theme of guidance from the Chief Constable: 
'I thiiik they are inevitably guided by the Chief Constable. I don't know that I can think of 
any examples where he has guided us in a way we did not wish to go but I feel on the 
whole that we don't really make policy. But what is our role? It could be that we are there 
as a stop gap until something goes wrong and if we have a Grampian situation then the 
Authority obviously plays a vital role. Providing the Chief Constable behaves himself and 
goes along with general public backing I don't think the. Authority has got a great deal to 
say.' [5]. 
Other members were more aware of the operational responsibility of the Chief Constable: 
'I think the Chief should iofluence them, because it's all about delivery to the general 
public of policing, and that is an operational and active thing, and that is something that 
the Police Authority are not directly involved in. It must be through the operational force. 
280 
Now the operational force is of course represented by the Chief What he says shbiild 
influence the view of the Authority members, but the decision, i f a decision has to be 
made, is that of the members. We don't always necessarily, and I can't think of a direct 
example here, but we never, I mean I never, feel under any obligation to, despite my regard 
for chief constables, I am under no obligation "to follow directly what the Chief says, but 
he's so close to the issue that to ignore his advice, well you've really got to understand it. 
We've got an advantage down here as well, in that as far, certainly as far as this Authority 
is concerned, and I see this when I go up to national meetings, we're sort of non-political. I 
wear a political label and as you know, other members wear political labels, well some of 
them anyway, but that doesn't enter into it. Now when one sits with other members of 
Authorities from finther up the way, you hear the political influences coming in, where 
they would give their right arm to be able to influence the operational activities of the 
Chief Constable. I mean, I went to a meeting not long ago where there were two different 
Authority members sat round a table and they were not boasting, but they were very proud 
to show how they had been in a position to argue, really argue with the Chief Constable, 
and no agreement was reached on certam things. That means, for me, the only people who 
suffer would be the general public' [4]. 
And a note about personality: 
'I have a sneaking suspicion that he does confrol us but he's no fool and I think he does 
know his limits and he works hard, of comse he works hard, you know we are all aware of 
what's going on and he also and he also presents his case exceedingly well. I do have to 
say that I noticed with the very first meeting of the new Police Authority and I do get a-
feelmg that he thought he was going to confrol us and I noticed a re-frenching I think is the 
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word. Perhaps other people wouldn't agree" with me buit I found it well, it's a partnership,I 
do think it is a partnership, other people might disagree but I'm quite happy.' [2]. 
Members of the Police Authority were asked who set the agenda for their meetings. They 
considered that in general the agendas were decided by the Chief Constable, the Clerk to 
the Police Authority and the Chairman. With comments varying from: 
'Well we have no mput, the ordinary member has no choice or opportunity to put anything 
on the agenda as far as I'm concemed the Chanman probably the Vice-Chauman and the 
Clerk and the Chief Constable decide on the agenda for the meetings.' [9]. 
And: 
'They just arrive and I suspect it's between the Chairman the Chief Constable the 
Treasurer and the Clerk.' [2]. 
To: 
'There is an opportunity for Police Authority Members to influence the agenda but the 
agenda is very much driven from the Chief Constable, the Chairman and the Clerk, but I 
would say that it is more likely to be Chief Constable driven at the moment. [1]. 
The relationship quandary 
Seven of the nine Police Authority members interviewed made specific reference to the 
relationship between the Authority and the force, 
hi terms of it becoming too close: 
'There is one little thmg that I think we have to be carefiil of, I think, well I know it is most 
important for the efficiency and good operation of a police Force certainly the Devon & 
Comwall Force that you need to have a good working relationship not to be in each others 
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pockets but you heed to have a good relationship with the force and the Pphce Authority 
i.e. the Chief Constable and the senior officers and the Police Authority. But I also believe 
that we have to be a little bit careful that we as a Police Authority don't become high 
jacked, in inverted commas, by the force because it is most important that we have a 
slightly detached identity. We are the Devoh.& Comvi^ all Police Authority we are riot the 
Devon & Comwall Police Force and we should be seen by. the public as being slightly 
detached and not part of We have a need to be part of it to work together but the public 
perception must be that we stand slightly to one side because otherwise there is a danger of 
this bridge becoming a bit rickety I think.' [8]. 
In terms of policy and practice: 
'Having been on thte Authority since 1989, anything I've wanted to influence I've had the 
opportunity to do it. It does seem to me that here, in Devon & Comwall, the relationship 
between the full time professionals and the Authority is probably about as good as 
anywhere. We wouldn't wish it any other way and I think the Chief Constable and the 
Chief Officers up the road are sufficiently in touch with things that they'll soon pick up if 
there is something that the authority members are not happy about and usually they'll 
move to come along side even if they can't actually agree with what members are saying. 
Chiefly I think that Police Authority members are conscious of the fact that operationally 
that's not our route or responsibility. We may comment on particular operational issues if 
we know something about it or received criticism. We accept that it is the Chief Constable 
role in life and I think that as long as that relationship continues then you know there will 
be little or no problems down here.' [7]. 
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Or: . •. . • 
'We were talking about influence in respect of the Policing Plan and of the influence the 
Pbhce Authority have on the Chief Constable. I have an example which you may be 
interested to hear. It relates to licensing and the force policy in respect of liquor licensing 
and of comse force policy is to hold the line at one am closing. We feel in that this 
goes agamst the —-* ethos and. that we should be allowed to go on to two. Wp have been • 
told in no uncertain terms that force pohcy is one and that's it. Having in the last few 
months talked to the Chief the A.C.C and the local Divisional Chief as well, they are now 
saying that although force policy remains, they are quite happy for us, at a divisional level, 
to talk and look at how we can see how we can work with it in *. I feel very much that 
if that wasn't something that I had brought up it would still be the same now but at least 
we are working now towards changing that. Now I may only have achieved what de­
regulation may be bring, but at least the Chief is now talking to us about this sort of thing, 
which would probably not have happened five years ago.' [6]. 
* Removed to preserve confidentialify. 
The distinction between policy and practice was not a problem for most of the members, 
but one of the newly appointed independent members felt it could be difficult: 
'I am concemed because I often find that there is a difficulty in actually defining what is 
operational, for the concem of the Chief Constable, and what we should be lookmg at, 
because there is a grey area here which I have problems with.' [9]. 
Another recently appointed member of the authority was concemed not only with the 
relationship between the authority and the force, but between members of the authority: 
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'We have talked about change and how the latest Act has actually changed altered the 
Police Authority as there are now a lot less of us. It is also made up of slightly different 
people in so far as three IPs, six mdependent members and then you've got ten political 
appointees. Now having looked at other quangos or whatever you want to call them, in 
their way I have to say that the influence, and the very expertise that is required of the 
Police Authority is considerable. This doesn't necessarily mean that its got it, but it is • 
required to have it. I go away quite a lot on Home Office conferences to various Police 
Authority Associations and there is no doubt that some Police Authorities have incredible 
influence upon policy. Now whether that is a good thing or bad I don't know, all I know is 
what the Home Office, what that Act required us to do. What that Act required us to do 
was to set the pohcing plan, be responsible for the budget, hire and fire the top officers and 
be answerable to the public. In doing that we require, in my opinion, a higher level of 
expertise than has been shown in the past and is indeed required on some other similar 
type functional authorities or organisations. It is my opinion that the Police Authority, if 
they are to serve the public and the constabulary well, must increase their expertise and 
they must be prepared to question to monitor and put away the rubber stamp. I feel very 
strongly that there is too much rubber stamping ui this Police Authority. It is well known, I 
have made my views on this well known, it is no secret. It is not the case in all Police 
Authorities many have moved on in a way. This Authority still has a lot of people from 
the origuial Police Authority still on it. Now I'm not in any way criticismg them, but it 
makes it more difficult for change to come about in a shorter space of time and for people 
to change their ways and actually to gain more knowledge themselves. I have got real 
doubts about the selection process of the Pohce Authority as it stands at the moment. 
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although I do say that the Home Office and The Local Authorities Association are trying to 
address the issue but I don't know how to address the overall issue when you've got the 
political appomtees. The political appointees do not like the independents, they see it as a 
lack of democracy and they shouldn't be here. We, I, don't know about the independents 
view because we don't get together as a body, that's another difference, the political 
parties are always together and that's political, despite what this Police Authority will tell 
you, that we're not political, it is. Decisions for appointments are politically motivated. 
Lib-Dems get together, the poor little Tories, there are not many of them, and Labour they 
do get together, and they don't choose the right people for the job and the chairmanship is 
one example where they take it in turns and it is diabohcal it is unprofessional and its out 
dated and it makes me angry.' (giggle). [1]. 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 
hi order to assess the influence of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, managers 
were asked i f the process was becoming more rigorous and probing, and whether it was 
possible to deflect or defer then recommendations. 
The top corridor perspective 
The research indicates that the top corridor sees the inspection process carried out by Her 
Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary as bemg much more rigorous and probing than it 
was, for example, five years ago. The following answers are representative: 
'Absolutely yes. The quality of the Inspectorate has gone up. Our own inspector is a good 
man and asks the right questions. The employment of civilian members is a good thing 
286 

they too ask the right questions. We riow have a very focused hispectorate who undertake 
veiy focused interrogations, which they coihe back to at the next inspection to see if you 
have met the targets they have suggested. They do not discuss the things you are doing 
right, the good thmgs, but look at the problem areas, look at the things that the force may 
not be doing right the things that may be a problem. The Inspectorate also, have good 
quality staff officers which helps in the inspectipn process.'[1]. 
And 
'I have seen two. The first though not fully, was a performance review. The interview was 
hell, really challenging and really in-depth. The questions were really political and in 
some cases I was hesitant to answer. Why did you do this? I can't say 'Because the Chief 
Constable said so.' I have to retain some loyalty. They were extremely rigorous.' [6]. 
The top corridor also felt that it was possible to deflect or'defer reconunendations made by 
theH.M.I: 
'Yes the H.M.I makes recommendations in a report to the Police Authority which the 
Chief Constable does not always accept. For two or three years running the H.M.I has 
wanted the force to set up a volimteer cadet force. However the force does not believe that 
it can afford to do this and it has now been dropped. A cmrent issue is the civilian 
divisional personnel officers which the force does not accept and will not unplement. This 
has not worsened our working relationship with the H.M.I. A healthy tension exists. [4] 




'Perhaps not only can we deflect their reconunendations but be able to^  show that their 
• policy agendas may not be as effective as they previously thought and effect changes in 
their policy agendas.' [1] 
It was also pomted out that to successfiilly deflectparticular reconunendations over time, 
the Chief Constable niay require the backing of the Pplice Authority: 
'If the Chief Constable doesn't think that the H.M.I is right he tells him so. Every year the 
H.M.I can repeat a recommendation, and every year the Chief Constable can tell him why 
he will not implement it. However where this does happen, every Chief Constable must 
have the backing of the Police Authority. We must remember that the H.M.I is an 
individual just as is the Chief Constable ! [10]. 
Most managers agreed that this would not effect the relationship between the force and the 
Inspectorate, with opinions ranging from: 
'The Chief Constable will argue it out with the H.M.I.C to sort out best policy for the force 
and he is not worried about then relationship' [9] 
To: 
'I think that there is a buddies relationship between the H.M.I and Chief Constables.' [11]. 
Divisional Managers ' 
The majority of divisional managers agreed that the inspection process had become more 
vigorous and probing, this comment represents the general response: 
'I think the inspections process itself has changed and I actually think that the inspectipn 
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process now is more valuable than it used to be/and in tum our ihtemal inspection 
processes have changed. It's not about checking 'pocket books', 'lockers' and 'skippets', 
or over-time vouchers. It's about checking processes, systems and the plarming process 
and I think that makes it a more powerful tool m terms of its abihty to influence.' [50]. 
There were some mangers who felt that the process had become too adversarial: 
'Only last week we had our pre-H.M.I visit. It was done completely differently than last 
years and last year I had a.chat with them as weU for about half an hour and I felt it was a 
safer envnonment I felt that I could tell him things like I can tell you. But this year he had 
the management team of this department, the four of us, in a room in the training block 
and went roimd the room asking us what our jobs were about. Asking us general questions 
and I'm not so sure that was the best way, it may have been quicker for him, but I'm not so 
sure he's getting the most out of the interviews, and also he had a Chief Inspector there 
and I think it should be on a one to one basis. And I know last year that some people from 
my department had two from the H.M.rs office interviewing them and it was very 
adversarial and I think that's completely wrong. Again as with any mspection process 
unless everyone has got faith in it then it's a waste of time to an extent. I've also heard 
rumours in the past that someone had a meetmg with the H.M.I, or may have been the Staff 
Officer, and it was fed back to the Chief where that came from, which is wrong. And 
those sort of rumours quickly go through the police service, well not rumours but stories.' 
[52]. 
And: 
'Oh absolutely I do. I was at the heart of things as staff officer at the start of several 
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different H M i ' s inspections and yes its much more rigorous now and I think that the 
manner in which the personal manner in which our current H.M.I does things is sadly 
wrong. Having experienced the totally unfair and inquisitorial manner in which questions 
are asked of me as a senior officer in the presence of people my junior when the H.M.I 
knows. fiiU well that I'm not going to beable to answer the question ma manner whichis 
credible because he's already done his groimd work. He knows that the systems that the 
questions are being asked about reveal them as being absent and those systems are 
certainly absent. I'm therefore going to be embarrassed I'm going to be embarrassed in a 
way that undermines my operational credibility. That is bad practice and in my view 
denied me the opportunity of conunanding a division at a higher grade than I recently have 
because of one slip up on that one occasion. My track record has been excellent and then I 
go and embarrass the Chief because I can't answer one question which everybody knows 
I'm not gomg to be able to answer. I'd only just been in that position having been away 
for months on end conunanding another division and suddenly I'm embarrassed and its an 
example of, I think, a very unfair individual approach by that H.M.I. I think the general 
process of the model the performance review inspection model I think its a very good 
catalyst for good practice and yesterday with my divisional management team I went 
through that document and we went through all the questions that we could to explore to 
examine our ovra processes and we came up with a number of things that we felt we 
weren't doing well enough and we've mtroduced a number of processes to address the 
issues. That's got to be good news. Now that's only because we've got HM-I's inspection 
coming up and I want to be sure that I and my Divisional Management Team staff are in a 
position that, if they are asked these questions, they can come up with the sort of answers 
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that Iwasn't able to.' [45]. 
The majority of divisional managers beheved that it was possible to defer or deflect 
recommendations made by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary: 
'Yes. Its quite a robust relatidnship'. The Chief Constables safeguard their autonomy and 
their independence quite jealously, and the Inspectorate has a particular fimctioh but the 
Inspectorate is not there to manage police forces or direct chief constables. In one or two 
H.M.I reports there have been things in there which the Chief Constable has resisted and 
quite a topical one at the moment is the civihanisation of personnel officers. At the 
moment we still use Chief Inspectors as persoimel officers on division and for several 
years now the Chief H.M.I has suggested that they should be a post that should be 
civilianised and other forces have civilianised that post, for example the 'Mets' have. So 
that's one area and there are other areas, one is tenure of post. I mean this Chief Constable 
has resisted the implementation of tenure of post for a some time but I mean we have got 
one now. He's resisted H.M.I policy in other areas as well because its not right for Devon 
& Comwall.' [50]. 
This kind of example, where the force deflects but eventually accepts the 
recommendations is often quoted. 
'It is possible it has been done. I think that is down to the Chief Constable to negotiate 
with the particular H.M.I who he is workmg with and I think it can. I won't say it has but I 
think it could make the relationship between the force and an H.M.I precarious and I look 
at Derbyshne as a case in point where for two years running there was quite a problem and 
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it wasn't.necessarily the Chief Constable. In Derbyshire it was actually the Police 
Authority but I do know that in our own force we don't agree with everything that the 
H.M.I says. I think that A.R.V's is something that the Chief Constable is now had to 
acknowledge and work towards but in the early days he put it off as long as he could 
because of resource issues. Job tenure I think is another que and I think the H.M.I has 
been pushing that one for some, years now and we have only just finally embraced it.' [31]. 
Others believed the relationship would not be affected, for example: 
'Yes it is possible for the force to disagree and not comply with recommendations of an 
H.M.I. The relationship is not going to be a great relationship if you don't implement an 
H.M.I recoirunendation but I'm siue that the Chief Constable and the H.M.I are big enough 
to be able to disagree and I'm sure they sit down and agree to disagree.' [22]. 
There was also a view that it was too easy to deflect or defer recommendations: 
'I think it's all too easy for the force to deflect recommendation of the H.MI. I would 
prefer to see that we analyse his recommendations better, and we actually have a written 
case that says in a defensive but constructive way, to say yes we acknowledge this and m 
our priority for things to do this is where it sits, and this is our tune scale for achieving it. I 
think with some of the other things we're saying that we should be able to articulate why it 
isn't an issue for us. I mean the A.R.V's were a classic on that. We gradually got pushed 
into it and may be on Drug Squads we may get pushed the same but we should be able to 
articulate, based on facts, as to why we are not doing it. I think what we've done in the 
past is just ducked it, not answered, and we just wait for them to come back and beat us 
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again. I think we should say, its on our list of priorities, look what's above it, what do you 
suggest we stop doing, we've got to manage that process better.' [53]. 
Ground level managers 
Most ground level matiagers suggested that the inspection process was now more rigorous 
and probing, however.fewer of these managers had been involved in the process than 
managers at divisional or top corridor level: 
'Yes. I can remember a visit from an H.M.I when I was on fraffic and his questions were 
quite probing about pohcy and you're aware now that when the H.M.I comes he is gouig to 
ask questions about policy. Whereas in the past I beheve that R M . I visits were more a 
jolly for the bosses.' [34]. 
And: 
'Yes they are, because they comatose with set ideas of exactly what they are going to 
examine, whereas before it was just a guided tour of the force and I think it was a bit too 
cosy really. Whereas now they do come down and inspect and from what I've read in 
reports of forces they are critical and in some parts of the country they have with held 
money. Also when the H.M.I visited last year he took the opportunity to meet in private 
individuals at all levels and talk to them, and they were not people who were actually 
presented to him as stooges, they were people he identified, who he wanted to speak to, so 
the H.M.I had more confrol over the process.' [24]. 
And: 
'I have not been involved in this but I am becoming involved, as we have an inspection 
commg up in three weeks time with his staff officer. Certainly, to a large extent I think you 
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would be better off if an H.M.I just dropped in. Take us as we are sort of thing, because 
we do so much preparation to get things right and this is a two edged sword because if it 
was wrong it would be put right, if we knew he was. coming down, but if he came in and 
saw you, warts and all, and saw the pressures imder which everybody was workmg then he 
may not be quite so benevolent as you would like him to be but yon do spend a lot of time 
.preparing for a HiM.I visit and briefing for them. I mean I'm doing this now and selecting 
the people who will come up and meet the staff officer, to make sure that we've got the 
people who will speak the right language, say the right things basically, which is what the 
boss feels should be said, i f you see what I mean. So we shall be keepmg the ones that are 
out-spoken or whatever out of the way on that day. Perhaps out-spoken is the wrong word 
but you know what I mean I'm sure. So I just say sometimes I wonder if it might be better 
to drop in, perhaps not for three days, but regularly for an hour, to see what it's really like. 
However I do not have enough experience of them to say if they are becoming harder or 
not' [32], 
Once again the remoteness of these managers from the centre of the organisation reflects 
their detailed knowledge as to whether the force can deflect or defer recommendations 
made by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and any resultant relationship 
between these actors. Many felt it was possible: 
'Yes it can be done and it does effect the relationship. For example in terms of staffing 
levels in Special Branch when we had a thematic inspection by H.M.I and it showed us as 
being under represented by a Detective Inspector and a Detective Sergeant and about for 
or five Detective Constables and three civilians about four years ago. At that time we 
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made a bid to the force for an increase in staff and it was subsequent to that our staff were 
reduced. Totally arbitrarily in terms of the force re-organisation and 'L Division' was 
bemg set up and it had taken some of our staff for other functions. The report of the RM.I 
thematic inspection was waved in front of the chief to no avail.' [29]. 
And: ' . 
'I think it is possible for a force to say we take onboard what you say but this is not the 
case in this force. I think that the H.M.rs make their reports and those reports are quite 
categorical as to how they see it. I mean the Chief Constable is able to respond if he 
wishes but the would have to show a good reasons to why he has disagreed with the H.M.I 
as the H.M.rs are looking at things which are of national concem at that time so the Chief 
Constable has got to be on sfrong ground if he is going to attempt to deflect criticism.'[23]. 
The Audit Commission 
Similarly managers were asked i f it was possible to easily discoimt a recommendation of 
best practice made by the Audit Commission, if the force considered it to be ineffective or 
inappropriate. 
The Top Comdor 
Four of those interviewed felt that it was not possible to discount recommendations from 
the Audit Commission and eleven said tbat it was. Opinions ranged from: 
'I think there is so much pressure on the force today to take notice of Audit Commission 
recommendations and one can see from the increasing number of then reports on the 
police, for example 'Tackling Crime more Efficiently', that the force has to respond, 
either by changing their stractures, or processes, to show that they have met the spirit, if 
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not the letter of reconunendations from the-Audit Commission.' [1]. 
To: 
'Historically the force has reacted to Audit Commission documents but now I think people 
are beginning to question them. I think they are questioiied and evaluated more and not 
merely implemented.. Historically the police have reacted to. cenfral direction and it is 
taking time for us to question their guidance.when not compatible to force dnectibn.' [2]. 
The Divisional Managers' Perspective 
Al l but four of these managers beheved that it was possible for the force to discount Audit 
Commission recommendations of 'best practice'. However it was fislt that such 
recommendations should be reviewed and only implemented i f they were considered to be 
of value to the force. For example: 
'Yes, I wouldn't say just discount it but argue against it in a proper manner. I don't think 
any Chief Constable is just going to accept something because someone else has said it. 
I think we're going to look in to it and say well what are going to be the benefits of this 
and costs and everything else. Because, remember, these people making these 
recomniendations have never worked in the police service. Generally the Audit 
Commission, certainly are all about poxmds shillings and pence really, that's certainly what 
its about. So it might be easy for them on paper, to say do that but in reality i f s a lot more 
complex and expensive and I can't see this Chief Constable just accepting something 
without researching into i t ' [52]. 
Even those who felt it was not possible, still referred to the need to evaluate: 
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'I don't know that we can actually discount anything the Audit Commission says because 
they are too tightly involved in our money situation. But I think what we can do is an 
evaluation of what they are saying, against what we do, against what's best for the force 
and maybe show a business case to show we shouldn't take it up. I .have no examples.' 
[39]. 
However there was some feeling that the police over-reacted to the Audit Commission: 
'But the Audit Commission is I think a classic it is something that is looking into us and 
we have to be chcumspect on the depth of the things they go to, because of what they are 
telhng us. We shouldn't be up there saying, we know what's best we shoxild be mindfiil of 
public scrutiny and public comments, but the Audit Comniission, I think, is a classic in 
that it's somethmg that I think the police service has been a bit too rolled over by, and they 
have said this and we say that must be the case, so that's what we've done. And to some 
extent the Home Office fits into that, albeit in this democratic society that we've got, it 
must be the case that the Home Office is the arm of the political representation of the 
country so that is 'Joe public' through their elected members telling us what they want. I 
suspect that it is probably better these days and I think eventually you very often see 
politicians, particularly if they are not in office, spouting off about all sorts of things and 
when they get into office they become far more pragmatic m the nature of the way things 
are dealt with, because this is the world we live in, this is what is achievable, this is what 
we can do.' [42]. 
And: 
Every report that comes out must be reviewed and assessed and no knee jerk reaction to 
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the fact that the Audit Commission say we've got to do it; so we've got to do it. I have 
experience ui respect of activity sampling where the Home OfBce were pushing us for 
activity sampling, the Audit Commission were pushing us and we went back to the Audit 
Commission and said, no we're not going to give you our statistics for the past year 
because all you are going to do is look at them and beat us with the stick, we have given 
you. It should be questioned. I have met people froni the Audit Commission and they are 
amazed by the way police forces, when you tell them to go and do something or ask them 
or suggest to them they roll over on their back and they do it. Whereas other organisations 
say we haven't got the staffing to do that, go away, and we are learning firom that, because 
we are an organisation where somebody says that's a problem go and deal with it and we 
deal with it, but we shouldn't be. We mustn't just accept what they say, because all their 
doing is that they've got their information firom somewhere, we must remember that, and 
they got their information from police forces, and who is to say that those police forces are 
doing it correctly. I think you have to question it and look at your own circumstances.'[30] 
Others were more pragmatic: 
'It is a bit of all things really. I think we all get, well I get, copies of Audit Commission 
reports and I get copies of Police Research Group reports etc. I think anybody ui my 
position, I'm not sure about the force, but anybody in my position a Divisional 
Commander must be frawling all the tune and flagging up where ever possible thmgs we 
need to look at. Now, because something works in Northamptonshire doesn't mean that 
it's going to work in Plymouth, so one would be aware of it, look at it and i f there was 




Some ideas can be more acceptable for other reasons: 
'I think the 'Street-Wise' report was a good example of how easily something could be 
dismissed and I think it's a shame because there were some very important lessons. 
'Tackling Crime Effectively' was taken on board because it happened to suit individual 
preferences. 'Street-Wise' didn't because it meant that it directed the Chief Constable to 
go down a particular policing philosophy with which he wasn't comfortable at that time. I 
think there has been a fundamental shift now and as we approach A.C.P.0 Presidency I am 
sure there will be a much more holistic approach.' [45]. 
From the perspective of groimd level managers 
Eleven of the fourteen ground level managers believed that it was possible to defer 
recommendations made by the Audit Commission, again, however, not without some local 
review: 
'Yes, i f it has been identified as a good practice if it can be shown to be better than what 
we have now, then by all means use it. I would suggest that at the end of the day if you 
can show in a sensible way that what you have got is as efScient or better than, without 
'poo-pooing' it, a constructive argument, then yes they are reasonable people.' [17]. 
And: 
'They only reconunend but I'm not aware of one that's been totally ignored, it may be 
tweaked but again I would say that the Chief Constable is looking towards the Police 
Authority and saying, this is what the Audit Commission is saying nationally about what 
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we're doing, but we don't have to worry too much about it here, we'll do this ,that, and the 
other and that will suffice'. [21], 
And a closing comment from one manager in respect of the Audit Commission and the 
H.M.I: 
'Do we need an H.M.I. We have the Audit Commission, which is seen as a squeaky clean 
independent organisation outside of police mfluence. The H.M.I is not achieving very 
much.' [10]. 
Concluding comments 
The Police Authority is seen both by its members and by police managers as being a much 
more dynamic body than the larger old style authority. But they still see the Chief 
Constable as being able to affect then decision making, both through his advice based 
upon professional knowledge and through his own ability and sfrong personahty, an 
opinion which is also expressed by police managers. 
The research shows that there is no evidence to suggest that there has been a change in the 
power relationship between the Police Authority and the Chief Constable, hi fact their 
relationship conforms to a Chief Constable's ideal type, one which '... .acts as a sounding 
board for local opinion, but which does not ultimately question the chiefs decisions.' 
(Reiner 1992:251). 
For many managers the inspection processes carried out by the Her Majesty's Inspectorate 
of Constabulary is seen as a difScult and in some cases a fraumatic experience. A l l those 
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interviewed saw it as being more rigorous and probing than it once was. It was generally 
considered that it was possible to argue that reconnnendations made by the H.M.I., need 
not be implemented locally (a course of action which would not effect the relationship 
between the force and the hispectorate). However evidence from their Inspection Reports 
in the policy areas previously discussed, would indicate that it is only possible to defer 
such recommendations, rarely, if ever, to deflect them completely. 
Papers published by the Audit Commission were seen by managers to demand close 
scrutiny, as they contained information applicable to policing on a national scale, which 
could be of value locally. It was generally considered that the Audit Conunission had 
become an increasingly important influence on police pohcy, but then recommendations 
could be both deferred and deflected, i f it could be argued that such recommendations 
were ineffective or mappropriate for local conditions. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
DRAWING THE STRANDS TOGETHER: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The avenues available to the pubhc to influence the police, both in pohcy and practice, 
have increased considerably since the days of the Pohce Act 1964, where issues of 
accountabihty and control were essentially based upon the 'tripartite arrangemenf of the 
Home Secretary, Local Pohce. Authority and Chief Constable. So too has the influence of 
Quasi Government agencies, such as Her Majesty's hispectorate of Constabulary; The 
Audit Commission; and Government Inquiries, such as 'Scarman'. How, then, have these 
new avenues of influence affected the issues of power, accountability, control and 
influence over the pohce at a local level? 
Organisational stmcture is central to these issues, because it is through the organisation 
that people from various backgrounds are brought together to achieve specific aims, 
involving corporate culture and control, shared values and experiences. Like many other 
organisations in the pubhc sector in England and Wales, the Devon & Comwall 
Constabulary has undergone major changes in recent years, much of it implemented as a 
result of pohtical pressure, originating from a desire to reduce management costs. Reports 
from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and The Audit Commission, as well as 
inquiries such as 'Sheehy', have had considerable influence over these changes. This is 
reflected by the perceptions of all of the managers interviewed who beheved that the Chief 
Constable, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, The Audit Commission and The 
Home Ofiice had the greatest influence on the introduction of these changes. Employees 
and staff associations/unions were seen as having the least influence. Senior managers 
from the top corridor felt that implementation was achieved through special project teams 
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that would obtain views from various levels of the organisation; however middle managers 
and front line pohce officers beheved that these orgamsational changes were implemented 
in a top down manner, with httle local consultation. In particular, although the Audit 
Commission have enshrined the value of Basic Command Units, front line staff are not 
convinced that their infroduction, and the Ward System in particular, was an effective 
method of pohcing for Plymouth. 
The organisation has attempted to become less centralised and more organic, but it is stiU 
unable to escape the hierarchy of a tall organisation, with a rank structure firmly fixed in 
its mihtaristic origins, and with the ever-present positional and latent power of the Chief 
Constable at the apex of the organisation, it cannot be considered to be a truly de­
centralised organisation. It remains an adminisfrative bureaucracy, as described by the 
classical theorists, where organisational rules and procedures are intended to control the 
actions of members of the organisation, a control that can be enforced by specialist 
departments, and an efiective force wide system of computerised information technology. 
Therefore, in terms of the power of the organisation to exert control, issues of pohcy 
making and implementation are important in a policing context, because of the disaetion 
available to front-line pohce officers, that permits pohcy making to continue during the 
course of implementation, resulting in continuous pohcy making. This occurs even though 
managers believed that they could distinguish between pohcy and practice. The power 
available to those who implement policing pohcy is extended by their abiUty to apply 
'bottom-up' confrol over pohcy implementation (also seen in other pubhc service 
organisations) based upon a perceived need by sfreet level staff to slow down, or ration the 
demands upon these services, aUowing street level bureaucrats to apply pohcy to suit their 
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own needs: needs often based upon a desire to keep up with demand, rather than 
complying with specific perfonnance indicators. 
Managers conceded that it was possible for pohcy to be initiated by front line staff, by 
affecting pohcy initiatives by faihng to implement them if they considered them to be 
ineffective or too cumbersome. But it was the 'committee system' that was highlighted, 
both by managers (in the interviews! conducted) and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (in then reports), as being the major driver in the policy and.decision making 
processes. This system however enables both the positional power of the Chief Constable 
to control those who are chosen to be committee members, and his latent power to ensure 
that overt conflict does not occur. Essentially, then, the Chief Constable maintains control 
at a local level. 
Applying a rational through to incremental contmuimi, the research suggests that decision­
making is more inclined towards inaementalism and muddling through. Radical changes 
in pohcy were not made, and with many managers criticising the way in which pohcy is 
tested, there is little evidence of backward mappmg in terms of assessing the affects of 
unplementation. 
With the requirement of Partnership Pohcing in respect of crime prevention and crime 
reduction initiatives implemented under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the implications 
of continuous policy making must be taken into consideration. This will require a more 
effective system of pohcy evaluation, and greater consultation with front line staff. 
Much been made of local consultation and a partnership approach in terms of influencing 
what the pohce do. However, using pohcing plans as an example, both managers and 
members of the Pohce Authority considered that they had made every effort to involve the 
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public and lower ranks in the pohcy making process, expanding the ri^ts of citizenship, 
by giving them the opportunity to iodQuence what tiie police do and how they do it. 
Unfortunately, s^ can be seen from the attendance at intemal police and extemal pubhc 
consultation meetings, the desire for such involvement, both by the pubhc and by grotmd 
level staff, remain at a low ebb. In terms of pubhc accountability, control and influence 
over local pohcy and practice, this perceived lack of interest in pohcing issues permits the 
existence of 'non-decision making through non-participation', reaching a point at which 
local communities are 'unaware of their interests and therefore not in a position to demand 
that their interests are met', leaving the question of who confrols (the senior - junior 
partner relationship) untested. 
Papers pubhshed by The Audit Commission, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 
and The Home Office clearly had considerable influence over local pohcy, a view that is 
reflected consistently by the perceptions of managers in the Devon & ComwaU 
Constabulary, who saw them as having the greatest influence over the pohcy and decision­
making processes in the five policy areas examined: followed closely by the Chief 
Constable, hi confrast the Pohce Authority, employees not normally or routinely involved 
in the pohcy process, and pohce staff associations and unions were seen as having the least 
amount of uifluence. However front hne staff (sergeants and constables) saw the greatest 
influence over their day-to-day work coming, firstly, from the consumers of pohce 
services, and thereafter from their coUeagues, their immediate supervisors, and pubhc 
opinion. 
The Citizen's Charter has had a considerable impact upon local pohce managers, not only 
in coming to terms with the problems of quahty in pubhc service provision, but also with 
the issues of defining and measuring perfonnance indicators. They saw the Citizen's 
Charter as having a positive impact upon the pohce service, leading to improved services, 
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but accountability was hardly mentioned by top corridor managers. However the majority 
of giround level managers saw the Citizen's Charter as making the police more 
accountable, by enabling the pubhc to be more aware of the service standards of the 
organisation. The strongest influence over the introduction of the Force Charter was seen 
to come from The Audit Commission, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and the 
Chief Constable, even if almost no one knew how the contents of the Charter had been 
decided. Front line staff were not convinced that it had improved, pohce service to the 
community; more importantly, the majority of those who ware members of the Force prior 
to the infroduction of the Charter did not beheve that it had made any difference to the way 
they carried out their work, even though they saw it as decreasing their general level of 
discretion as to what they actually did. 
The pubhcation of Annual Policing Plans gave notice to the community policed of the 
service they could expect to receive over the forthconung year. However it is evident that 
documents pubhshed by the Home Office and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 
have had the greatest influence over the Local Pohcing Plan. The process of deciding the 
contents of the Constabulary Annual Pohcing Plans (now Performance Plans) was seen by 
all managers to be one where the pohce produced a plan on behalf of the Police Authority, 
through the apphcation of Ministerial Priorities and local consultation. They saw influence 
over the contents coming from The Home Office, The Audit Comniission, Her Majesty's 
Inspectorate of Constabulary, and locally from the Chief Constable, who was seen as 
having a great deal of influence, being responsible for the production of the draft Annual 
Plan. However they considered that the Pohce Authority did have some influence. 
The sfrength of these influences over the contents of local plans is reflected by front hne 
police officers. However, although they believed that this had lead to greater influence 
being placed upon measured tasks, over forty five percent those officers who were 
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members of the force prior to the introduction of Annual Pohcing Plans believed that this 
had made no difference to the way they carried out their day-to-day work. 
hi terms of these two generic pohcy areas, the issue of 'management level' and 'street 
level' control over local pohcing remains. The former pohcy network concemed with 
plans, targets and achieving performance indicators for the benefit of the Chief Constable, 
the Local Pohce Authority and Central Government, and the latter concemed with keeping 
up with local demands and satisfying the 'consumer with a cause'. 
Therefore, considering the resource imphcations of producing the Force Charter and 
Annual Perfonnance Plans; the requirements to pubhsh reports giving details of 
performance against complex and varied lists of perfonnance indicators; the limited affect 
it has on front line service providers; and the interest shown by local communities; then the 
value of these documents, at the local level, is questionable. Although they may have 
improved pohce accountabihty to the pubhc through the publication of perfonnance 
mdicators, there is no evidence to suggest that these pohcy documents have changed the 
power relationship between front line service providers and consumers. 
Domestic violence is the pohcy arena that has produced the most positive comments from 
all levels within the pohce organisation, and one in which the power of the 
victim/consumer has been greatly enhanced, as against that of the service provider, both in 
terms of influence, accountability and confrol. From the examination of pubhshed 
documents and the views of managers, it is clear that the major influences over this pohcy 
area come from: pubhc opinion; Central Government; and Her Majesty's frispectorate of 
Constabulary. Front hue staff agreed with this view, but they also believed that the Chief 
Constable had an influence. Interestingly, they felt that they themselves had no influence 
in this pohcy arena. Although discretion was an issue, there was general agreement from 
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all levels of management and from front line staff that it was a pohcy of positive arrest; 
one that was accepted throughout the force, with a stroiig feeling that this was a pohcy area 
that attracted the greatest and most effective top down control over its implementation, 
applied through rules and procedures, enforced through force-wide information technology 
systems. Domestic Violence Units, and the reqmrement to complete 'domestic violence 
report forms'. 
The examination of pubhshed documents in respect of equal opportunities pohcy indicate 
that the major influences came from legislation. The Home Office, and The Audit 
Commission, with the sfrongest influaice coming from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Constabulary. This was reflected by the views of pohce managers, with front line staff 
beheving that this pohcy had improved the position of women, racial minorities, and 
lesbian and homosexual officers withia the force. 
The opinions of managers and front line staff differ regarding the influences over generic 
policy areas, such as the Force Charter and Pohciag Plans: areas that managers see as 
having an influence on the services provided, but which front hne staff perceive to be 
pohcies that have done littie to change then day to day work. Only in pohcy areas such as 
domestic violence, can the power and influence of the key players in the pohcy process be 
seen at the implementation stage; where it has been possible to shorten chains of 
command, thereby ensuring greater top down confrol over pohcy implementation. 
Pohce manages beheved that the present Pohce Authority was much more effective than 
the old style Authority, but beheved that the Chief Constable stiU had considerable 
influence over its day to day decision making processes. This power relationship was 
iUusfrated by the fact that, generally, managers perceived that there were few 
disagreements between the Pohce Authority and the Chief Constable in deciding the 
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contents of the Annual Plan, but the Pohce Authority was able to make minor adjustments 
to the draft document prepared by the pohce. Front line staff, particularly the constables, 
did not see the Pohce Authority as having any poWer or influence dvei: their day-to-day 
work. 
Pohce Authority members beheved that they were more analytical, more critical and more 
fiscally aware, than the old style Authority. However they also acknowledged that the 
Authority could be influenced by the Chief Constable. 
Essentially the power relationship between Police Authority and Chief Constable remains 
unchanged siace the implementation of the Pohce and Magistrates Court Act 1994. One in 
which the power of professional knowledge is likely to ensure that the Chief Constable 
remains in control; where Lukes (1974) 'third dimension of power' allows the Chief 
Constable to shape the views of members of the Pohce Authority, thus avoidmg both overt 
and covert conflict and maintaining the status quo. In fact the situation remains the same 
as it did when Brogden (1977) identified the 'third dunension of power' in his research 
ittto this relationship: fiirthermore control over the agenda of meetings by the Chief 
Constable, the Chairman, and Clerk of the Police Authority, can allow non-decision 
making to occur. 
Managers made it clear that the inspection process carried out by Her Majesty's 
hispectorate of Constabulary is much more rigorous and probing than it was, for example, 
five years ago, with some managers saying that they felt it had become too adversarial. 
However they did beheve that it was possible to deflect or defer recommendations made by 
the Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, and in doing so not affect the relationship 
between the Force and the Inspectorate. However research from Inspection Reports for the 
-Force show that, although it may be possible to defer then recommendations, they are 
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inevitably implemented in due course. It is through Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Constabulary that pressure is apphed ftom Central Government in all its forms; influence 
that has smce been re-enforced by the Local Government Act 1999, that now empowers 
them to inspect local police autiiorities in respect of Best Value (Home OfBce 1999). 
Managers felt that the police service has comphed too readily with recommendations of 
best practice proposed by The Audit Commission, a view that is supported by the 
examination of their reports. They felt that these recommendations should be reviewed and 
only unplemented if they were considered to be of value to the force, but it was essential 
that a constructive argument should be made before they could be discounted. 
The relationship between the Chief Constable and these two bodies is an interesting one in 
that the positional, expert and resource power of the Chief Constable can enable him/her to 
defer or deflect or deny recommendations made by the Audit Commission that ha'she 
thinks are inappropriate or unacceptable to the force. However this power is greatly 
reduced when he/she is dealing recommendations made by his/her peers and equals -
members of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. However the mfluence of these 
two bodies, although present, diminishes in importance until it reaches those on the front­
line, who perceive them to be less influential than, for example, their senior managers. 
With members of the Police Authority and pohce managers believing that the Chief 
Constable has influence over the decision making processes of the Pohce Authority and 
with intemal confrol over pohcy through the conunittee system, then, locally the balance of 
power over pohcy-making hes with the Chief Constable. However this local influence is 
tempered by a perceived increase in the power of Her Majesty's hispectorate of 
Constabulary. With front hne ofiicers believing that there is a greater influence coming 
from local sources, in particular from consumers of pubhc services, but also from their 
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colleagues, immediate supervisors, and local public opinion, then, with the exception of 
domestic violence issues, using the power of professional knowledge and their position as 
'street level bureaucrats' they have the balance of power over the implementation of local 
police practice. 
Despite recent introductions of pohcy initiatives proposing changes in organisational 
structure, partnerships, planning, audits, and performance indicators, very httle has 
changed; other than enhancing the gap between 'street level' and 'managenient level' 
police. The former being accountable at a local level to consumers, pubhc opinion, theh 
colleagues and immediate supervisors and the latter at a central level, to pubhshed 
performance indicators and pohcy documents. In public sector organisations issues of 
accountabihty, control, and influence remain as comphcated as ever; especially in respect 
of pohcing, where the ever presence of continuous pohcy making is an important 
ingredient in the relationship between Central and Local Government pohcy makers, 
policy implementers, local pubhc opinion, consumers with a cause, and other groups that 





1) " ANNUAL POLICING PLAN 
A/ Can you please describe the processes involved in producing the 
Force Annual Plan. 
B/ How much influence do you believe the foUowmg groups shown on 
this card have upon the contents of the Force Aimual Policing Plan. 
CARD: 
0 The Police Authority 
ii) H M Inspectorate of Constabulary 
iii) The Audit Commission 
iv) Home Office Cnculars 
V) ACPO 
vi) The Chief Constable in person 
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally 
involved m the policy making process. 
viii) Police Staff Associations 
ix) Legislation 
X) Public opinion 
PLEASE KEEP THE CARD AS I SHALL RETURN TO IT LATER. 
CI How much freedom are divisional commanders given to produce 
their local annual policing plans. 
D/ From your experience as a member of a divisional Management Team 
can you tell me how the force ensures that members of 'groimd level' staff 
(Inspector rank and below) are conversant with both the Force and the 
divisional Policing Plan. 
E/ How were members of the Special Constabulary involved in the 
formulation of these plans. For example was the Commandant of the 
Force Special Constabulary involved in the policy making 
process. 
2) THE'NEW POLICE AUTHORITY 
A/ From your experience in the policy making process do you 
think that the 'new' Police Authority is: 
i) More analytical than its predecessor. 
ii) More critical in its decision making 
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iii) More aware of the fiscal constraints of effective policing 
B/ Are you aware of any differences of emphasis or disagreements 
between police representatives' arid the Police Authority in deciding the 
contents of the annual policing plan. 
CI How much influence do you thiiik the Chief Constable has over 
members of the police authority in their decision makmg processes 
D/ Are you aware of examples of any such an uifluence either: 
i) Under the previous Tripartite Police Authority system 
or 
ii) Under the present system 
3) ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES TO THE FORCE DIVISIONAL 
. BOUNDARIES AND MANAGEMENT TEAM STRUCTURE. 
AJ How much influence do you believe the groups shown on the card had 
upon this change: 
CARD: 
i) The Police Authority 
ii) Audit Commission 
iv) Home Office Circulars 
V) ACPO 
vi) The Chief Constable in person 
vii) Employee's of the organisation not routinely or normally 
involved in the policy making process. 
viii) Police Staff Associations 
ix) Legislation 
X) Public opinion 
B) Can you please tell me why you think the organisational structure was 
changed. 
CI How was the organisational change implemented. 
D/ Would you describe this as a standard approach to policy 
implementation within the pohce service. 
PROBE Why? 
E/ How do you think the new structure affected communication between: 
The Public and Divisional Commanders, 
Divisional Commanders and Chief Officers, 
and Chief Officers and the public 
PROBE Can you give me any examples to illustrate this. 
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F/ Would you agree that the present organisational structure is one based 
upon a system of 'Basic Conunand Units'. 
G/ Do you consider that further changes are likely to the Force divisional 
structure within the next couple of years. 
PROBE: Why What 
H/ What are your views on the comment that divisions should become 
completely self sufficient to the extent that they are to all intents 
and piuposes agencies of the host force. 
WARD POLICING 
A/ Can you tell me why the Ward Policing System was introduced in 
Plymouth. 
(PROBE: Why Plymouth. Why not elsewhere) 
B/ How is its success to be measured. 
CI Has any interest has been shown in this policy initiative by 
the following groups: 
i) H M Inspectorate of Constabulary 
ii) The Audit Conunission 
iii) ACPO 
iv) Other police forces 
PROBE Can you give me any examples. 
D/ Do you think it likely that this scheme will be introduced to 
other areas 
of the force, or to other police forces. 
PROBE Why? 
E/ Can you please describe the processes involved in deciding a 
new force policy. 
PROBE How is this policy tested. Is it possible for new policy 
to originate from Divisions. 
F/ The Audit Commission report regarding 'effective police patrol' 
makes recommendations regarding the direction and targetmg of 
patrol work. How do you think the force should respond to these 
reconunendations. 
5) THE CITIZENS CHARTER 
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Al Can you tell me what effect the Governments Citizens Charter 
initiative has had upon the Police Service. 
B/ Very briefly how did the force formulate its Charter. 
CI How much influence do you believe that the groups shown on the 
card have upon the content of the Force Charter: 
CARD: 
i) The Police Authority 
ii) H M Inspectorate of Constabulary 
iii) The Audit Commission 
iv) Home Office Circulars 
V) ACPO 
vi) The Chief Constable m person 
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally 
involved in the policy making process. 
viii) Police Staff Associations 
ix) Legislation 
X) Public opinion 
D/ How does the force maintain public interest in its Policing 
Charter. 
E/ Do you believe it is likely that there will be changes to the 
charter, within the next couple of years, for example any of 
the performance indicators. 
F/ From your experience, how does the force ascertain, firstly, 
how much importance that members of Divisional Management 
teams place upon the Force Charter and secondly how much 
importance that members of'grotmd level' staff (eg. Inspector rank 
and below) place upon the Force Charter during their routine 
tours of duty. 
G/ Its been suggestion that there is duplication between the Force 
Charter and the Aimual Policing Plan and that they should be 
merged. What's your view on this? 
6) EQUAL OPPORTUNITIESyHMIC 
Al Can you briefly describe force policy in respect of equal 
opportunities in its broadest sense. 
B/ How much influence do you believe that the groups shown on the 
card have upon force equal opportunities policy: 
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CARD: 
i) The PoHce Authority 
ii) H M hispectorate of Constabulary 
iii) The Audit Commission 
iv) Home OfBce Circulars 
V) ACPO 
vi) The Chief Constable in person 
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally 
involved in the policy making process. 
viii) Police Staff Associations 
ix) Legislation 
X) Public opinion 
CI A recent H.M Inspectors report for the force suggested that 
females v/ere under represented in drug squads. Hov^ did the 
force react to this and do you think anything else should be 
done in respect of female representation m specialist poHce 
squads. 
D/ Is it possible to deflect or defer recommendations made by 
H M Inspectorate of Constabulary, which the force does not 
consider acceptable. If so how would this affect the 
relationship between the force and the Inspectorate. 
PROBE Can you give me any examples of where this has been done. 
El From your experience of HMIC force inspections do you believe 
that the inspection process is more rigorous and probing than 
it was, for example five years ago. 
PROBE Can you give any examples. 
RIGHT, THIS IS THE LAST SECTION NOW: 
7) DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY 
Al Can you briefly describe force policy in respect of domestic 
violence. 
B/ Would you please describe the policy making process in respect 
of domestic violence; for example is it one which has developed 




CI Do you think this is the way in which most pohcing pohcy is 
decided. 
D/ How much influence do you believe that the groups shown on the 
card have upon the pohcy: 
CARD: 
i) The Police Authority 
ii) H M Inspectorate of Constabulary 
iii) The Audit Commission 
iv) Home Office Circulars 
V) ACPO 
vi) The Chief Constable in person 
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally 
involved in the policy making process. 
viii) Police Staff Associations 
ix) Legislation 
X) Public opinion 
E/ How is the effectiveness of force domestic violence policy monitored. 
F/ Should a report from the Audit Conunission indicate a Tsest practice' 
in respect of domestic violence pohcy would the force unplement it as 
a matter of course or can such recommendations be easily discoimted 
if it is considered that they may be ineffective or mappropriate. 
PROBE Can you give me any examples of where this has been done. 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR ANSWERING M Y QUESTION. 
ARE THERE ANY POINTS YOU WOULD LIKE TO M A K E WHICH YOU FEEL 






1. How would you describe your profession or occupation? 
2. Can you please tell me how longyou have been a member of the Police 
Authorily? 
3. Was this before the implementation of the Police & Magistrates Courts Act 
1994? 
4. How do you see the role of the Police Authority? 
5. Do you believe that this role will change. If so, in what way? 
6. Either firorn personal experience, or anecdotally, do you think that today's Police 
Authority is: 
a) more analytical than its predecessor 
b) more critical in its decision making processes 
c) more aware of the fiscal constraints of effective policing 
7. Can you please tell me how the Agendas for Police Authority meetings are 
decided? 
8. Do you think it is possible for the Chief Constable to influence members of 
the Police Authority in their decision making processes. If so, can you give me 
any examples of where this has been done? 
9. How has the Force taken the opportunity to educate members of the Police 
Authority in respect of policing issues which may be useful for them in their 
role, for example in deciding the contents of the Aimual Policing Plan and its 
performance indicators? 
10. In what way do you think any such training might affect the decision making 
processes of the Police Authority and their relationship with 
the Chief Constable? 
11 Could you please describe to me the processes involved in deciding the contents 
of the annual policing plan? 
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12. How much influence do you think that the following groups have upon the contents 
of the Police Authority Annual Policing Plan: 
(USE CARD. PLEASE KEEP IT AS I M A Y RETURN TO IT LATER) 
i) The Police Authority itself 
ii) H M Inspectorate of Constabulary 
iii) The Audit Commission 
iv) The Home OfSce 
V) ACPP 
vi) The Chief Constable in person 
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally 
involved in tbe policy making process. 
viii) Police Staff Associations 
ix) Legislation 
PRESS FOR REASONS 
13. Are you aware of any differences of opinion or disagreements between police 
representatives and members of the Police Authority in deciding the contents of 
the annual pohcing plan? If so can you give me an illustration of this? 
14. How effective do you think the consultative processes is in deciding the contents of 
the aimual policing plan: 
a) for the public 
b) for members of the police organisation not normally or routinely 
involved in the policy making processes but involved in its service provision. 
15. If you were to be given the opportunity to improve these consultative 
processes, what measures would you like to introduce? 
16. Do you consider that the Police Authority and your clerk have enough 
involvement in the drafting, writing and publication of the annual plan, 
including the setting of its performance indicators? WHY? 
17. What are your views on the statement that Home Office National Key 
Objectives restrict local autonomy when it comes to deciding your Police 
Authority Annual Policing Plan? 
18. It has been suggested that there is duplication between the Citizens Charter for 
the Force and the Annual Policing Plan and that they should be merged. What 
are your views on this? 
19. Do you think that it is possible for the force to deflect or defer 
reconunendations made by HMI which the Chief Constable considers are 
inappropriate or unacceptable for the force. If so how do you think this would this 
effect the relationship between the Chief Constable, his senior staff, the Police 
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Authority and the Home Office? 
20. If the Audit Commission should indicate a best practice in respect of a 
particular policy initiative, do you consider that the force should adopt 
it as a matter of course or can it be easily discounted i f it is considered to 
be ineffective or inappropriate for local needs. If so how do you think this 
would effect the relationship between the Chief Constable, the Police 
Authority and the Home Office? 
21. Is your knowledge of the Force Charter, prepared under the Citizen's Charter 
mitiative, sufficient to give yoin view of how the policy was influenced by the 




If YES. HOW much influence the following groups have upon the Force Charter: 
i) The Police Authority itself 
ii) H M Inspectorate of Constabulary 
iii) The Audit Commission 
iv) The Home Office 
V) ACPO 
vi) The Chief Constable in person 
vii) Employees of the organisation not routuiely or normally 
involved in the policy making process. 
viii) Police Staff Associations 
ix) Legislation 
PRESS FOR REASONS 
22. Is your knowledge of Force policy in respect of the organisational structure of the 
force and how it has developed sufficient to give your view of how the pohcy was 




If YES. HOW much influence the following groups have upon the organisational structure 
of the force: 
(Please keep the card as I shall return to it later) 
i) 
ii) 
The Police Authority itself 
H M Inspectorate of Constabulary 
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iii) The Audit Gommission 
iv) the Home Office 
V) ACPO 
vi) The Chief Constable in person 
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally 
involved in the policy making process. 
viii) Pohce Staff Associations 
ix) Legislation 
PRESS FOR REASONS . 
23. Is your knowledge of Force policy in respect of incidents of domestic violence 
sufficient to give your view of how the policy was influenced by the groups shown 




If YES. HOW much uifluence the foUowing groups have upon Force policy in respect of 
domestic violence issues: 
i) The Police Authority itself 
ii) H M Inspectorate of Constabulary 
iii) The Audit Commission 
iv) The Home OfiBce 
V) ACPO 
vi) The Chief Constable in person 
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally 
involved in the policy making process. 
viii) Police Staff Associations 
ix) Legislation 
PRESS FOR REASONS 
24. Is your knowledge of Force pohcy in respect of equal opporhmities sufficient to 




If YES. HOW much influence the foHowing groups have upon Force pohcy in respect of 
equal opportunity issues 
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i) • The Pohce Authority itself. 
ii) H M hispectorate of Constabulary ' 
iii) The Audit Comniission 
iv) The Home Ofiace 
V) ACPO 
vi) The Chief Constable in person 
vii) Employees of the organisation not routinely or normally 
involved in the policy making process. 
viii) Police Staff Associations 
ix) Legislation 
PRESS FOR REASONS 
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APPENDIX C 
TEMPLATE ANALYSIS CODE FRAME 
Used for responses to questions to police managers which produced a qualitative 
response, other than a quantitative yes or nofrased answer. 
Annual Policing Plans 
Processes - Top Corridor: 
1) Consultation 
2) Police Authority Plan written by the police 
3) National Key Objectives 
Processes - Divisional Managers: 
1) Consultation 
2) National Key Objectives 
3) To Down Approach 
4) Police Authority Plan written by the police 
Processes - Ground Level Managers: 
1) National Key Objectives 
2) Consultation 
3) Top Down approach 
4) Police Authority Plan written by the pohce 
Influences - Top Corridor: 
1) Chief Constable 
2) H.M.I 
3) Legislation 
Influences - Divisional Managers: 
1) Chief Constable 
2) H.M.I 
3) Home Office 
Influences - Ground Level Managers: 
1) Audit Conunission 
2) Home Office 
3) Pubhc opinion & Police Authority 




Conversant mth. plan - Top Corridor: 
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1) Knowledge of Divisional Plan means knowledge of Police 
Authority Plan 
2) Through Divisional Meetings 
3) hitemal Inspection process 
4) Performance Indicators 
Conversant with plan - Divisional Managers: 
1) Divisional Meetings 
2) Aide Memoirs 
3) Consultation 
4) Performance Indicators . 
Conversant vdth plan - Groimd Level Managers: 
1) Aid Memoirs 
2) Performance Indicators 
3) Divisional Meetings 
Organisational changes 
Influence on Change - Top Corridor Managers: 
1) Chief Constable 
2) H.M.I 
3) Audit Commission 
Influence on Change - Divisional Managers: 
1) Audit Commission 
2) H.M.I 
3) Chief Constable 
Influence on Change - Ground Level Managers: 
1) Audit Conunission & Chief Constable 
2) Home Office 
Why the Changes 
Al l Managers: 
1) Reduce Management costs 
2) Co-terminus with council boundaries 
3) Flatten the Organisation 
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How change implemented: 
Al l Managers: 
1) Special project team 
2) Top down approach 
Communication: 
Al l Managers: 
1) Poor intemal conununication (eg. H Q to Divisions) 
2) Better conununication with local coramimities 
Ward Policing - Why Plymouth: 
Al l Managers: 
1) Fitted Plymouth 
2) Driven by local police commander at the time 
Measuring success of Ward Policing: 
Al l Managers: 
1) Public satisfaction 
2) Performance indicators 
The processes used to decide force policy: 
Al l Managers: 
1) Through Policy Committees 
2) From anyone in Division 
The Citizen's Charter 
Top Corridor Managers: 
1) Improved services 
2) Positive impact 
Divisional Managers: 
1) Improved services 
2) Positive impact 
3) Little effect 
Groimd Level Managers: 
1) Made people more aware of their right to services 
2) Made pohce more accountable 
3) Improved services 
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Influence on contents of Force Charter. 
Top Corridor Managers: 
1) Chief Constable 
2) Audit Conunission 
• 3) H.M.I 
Divisional Managers: 
1) H.M.I 
2) Chief Constable 
3) Home Office 
4) Audit Commission 
Ground Level Managers: 
1) H.M.I 
2) Chief Constable 
3) Home Office 
4) Audit Conunission 
Mamtaining public Interest. 
Top Corridor Managers: 
1) Annual results published in local press 
2) Not much pubhc interest 
Divisional Managers: 
1) Not much public interest 
2) Not done very well 
3) Leaflets 
Ground Level Managers: 
1) Not much public mterest 
2) When things go wrong 
3) Leaflets 
Ensuring importance of Charter to staff. 
Top Corridor Managers: 
1) Influence of performance indicators 
2) Staff meetings 
Divisional Managers: 
1) Influence of perfonnance indicators 
2) Little or no interest maintained 
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• Groimd Level Managers: 
1) Influence of performance indicators 
2) Little or no interest maintained 
Equal opportunities policy. 
How policy is described: 
Top Corridor Managers: 
1) We are an equal opportunities employer 
2) Fairness and equality 
Divisional managers: 
1) Fairness and equality 
2) Not fully implemented 
Ground Level Managers: 
1) Fairness and equality 
2) Not being enforced 
Influence over force policy. 
Top Corridor Managers: 
1) Legislation 
2) H.M.I 
3) Home Office 
Divisional Managers: 
1) H.M.I 
2) Home Office 
3) Chief Constable 
Ground Level Managers: 
1) H.M.I 
2) Home Office 
3) A.C.P.0 
Females in specialist squads. 
Top Corridor managers: 
1) Positive recruitment 
2) Canvassing females 
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Divisional Managers 
1) Positive recruitment 
2) Canvassing females 
Ground Level Managers 
1) Positive recruitment 
2) On merit 
Domestic Violence Policv. 
Description of force policy 
Al l Managers 
1) Positive arrest/positive action 
2) Positive support to victims 
Policy Process. 
Al l managers: 
1) Extemal pressure 
2) Home Office 
Influence on force policy. 
How monitored. 
Top Corridor Managers: 
1) Home Office 
2) Public opinion 
3) A.C.P.0 
Divisional Managers: 
1) Public Opinion 
2) H.M.I 
3) Home Office 
Ground Level Managers: 
1) Public Opinion 
2) Home Office 
3) H.M.I 
Top Corridor Managers: 
1) Supervision of staff by computer and D.V.U Staff 
2) Case referrals 
Divisional Managers 
328 
1) Case referrals 
2) Supervision of staff by computer and D.V.U Staff 
3) More recorded incidents 
Ground level staff 
1) Supervision of staff by computer and D.V.tJ staff 
2) More recorded incidents , 





POLICY AND PRACTICE 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
CONFIDENTIAL 
The foUowmg questions concem your views on how various people, groups, 
organisations and legal requirements mfluence local policmg policy and practice. 
For each question please place a circle around the number of the answer that 
you consider to be the nearest to your opimon. (These numbers are for coding 
purposes only). 
The first section relates to your local Policing Plan for Plymouth: 
1) How influential do you think the following are in deciding the contents of 
your Plymouth Annual Policing Plan. 
Very 
Influential 







1 2 3 4 
Constables, 
sergeants and 
unsworn staff at 
Area level 
1 2 3 4 
Local Public 
Opinion 
1 2 3 4 
The Chief 




1 2 3 4 
Your Area 









2) How important do you think it is for local public opinion to influence what 
the police actually do? 
Very important Important Unimportant Very Unimportant 
1 2 3 4 






Un-informed Very un-informed 
1 2 3 4 
4) How much influence does the Plymouth Annual Policing Plan haye on the 
way you carry out your work? 
A great influence Some influence Very Little 
influence 
No influence 
1 2 3 4 
5) How much importance do you personally place upon the Plymouth Annual 
Policing Plan during the normal coiurse of your work? 
A great deal of 
importance 
Some importance Little importance No importance 
1 2 3 4 
6) Were you a member of the force before the introduction of annual Pohcing 
Plans prior to 1995? 
Yes 1 Please go to question 7 
No 2 Please go to question 8 
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7) How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Agree strongly Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 









the police do 





the quality of 
service 




















the police do 






























This section relates to your views on the organisational structure of the 
Devon & Cornwall Constabulary. 
OFFICE USE 
ONLY 
8) The present stracture of the force, consisting of Areas and Districts, was the 
latest of a niunber of recent changes to the force stracture. How influencial do 
you think the following have been upon these changes? 
Very 
influential 







and unsworn staff at 
Area & District Level 
Views of local people 
The Chief Constable 
Members of the Special 
Constabulary 
Senior managers (Supt. 
and above and 
equivalent unsworn 
ranks). 
The Association of 
Chief Police Officers 
The Audit Commission 
The Police Authority 
H.M.I.C 
The Home Office/ 
Central Government 

















structure of the 
force is one of 
Basic Command 
Units 
1 2 3 4 5 
The Ward Policing 
system as used in 
Plymouth can be 
utilised in any 
police area (rural 
or urban). 
1 2 3 4 5 
10) How effective do you think Ward Policing is as a means of combining a 
desire for iimnediate response policing with that of the idea of commimity 
pohcing? 
Very Effective 1 
Effective 2 
No opinion 3 
Ineffective 4 















The next section concerns the effects of the Citizens' Charter on your work. OFFICE USE 
ONLY 
13) Were you a member of the Devon & Comwall Constabulary prior to the 
introduction of the Force Policmg Charter ('Our Commitment to you ' etc) 
prior to 1993? 
Yes 1 Please go to Question 14 
No 2 Please go to Question 15 
14) Considering the services provided before the introduction of the Force 
Policing Charter and its accompanying performance indicators, vwth the service 
provided after its introduction, please indicate how far you agree or disagree with 
the following statements 
Agree 
strongly 







awareness of the 
services 
provided by the 
police 












available to me 
in my work 
1 2 3 4 5 
The Force 
Charter made 
no difference to 
the way I carry 
out my work 
,1 2 3 4 5 
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This section will focus on force equal opportunities policy. 
15) Please indicate how mfluential you think the following are upon force 










and unsworn staff at 
Area and District level 
2 3 4 
The views of local 
people 
2 3 4 
The Ghief Constable 2 3 4 
Members of the 
Special Constabulary 
2 3 4 
Senior managers 
(Supt. and above and 
equivalent unsworn 
rsmks) 
2 3 4 
The Association of 
Ghief Police Officers 
2 3 4 
The Audit 
Commission 
2 3 4 
The Police Authority 2 3 4 
H.M.I.C. 2 3 4 
The Home Office 2 3 4 





16) How important do you think it is that the force should ensure that female 
staff are not imder-represented in aU specialist posts? 
OFFICE USE 
ONLY 
Very important Important Un-important. Very un­
important 
1 2 3 4 
Comments. 
17) With regard to the.Force Equal Opportunities policy, how do you think it 
has affected the situation for the following groups in the force: 
1 Women 
Improved Made Worse No change Don't know 
1 2 3 4 
1 Members of racial & ethnic 
1 minority groups 
Improved Made Worse No change Don't know 
1 1 2 3 4 
Lesbians 
& homosexuals.. Improved Made Worse No change 
Don't know 




This section concerns force policy in respect of domestic violence issues. 
18) Please indicate how^  much influence you think the following have upon 
force pohcy in respect of domestic violence issues. 
Very 
influential 






unsworn staff at 
Area & District 
level 
2 3 4 
Public opinion 2 3 4 
The Chief 
Constable 
2 3 4 
Senior managers 
(Supt & above and 
equivalent unsworn 
ranks) 
2 3 4 




2 3 4 
The Police 
Authority 
2 3 4 
H.M.I.C 2 3 4 
HomeOffipe/ 
Central Govt 
2 3 4 





19) How do you.think force policy has changed police working practice in 




20) How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? 
"Force pohcy in respect of domestic violence issues detrimentally restricts 
officers' discretion as to how they deal with these types of incidents." 
Agree strongly 1 
Agree 2 
Disagree 3 
Disagree strongly 4 
Don't know 5 
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The last section deals with general issues of policy and practice. 
21) What is the likelyhood of .Constables, Sergeants or Unsworn Staff at Area/ 
District level initiating force policv ? 
OFFICE USE 
ONLY 
Very likely Likely Not very Unlikely Very unlikely 
likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
22) How strongly do you agree or disagree with the foUowing statement? 
"Pohce policy should reflect public opinion not direct it." 
Agree Agree Disagree Neither agree Disagree 
strongly nor disagree strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 
23) During the course of your normal working day within the force, how much 
influence do you think the following have upon what you actually do? 










1 2 3 4 
Your immediate 
supervisors 1 2 3 4 
Members of your 
AreaMangement 
Team 
1 2 3 4 
Consumers of 
police services (i.e 
victims, witnesses 
or offenders). 
1 2 3 4 
Views of local 
people (Not victims, 
witnesses or 
offenders). 
1 2 3 4 
The Chief 
Constable 
1 2 3 4 
A.C.P.0 1 2 3 4 
The Audit 
Commission 
1 2 3 4 
The Police 
Authority 
1 2 3 4 
HM.I.C 1 2 3 4 
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Question 23 continued. 
OFFICE USE 
ONLY 
















the Crime &' 
Disorder Act 
1998. 





Finally would you please complete the last section about yourself. Once again 
circling the appropriate category number. 
24) How long have you been a member of the Devon «fe Comwall 
Constabulary? 
5 years or less 1 
Over 5 and under 10 years 2 
10 years and under 15 years 3 
15 years and under 25 years 4 
25 years and over 5 
(92) 
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25) How long have you worked in the Plymouth Division/Area 2 during your 
the police career in 
service? 
26) What is your age? 
27) What is your gender? 
OFFICE USE 
ONLY 
Under 2 years 1 : 
2 years and under 5 years 2 
5 years and under 10 yiears 3 
10 years and over 4 
20 years or under 1 
21 to 30 years 2 
31 to 40 years 3 
41 to 55 years 4 






28) What is your role? 
Ward Sergeant 1 
Response Sergeant 2 
Ward Constable 3 
Response Constable 4 
Other (Please specify) 5 
(96) 
rhank you for your time and I reassure you that your views are confidential 
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